1. Risk Assessment & Management
Health & Safety Management for Quarries Topic Five
Risk Assessment & Management

2. Objectives of this Section
Introduce the concept of risk assessment and risk management and its role within UK health and safety legislation.
To define the principle components of risk management.
To outline advanced risk assessment methodologies for use in QRA’s.
To outline a practical risk assessment process.

3. Principals of Risk Management
Risk management can be defined as:
The eradication or minimisation of the adverse affects of risks to which an organisation is exposed.

4. Stages in Risk Management
Identifying the hazards.
Evaluating the associated risks.
Controlling the risks.

6. Regulation 3(1) of the ‘Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992 states:-
‘Every Employer shall make a suitable and efficient assessment of:-
a) The risks to the health and safety of his employees to which they are exposed whilst they are at work.
b) The risks to the health and safety of persons not in his employment arising out of or in connection with the conduct by him or his undertaking;
For the purpose of identifying the measures he needs to take to comply with the requirements and prohibitions imposed on him by or under the relevant statutory provisions.’

7. Risk assessment can be a
‘very straightforward process based on judgement requiring no specialist skills or complicated techniques.’
This approach is commonly known as qualitative or subjective risk assessment.

8. Major Hazards
Major hazards associated with complex chemical or nuclear plants, may ‘warrant the need of such techniques as Quantitative Risk Assessment’.
In Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) a numerical estimate is made of the probability that a defined harm will result from the occurrence of a particular event.

9. The Risk Management Process
Hazard Identification
Hazard :
The potential to cause harm. Harm including ill health and injury, damage to property, plant, products or the environment, production losses or increased liabilities.

10. Hazard Identification
Comparative Methods. e.g. checklists and audits.
Fundamental Methods: e.g. Deviation Analysis, Hazard and Operability Studies, Energy Analysis, Failure Modes & Effects Analysis.
Failure Logic: e.g. Fault Trees, Event Trees & Cause- Consequence diagrams

11. Assessing the Risks Risk:
The likelihood that a specified undesired event will occur due to the realisation of a hazard by, or during work activities or by the products and services created by work activities.

12. Quantitative risk assessment
Assessing the Risks
Quantitative risk assessment
Commonly used in the high technology industries
QRA tends to deal with the avoidance of low probability events with serious consequences to the plant and the surrounding environment.

13. Assessing the Risks Subjective risk assessment
Qualitative risk assessment involves making a formal judgement on the consequence and probability using:
Risk = Severity x Likelihood

14. Assessing the Risks Example:
The likely effect of a hazard may for example be rated:
1.   Major
Death or major injury or illness causing long term disability
2.   Serious
Injuries or illness causing short-term disability
3.   Slight
All other injuries or illnesses 

15. Assessing the Risks The likelihood of harm may be rated 1. High
1.   High
Where it is certain that harm will occur
2.   Medium
Where harm will often occur
3.   Low
Where harm will seldom occur

16. Likelihood of occurrence
Assessing the Risks
Risk =
Severity of Harm x
Likelihood of occurrence
This simple computation gives a risk value of between 1 and 9 enabling a rough and ready comparison of risks.
In this case the lower the number, the greater the risk, and so prioritises the hazards so that control action can be targeted at higher risks.

17. Controlling Risk
Risk Avoidance – This strategy involves a conscious decision on the part of the organisation to avoid completely a particular risk by discontinuing the operation producing the risk e.g. the replacing a hazardous chemical by one with less or no risk potential.
Risk Retention – The risk is retained in the organisation where any consequent loss is financed by the company. There are two aspects to consider here, risk retention with knowledge and risk retention without knowledge.

18. Controlling Risk
Risk Transfer – This refers to the legal assignment of the costs of certain potential losses from one party to another. The most common way is by insurance.
Risk Reduction – Here the risks are systematically reduced through control measures, according to the hierarchy of risk control described in earlier sections.

19. ALARP
Legislation requires employers to reduce risks to a level that is as low as is reasonably practicable (sometimes abbreviated as ALARP).
To carry out a duty so far as is reasonably practicable means that the degree of risk in a particular activity or environment can be balanced against the time, trouble, cost and physical difficulty of taking measures to avoid the risk.

20. Types of Risk Assessment
Within Industry, three types of risk assessment can be distinguished:
Assessments of large scale complex hazard sites, such as those found in the process and nuclear industries. These require QRA’s
General assessments of the complete range of workplace risks – as required under the Management of Health & Safety at Work Regulations, 1999.
Risk Assessments required under specific legislation – for example for hazardous substances (COSHH Regulations, 1998), Manual Handling (Manual Handling Operations Regulations, 1992).

21. Advanced Risk Assessment Techniques
Quantitative Risk Assessment
QRA is most commonly used in the process industries to quantify the risks of ‘major hazards’.
QRA used in the offshore oil and gas industries, the transport of hazardous materials, the protection of the environment, mass transportation (rail) and the nuclear industry.

22. Quantitative Risk Assessment (1)
Individual Risk is defined as ‘the frequency at which an individual may be expected to sustain a given level of harm from the realisation of specific hazards’.
Societal Risk

23. Usually expressed as risk contours:

24. Quantitative Risk Assessment: Acceptance Criteria
The HSE state that ‘broadly, a risk of death of 1 in 1000 (1x10 -3) per annum is about the most that is ordinarily accepted under modern conditions for workers in the UK and it seems to be the dividing line between what is tolerable and what is intolerable’.

25. Failure Modes and Effect Analysis
The system is divided into sub systems that can be handled effectively.
It involves:
Identification of the component and parent system.
Failure mode and cause of failure.
Effect of the failure on the subsystem or system.
Method of detection and diagnostic aids available.

26. Failure Modes and Effect Analysis
A typical format:
Component
Function
Failure Mode
Failure Rate
Failure Effect
Criticality
Detection Method
Preventative Measures

27. Failure Modes and Effect Analysis
For each component’s functions, every conceivable mode of failure is identified and recorded.
It is also common to rate the failure rate for each failure mode identified.
The potential consequences for each failure must be identified along with its effects on other equipment, components within the rest of the system.
It is then necessary to record preventative measures that are in place or may be introduced to correct the failure, reduce its failure rate or provide some adequate form of detection.

28. Hazard & Operability Studies
Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) have been used for many years as a formal means for the review of chemical process designs.
A HAZOP study is a systematic search for hazards which are defined as deviations within these parameters that may have dangerous consequences.
In the process industry, these deviations concern process parameters such as flow, temperature, pressure etc.

29. Hazard & Operability Studies
HAZOP is a team approach, involving a team of people representing all different functions in a plant.
They identify all the deviations by ‘brain-storming’ to a set of guide words which are applied to all parts of the system.

30. Hazard & Operability Studies
The process is as follows:
The system is divided into suitable parts or sub-systems, which are then analysed one at a time.
For each sub-system each parameter (flow, temperature, pressure, volume, viscosity etc.) that has an influence on it, is noted.
Guidewords are applied to each parameter in each subsystem. The intention is to prompt creative discussion of deviations and possible consequences
For each significant deviation, possible causes are identified.

31. Hazard & Operability Studies
Guideword
Definitions
NO or NOT
No part of the design intent occurs, such as no flow in a pipeline due to blockage.
MORE or LESS
A quantitative increase or decrease of some parameter, such as flow, temperature etc.
AS WELL AS
All the design intentions are fulfilled and something happens in addition
PART OF
Only part of the design intention is fulfilled
REVERSE
The logical opposite of the design intention occurs
OTHER THAN
Something completely different than attended occurs

32. Hazard & Operability Studies
Example
Consider the simple process diagram below. It represents a plant where substances A and B react with each other to form a new substance C. If there is more B than A there may be an explosion.
Example from Harms Ringdahl L (1995), Safety Analysis: Principals and Practice in Occupational Safety, Elsevier Applied Science.

33. The HAZOP sheet for the section of the plant from A to C will be as follows:
Guide Word
Deviation
Possible Causes
Consequences
Proposed Measures
NO, NOT
No A
Tank containing A is empty.
V1 or V2 closed.
Pump does not work.
Pipe broken
Not enough A = Explosion
Indicator for low level.
Monitoring of flow
MORE
Too much A
Pump too high capacity
Opening of V1 or V2 is too large.
C contaminated by A. Tank overfilled.
Indicator for high level.
LESS
Not enough A
V1,V2 or pipe are partially blocked. Pump gives low flow or runs for too short a time.
See above
AS WELL AS
Other substance
V3 open – air sucked in
Flow monitoring based on weight
REVERSE
Liquid pumped backwards
Wrong connector to motor
A is contaminated
Flow monitoring
OTHER THAN
A boils in pump
Temperature too high
Temperature (and flow) monitoring.
Example from Harms Ringdahl L (1995), Safety Analysis: Principals and Practice in Occupational Safety, Elsevier Applied Science.

34. Fault Tree Analysis
A fault tree is a diagram that displays the logical interrelationship between the basic causes of the hazard.
Fault tree analysis can be simple or complex depending on the system in question. Complex analysis involves the use of Boolean algebra to represent various failure states.

35. Fault Tree Analysis
The first stage is to select the hazard or top event that is to be analysed.
The tree is structured so that the hazard appears at the top. It is then necessary to work downwards, firstly by identifying causes that directly contribute to this hazard.
When all the causes and sub-causes have been identified, the next stage is to construct the fault tree.

36. Fault Tree Analysis Symbol Designation Function EVENT / CAUSE
Causes or events that can be developed further
BASIC EVENT/CAUSE
Basic or Root Causes or events that cannot be developed further
UNDEVELOPED EVENT/CAUSE
Causes are not developed due to lack of information or significance.
AND gate
Output event occurs only if all input events occur
OR gate
Output event occurs if any one of the input events occurs

37. Fault Tree Analysis Example
Consider the simple circuit diagram shown below:
Example from Harms Ringdahl L (1995), Safety Analysis: Principals and Practice in Occupational Safety, Elsevier Applied Science.

38. Fault Tree Analysis
The corresponding fault tree for the above circuit, with the top event (or hazard) being the lamp not working is as follows:
Example from Harms Ringdahl L (1995), Safety Analysis: Principals and Practice in Occupational Safety, Elsevier Applied Science.

39. Practical Risk Assessment (from BS8800)

40. Classify Work Activities
Possible ways of classifying work activities include:
Geographical areas within/outside the organisation's premises.
Stages in the production process, or in the provision of a service.
Planned and reactive work.
Defined tasks (e.g. driving).
BS8800:1996

41. Identify Hazards Broad categories of hazard
To help with the process of identifying hazards it is useful to categorise hazards in different ways, for example by topic, e.g.:
Mechanical.
Electrical.
Radiation.
Substances.
Fire and explosion.
BS8800:1996

42. Hazards prompt-list
During work activities could the following hazards exist?
Slips/falls on the level.
Falls of persons form heights.
Falls of tools, materials, etc., from heights.
Inadequate headroom.
Hazards associated with manual lifting/handling of tools, materials, etc..
Hazards from plant and machinery associated with assembly, commissioning, operation, maintenance, modification, repair and dismantling.
BS8800:1996

43. Hazards prompt-list
Vehicle hazards, covering both site transport, and travel by road.
Fire and explosion.
Violence to staff.
Substances that may be inhaled.
Substances or agents that may damage the eye.
Substances that may cause harm by coming into contact with, or being absorbed through, the skin.
Substances that may cause harm by being ingested (i.e., entering the body via the mouth).
Harmful energies (e.g., electricity, radiation, noise, vibration).
BS8800:1996

44. Hazards prompt-list
Work-related upper limb disorders resulting from frequently repeated tasks.
Inadequate thermal environment, e.g. too hot.
Lighting levels.
Slippery, uneven ground/surfaces.
Inadequate guard rails or hand rails on stairs.
Contractors' activities.
BS8800:1996

45. Determine risk
The risk from the hazard should be determined by estimating the potential severity of harm and the likelihood that harm will occur.

46. Severity of harm
Information obtained about work activities is a vital input to risk assessment. When seeking to establish potential severity of harm, the following should also be considered:
Part(s) of the body likely to be affected;
Nature of the harm, ranging from slightly to extremely harmful:
1) Slightly harmful, e.g.:
Superficial injuries; minor cuts and bruises; eye irritation from dust.
Nuisance and irritation (e.g. headaches); ill-health leading to temporary discomfort.
BS8800:1996

47. Severity of harm 2) Harmful, e.g.
Lacerations; burns; concussion; serious sprains; minor fractures.
Deafness; dermatitis; asthma; work related upper limb disorders; ill-health leading to permanent minor disability.
3) Extremely harmful, e.g.
Amputations; major fractures; poisonings; multiple injuries; fatal injuries.
Occupational cancer; other severely life shortening diseases; acute fatal diseases.
BS8800:1996

48. Likelihood of harm
When seeking to establish likelihood of harm the adequacy of control measures already implemented and complied with needs to be considered.
Issues considered:
Number of personnel exposed.
Frequency and duration of exposure to the hazard.
Failure of services e.g. electricity and water.
Failure of plant and machinery components and safety devices.
Exposure to the elements.
BS8800:1996

49. Likelihood of harm
Protection afforded by personal protective equipment and usage rate of personal protective equipment;
Unsafe acts (unintended errors or intentional violations of procedures) by persons, for example, who:
1) May not know what the hazards are.
2) May not have the knowledge, physical capacity, or skills to do the work.
3) Underestimate risks to which they are exposed.
4) Underestimate the practicality and utility of safe working methods.
BS8800:1996

50. Decide if risk is tolerable
One simple method for estimating risk levels and for deciding whether risks are tolerable. Risks are classified according to their estimated likelihood and potential severity of harm.
Slightly harmful
Harmful
Extremely harmful
Highly unlikely
TRIVIAL RISK
TOLERABLE RISK
MODERATE RISK
Unlikely
SUBSTANTIAL RISK
Likely
INTOLERABLE RISK
BS8800:1996

51. Prepare risk control action plan
Risk categories shown form the basis for deciding whether improved controls are required and the timescale for action.
The outcome of a risk assessment should be an inventory of actions, in priority order, to devise, maintain or improve controls.
BS8800:1996

52. A simple risk-based control plan.
RISK LEVEL
ACTION AND TIMESCALE
TRIVIAL
No action is required and no documentary records need to be kept.
TOLERABLE
No additional controls are required. Consideration may be given to a more cost-effective solution or improvement that imposes no additional cost burden. Monitoring is required to ensure that the controls are maintained.
MODERATE
Efforts should be made to reduce the risk, but the costs of prevention should b e carefully measured and limited. Risk reduction measures should be implemented within a defined time period.
Where the moderate risk is associated with extremely harmful consequences, further assessment may be necessary to establish more precisely the likelihood of harm as a basis for determining the need for improved control measures.
SUBSTANTIAL
Work should not be started until the risk has been reduced. Considerable resources may have to be allocated to reduce the risk. Where the risk involves work in progress, urgent action should be taken.
INTOLERABLE
Work should not be started or continued until the risk has been reduced. If it is not possible to reduce risk even with unlimited resources, work has to remain prohibited.
BS8800:1996

53. Prepare risk control action plan
The action plan should be reviewed before implementation, typically by asking:
Will the revised controls lead to tolerable risk levels?
Are new hazards created?
Has the most cost-effective solution been chosen?
What do people affected think about the need for, and practicality of, the revised preventive measures?
Will the revised controls be used in practice, and not ignored in the face of, for example, pressures to get the job done?
BS8800:1996

54. Changing Conditions and Revising
Risk assessment should be seen as a continuing process. Thus, the adequacy of control measures should be subject to continual review and revised if necessary.
BS8800:1996