1. Business Continuity /Disaster Recovery Panel
STA Annual Conference 2006

2. A High Level Summary of the Lessons Learned from Hurricane Wilma by
Franklin Templeton Investments
Wayne Behrens
Director
Business Continuity Planning
Prepared for the
Securities Transfer Assocation
Amelia Island Meeting on Oct 20, 2006

3. Wilma Agenda Franklin Templeton Investments Who was Wilma
Impact of Wilma
What Went Right
Crisis Management Lessons
Business Continuity Lessons
Technology Lessons
Facility Lessons

4. Franklin Templeton Investments
Parent: Franklin Resources Inc.
Approx 500 Billion in Assets Under Management
Major Brands
Franklin
Templeton
Mutual Series
Fiduciary Trust
Darby Overseas
Bisset (Canada)
Employees: Approx 8,000 in 29 countries. In the Florida Area:
St. Petersburg (1,200+)
Ft. Lauderdale (466)
Nassau (49)
Miami (16)

5. Who the Heck was Wilma?
Hurricane Wilma is the lesser known cousin of Katrina. However, Wilma was the most intense hurricane ever recorded in the Atlantic basin. It devastated parts of the Yucatán Peninsula as well as southern Florida.
There were 62 deaths attributed to Wilma and damage is estimated at $12.2 billion in the U.S., making Wilma the sixth costliest storm in U.S history.
When Wilma reached Ft. Lauderdale, she was a category 2 hurricane with sustained winds of 110 mph to 130 MPH.

6. Impact of Wilma on Franklin
Wilma reached Ft. Lauderdale early Monday morning, October 24th. By Monday afternoon, we had received preliminary damage assessments indicating that hundreds of windows primarily on the north west section of the building were blown out.
We were unable to occupy the building from October 24 through November 18.
No loss of life and no injuries to employees. Some damage to a few employee’s homes. Many employee’s homes were without power for days or weeks.
500 employees were impacted, with over 230 being relocated to other sites: Toronto, St. Petersburg, Miami, New York, Short Hills, San Mateo, and Rancho Cordova.   

7. What Went Right
In general, our Crisis Management, Business Continuity and Technology Disaster Recovery plans worked well.
Wilma caused virtually no disruption to our customers.
The Ft. Lauderdale Emergency Management Team took charge of the situation in Ft. Lauderdale.
All business units were able to follow their business continuity plans and recover their operations.
Technology operations were restored to include two critical applications.

8. Crisis Management Lessons
When the local Emergency Management Teams (EMT’s) are in the midst of the incident and working literally in the dark, they do not always have the ability to fully coordinate the recovery of business operations away from the site.
Each of the major roles in our crisis management teams need to have a specific checklist.
We need to put in place a pre-plan to track and deal immediately with the relocation of employees to other sites.
You cannot over communicate. Despite the fact that we tried very hard to be proactive on communicating to our employees, we still heard a number of complaints in this area.

9. Business Continuity Lessons
Over 40 laptops were left in the FTL office when the hurricane hit. There had been so many hurricane threats during the year that many employees did not feel that Wilma would really hit or cause this much damage if it did.
The standard for Business Continuity Plans needs to be expanded to address a month long outage:
Shifting work to alternate sites for the first 3-5 days without moving employees
Plan for an incident to last over a month to include a month end
A number of issues arose in regards to employees:
Pay during the outage
Childcare and school closures
Bonus for extraordinary efforts
Relocation of children & elders

10. Technology Lessons Learned
We were surprised by the number of business units that still relied upon hard copies of faxed documents to stand alone fax machine. We have worked on a better process and documentation of FAX rerouting requirements.
Better written procedures for forwarding 800 numbers.
There is a desire from the business for a better disaster recovery solution for and Blackberry servers.
Environmental monitoring of server rooms needs to be tied into a central control point to insure it is remotely accessible.

11. Facilities Lessons Learned
We should have drilled more rigorously on damage assessments. For the first couple of days, the damage assessments were verbal and led us to believe the damage was much more extensive than it was. It turned out only 15% to 20% of the work areas were damaged.
Conversely, our repair and re-occupancy time estimates were wildly optimistic.
Based on initial reports, we planned for a week long disruption. We were out for almost a month.
Need to have working knowledge prior to the incident of what local agencies will require to re-occupy a building.
Keep in mind the fire marshal and the building inspectors are not always in sync.

12. Questions? Wilma Closing
In the end it was the knowledge, flexibility and perseverance of our people who really carried the day and made the recovery a success.
Questions?

13. Franklin’s Approach to Planning for a Pandemic

14. Pandemic Agenda Goal of this presentation Likelihood of a Pandemic
Basic Business Continuity Strategy
Why plan
How will a pandemic differ
Basic elements of our plan
Crisis Management
Business Continuity Planning
Technology
General Services
Human Relations
Corporate Communications
What our plan does not cover

15. Pandemic Background
1. Goal: To provide an overview of Franklin’s current approach and thinking in regards to planning for a possible Pandemic.
2. Likelihood of a pandemic occurring: The question is more like earthquakes in California. It is not a question of if, but rather when and how bad. Some data points such as the 1918, 1957 & 1968 pandemics and SAR’s. But, no good data on frequency or severity.
3. Strategy: Our basic disaster planning strategy is to shift our operations to other sites for 3 to 5 days, after which we will then need to start to shift people to alternate sites. However, this will not work in a pandemic situation.

16. Pandemic Background (Continued)
4. Why plan if civilization is going to collapse:
We used a “reasonable worst case scenario”. A scenario which we think is likely to occur. This is not a worst case scenario which anticipates the general breakdown of society and services.
5. How will a pandemic differ from our “normal incidents:
- Many sites are likely to be impacted
at approximately the same time
- Will not be able to shift people
between sites
Site might be impacted, but not
incapacitated
- Sites affected for months not hours
Affects people directly not facilities or IT.
Employees may choose not to come to work.
No clear beginning or end.

17. Pandemic Plan Outline Our pandemic plan is broken down into:
1. Crisis Management:
- Framework to address a pandemic
- Tabletop exercises
2. Business Continuity Planning:
- Guidance to business units on how to review their business continuity strategies and workflows against a
pandemic type scenario
3. Technology
Steps to reduce the impact of a
pandemic on our data centers
- Increased remote work capabilities
- Reviewing other strategies

18. Pandemic Plan Outline (Continued)
4. General Services
Best practices for employee hygiene program and procedures for facility
managers to follow in the event of a pandemic
5. Human Relations
Global HR policy framework to provide recommendations to local HR
groups to address issues that are likely to arise in a pandemic
6. Corporate Communications
Integrated communication plan
7. Plan Does not currently include:
PPE such as Masks gloves, Etc.
Antiviral Drugs such as Tamiflu
Vaccines

19. Pandemic Closing
Questions?

20. All Disasters are Local: Regionalizing Business Continuity
Securities Transfer Association
2006 Annual Conference
Brian Tishuk
ChicagoFIRST Executive Director
October 20, 2006

21. Critical Infrastructures
Government Services
Transportation
Energy
Critical Infrastructures
Water
Public
Health
Defense Industrial Base
Emergency
Services
Agriculture
Chemical
Industry
Telecommunications
Postal & Shipping
Food
Financial
Services

22. The Financial Sector

23. Federal Financial Partnership
Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure Committee (FBIIC)
(formed January 2002)
Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council (FSSCC)
(formed June 2002)

24. FBIIC FSSCC PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR President’s Working Group
on Financial Markets
Treasury - Lead Agency
(PDD 63)
US Treasury
Assistant Secretary for
Financial Institutions
FBIIC CHAIR
Assistant Secretary for
Financial Institutions
SECTOR LIAISON
Rhonda MacLean
SECTOR COORDINATOR
Financial and Banking Information
Infrastructure Committee
(FBIIC)
US Treasury Department
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Conference of State Bank Supervisors
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Housing Finance Board
Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Homeland Security Council
National Association of Insurance
Commissioners
National Credit Union Administration
New York Federal Reserve Bank
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
Office of Thrift Supervision
Securities and Exchange Commission
Financial Services Sector Coordinating
Council
for CIP/HLS
Financial Services Trade Associations
& Institutes
New York Stock Exchange
The Clearinghouse
FS/ISAC
Securities Industry Automation Corporation
The Options Clearing Corporation
ChicagoFIRST
NASDAQ
AMEX
ASIS

25. Public/Private Partnerships
The Role for Regional
Public/Private Partnerships

26. The Missing Piece
To increase the resilience of financial services in the event of a regional disaster in collaboration with the city, state, and federal agencies.

27. All Disasters are Local
How will that jurisdiction prevent, prepare for, and respond to incidents?
Do your business continuity plans incorporate government response plans?
How can coordination be fostered among jurisdictions?
Regional partnerships can strengthen the business continuity plans of participating firms

28. Regional Partnerships: Formed and Forming
Miami (FloridaFIRST)
San Francisco (BARC FIRST; Bay Area Response Coalition)
Los Angeles (SoCal FIRC; Financial Institutions Recovery Coalition)
Minneapolis (MN-ISAC; MN Security Board)
Tampa Bay Region of FloridaFIRST
HoustonFIRST
PhiladelphiaFIRST
ColumbusFIRST
Alabama Recovery Coalition for the Financial Sector
Chicago (ChicagoFIRST)
Washington, DC
Detroit
Alaska
Seattle
Jacksonville
Las Vegas
New Orleans (still thinking about it)

29. RPC FIRST Fostering Collaboration among Partnerships
ChicagoFIRST leading the formation of a Council
Council would share best practices
Council would help one another with administrative questions
Council can plug into FSSCC
RPC = Regional Partnership Council
FIRST = Financial Industry Resilience, Security, and Teamwork
Formed in early 2006

30. The ChicagoFIRST Approach
(formed May 2003)

31. ChicagoFIRST’s Primary Objectives
Obtain a seat at Chicago's 911 Center in the event of a crisis that affects Chicago's financial community
LaSalle Bank/ABN AMRO
Create permits/passes for essential personnel to safely access business facilities in the event of a general evacuation of the city (credentialing)
Northern Trust Bank
Develop and communicate standard evacuation procedures for industry personnel to exit city limits in the event of a disaster
JP Morgan Chase

32. Members ABN AMRO / LaSalle Bank Allstate Insurance Company Aon
Archipelago
Ariel Capital Management
Bank of America
Chicago Board Options Exchange
Chicago Board of Trade
Chicago Federal Home Loan Bank
Chicago Mercantile Exchange
Chicago Stock Exchange
Fidelity National Financial
Global Electronic Trading Company
Harris Bank
JP Morgan Chase
Man Financial
Mesirow Financial
Mizuho Securities USA
Northern Trust
The Options Clearing Corporation
PrivateBank and Trust
UBS
Washington Mutual
William Blair & Company

33. Strategic Partners (pg. 1 of 2)
Chicago Office of Emergency Management and Communications
Chicago Police Department
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
FBI / InfraGard
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure Committee
Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center
Financial Services Roundtable / BITS
Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council
Futures Industry Association

34. Strategic Partners (pg. 2 of 2)
Great Lakes Partnership
Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation
Illinois Emergency Management Agency
Illinois State Police
Illinois Terrorism Task Force
National Futures Association
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Securities and Exchange Commission
Securities Industry Association
United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois
United States Department of Homeland Security
United States Department of the Treasury
United States Secret Service

35. Achieving Our Goals

36. Formal 911 Center Seat Obtained seat at 911 Center in fall 2003
Primarily for government agencies
May use seat when Center is activated
Enhancements to seat at emergency operations center
Set of individuals to staff the seat (with Chicago Fed help)
Handbook with protocols for using the seat, activating our crisis communicator, and contact information
Private component of web site created and configured to provide a message board for posting and recording critical information
Information about the membership, including critical locations and essential employees, on the computer at the seat

37. Informal Information Sharing
Seat at 911 Center will be used rarely
But the relationships with the city and state are invaluable
Spring 2004 information about leaning transmission tower
August 1, 2004 threats against financial institutions
LaSalle Bank fire, December 2004

38. Credentialing and Evacuations
Discovered city and state each seeking credentialing systems, but not coordinating
City adopted credentialing pilot in which ChicagoFIRST participates
Evacuations
Illinois Department of Transportation tabletops in 2004, 2005, and 2006
September 7, 2006 evacuation drill in the Loop

39. Additional Achievements

40. Working Groups Security Working Group
Coordinating training needs and opportunities
Coordinating physical security and options
Piloted NC4 Situation Awareness Service
Power Working Group
Understanding electricity in multi-tenant buildings
Sharing ComEd information among members

41. Working Groups Telecommunications Working Group Educating membership
GETS
TSP
SBC call forwarding
Surviving a central office failure
TeleContinuity
LEMKO
Sprint IP network

42. Working Groups Pandemic Planning Working Group
Free exchange of HR, legal, & BCP information, without NDAs
Coordinating with state and local health departments
Coordinating with sector-wide efforts
Evaluating hiring a public health advisor for ChicagoFIRST
Tabletop scheduled for November 2, 2006

43. Working Groups Public Relations Working Group
Single point of contact for the media
Firms leverage membership with press
ChicagoFIRST increases media understanding
Crisis Communications Working Group
Quarterly tests of the 911 Center procedures
Quarterly tests of Dialogic (notification data)
Quarterly tests of TeleContinuity and GETS

44. 2004 Milestones
Testified before House Financial Services Committee on ChicagoFIRST as a partnership
9/11 Commission legislation identifies ChicagoFIRST as a model
GAO Report on Financial Market Preparedness praises ChicagoFIRST
Treasury handbook identifies ChicagoFIRST as model
Tabletop on city’s response to Chicago financial community

45. 2005 Milestones Tabletop focused on futures and options markets
Public television features ChicagoFIRST
Fund Illinois Terrorism Task Force (ITTF) video for the citizens of Illinois
Co-chair Private Sector Committee of the ITTF

46. 2006 Activities Mutual aid among the members
Credentialing critical supplies like cash
Evacuation drill
City of Chicago camera program
Provided testimony on pandemic preparedness to the House Financial Services Committee

47. ChicagoFIRST Model Works
The model is the partnership approach, not the goals or organization of ChicagoFIRST
FloridaFIRST covers the entire state, with several regions
BARC FIRST and SoCal FIRC split California
MN-ISAC has Target, Best Buy, 3M as members
Leverage partnership to encourage public sector information sharing and improvements
Seats in EOCs
Credentialing
Access protocols for critical supplies

48. The Value Proposition LaSalle Bank fire Mizuho futures
Cooperation vs. competition on employee safety and business continuity (mutual aid established after the fire)
Government appreciates single point of contact
NC4 and TeleContinuity

49. Contact Information
Brian Tishuk
Executive Director
ChicagoFIRST