1. Integrated Approach to Nuclear Security and Safeguards
Dr. Sukesh Aghara
Director, Integrated Nuclear Security and Safeguards
University of Massachusetts Lowell

2. Prof. Sukesh Aghara – UMass - Lowell
Ph. D. Nuclear Engineering - University of Texas, Austin, 2003
Experience
2014 – p: Director, Integrated Nuclear Security and Safeguards Laboratory (INSSL)
2013 – p: Director, Nuclear Energy Education Training (NEET)
2010 – 12: Director, NSF Center for Energy and Environmental Sustainability (CEES)
2007 – 09: NASA Administrator’s Fellow, Langley Research Center
2004 – 12: Associate Professor, Texas A&M University, Prairie View
Teaching & Training
Radiation transport, Radiation Shielding, Nuclear Fuel Cycles, Nuclear Energy Policy, Nuclear Security
Research
Nuclear analytical techniques, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Safeguards, Space Radiation
Associate Professor, Nuclear Engineering
Web:
Ph:
Prof. S. K. Aghara

3. Source: World Nuclear Association
Global Nuclear Energy
Prof. S. K. Aghara
Nuclear power provides 16% of the world's electricity
Globally there are 430 reactors in 31 countries
US – 19 %
UK – 18%
France – 78%
Germany – 17%
Canada – 15%
Russia – 17%
S. Korea – 35%
Japan – 18%
China – 2%
India – 3.6%
Country
Operating Reactor
New Construction
USA
104 4
Russia 33 10
France 58 1
China 17 30
India 18 7
Vogtle Units 1&2
Source: World Nuclear Association
Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Safety are more important than ever

4. Global Adaption of Nuclear Energy
Safety
Security
Safeguards
Economics

5. Q: Do you recognize this weapon design?
Post war Little Boy model
Who can tell me what type of fissile material was used in this weapon?

6. Q: What type of fissile material was used in “Little boy”?
Post war Little Boy model
Who can tell me what type of fissile material was used in this weapon?

7. Safeguards objective
Provide the international community with credible assurances about the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear material and facilities, through objective and independent verification that States are honouring their safeguards obligations.

8. IAEA Safeguards - Milestones
1950s-1960s: as nations started to trade in nuclear plants and fuel the IAEA safeguards system was established to ensure that this did not lead to the spread of nuclear weapons
INFCIRC/66
: following the signing of the NPT, the IAEA was tasked to apply safeguards on all the nuclear material in the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS)
INFCIRC/153
1991-present: came about due to the clandestine nuclear weapon program in Iraq, problems in applying safeguards in the DPRK, and the experience gained in verifying the denuclearization of South Africa. Additional Protocol (AP) was first adopted in 1997
INFCIRC/540
Prof. S. K. Aghara

9. Path to Nuclear Weapons – Build One
Mining
Milling
Conversion
Enrichment
Nuclear Power
Nuclear Weapons
Reprocessing
Prof. S. K. Aghara

10. Purse a Nuclear Weapons Program
Need fissile material
How much?
Design
Ease and size
Resources
Industrial capabilities
Reflectors, igniters
Humans
Finance
Delivery
Simple, crude
Prof. S. K. Aghara

11. Significant Quantity (SQ) - Timeliness
Material
Significant Quantity (SQ)
Timeliness
U (235U < 20%)
75 kg 235U
or 10 t natural U
or 20 t depleted U
1 year
235U
8 kg 235U
1 month
233U
8 kg 233U
HEU (235U ≥ 20%)
25 kg HEU
3 months
Pu (Pu ≤ 80% 238Pu
8 kg Pu Th
20 t Th
Prof. S. K. Aghara

12. IAEA Safeguards Terminology
Materials Balance Area (MBA)
Significant Quantity (SQ)
Bulk Facility
Key Measurement Points (KMP)
LOF
MUF
Physical Inventory List (PIL)
Book Inventory
SRD
MBR
Item Facility
Diversion Rate
Prof. S. K. Aghara

13. State Level Motivations
International security
Regional Issues
Lack of confidence on International Security
Prestige/Hegemony
Prof. S. K. Aghara

14. Safeguards Regime
As early as 1960’s there was some concern about small groups pursing nuclear weapons
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory conducted an elaborate controlled experiment in 1964 where 3 PhD nuclear physicists were randomly picked and were asked to design a nuclear weapon
28 months later they presented a design that was confirmed by the LLNL scientists that it would work!!
Never became a serious concern for the Safeguards Regime, Why?
Prof. S. K. Aghara

15. Safeguards Regime
Building a nuclear bomb would require a team of specialists with knowledge of physics, the properties of nuclear material, metallurgy, and explosives
And the team would need some special equipment
The undertaking would be dangerous
The outcome would be uncertain
Too costly, not achievable – This has been a true assumption so far
Prof. S. K. Aghara

16. New Paradigm – Steal One
Nuclear Terrorism - successful sabotage of an operating nuclear reactor, the deliberate release of any significant amounts of radioactive material, or the detonation of a nuclear bomb by a non-state actor
New concerns emerge
“Do not detonate the small bomb. Keep it for us. It may be useful.” – French General in Algeria during the nuclear weapons testing
Threat from stateless terrorists and more widespread access to nuclear materials and know-how started to manifest
Safeguards does not address this

17. Threat – Nuclear Terrorism
The twentieth-century nuclear stalemate is turning into the twenty-first – century era of nuclear terrorism, failed states, sophisticating terrorist networks
Huge inventory of nuclear warheads and new nuclear weapons state
~70,000 (1990’s) to ~22,000 (2012)
90% percent are US and Russian
India and Pakistan (1998) confirm their possession of nuclear weapons
North Korea (2006) conducted a successful nuclear weapons test
A 58 percent increase (since 2010) in the number of jihadist groups, a doubling of jihadist fighters and a tripling of attacks by al Qaeda affiliates – RAND study 2014
Prof. S. K. Aghara

18. Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? – Brian Jenkins
Nuclear terrorism is about a serious threat — the possibility that terrorists might somehow obtain and detonate a nuclear weapon
Nuclear terror is about the anticipation of that event.
Nuclear terrorism is about terrorists' capabilities, while nuclear terror is about imagination.
New Paradigm – Political Science
”A campaign of terror might even yield what an act of terrorism could not”
Prof. S. K. Aghara

19. Nuclear Terrorism Threats Fundamentalist Idealist Mental disorder
Mafia
Religion
Criminal
Targets
Materials
People
Information
Facilities
Pathways
Where
When
How
Prof. S. K. Aghara

20. Safeguards to Security
From 1950 – 1990: proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology
IAEA, Nuclear Safeguards, NPT
From 1990 – 2001: illicit trafficking of nuclear weapons and material from
Nunn–Lugar Act or Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program
Focused on Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries
Present: Nuclear terrorism from sophisticated non-state actors
Global Threat Reduction Initiatives (GTRI), Nuclear Security Summit
Comprehensive needs (safeguard and secure)
Terrorist capabilities, motivations, and opportunities have changed
Prof. S. K. Aghara

21. Safeguards to Security
Change in the makeup of Non-State groups since the 1990’s
Sustained motivations to cause devastating mass destruction (organized)
Significant resources: financial, material, and trained (resourced)
Permissive sanctuary for operations (networked)
Opportunities to acquire nuclear weapons components and capabilities more pervasive
Security of Russian weapon storage facilities imperfect
Large global inventory of nuclear material
Nontraditional weapon designs and material

22. Nuclear Security
Threat Assessment: “Over a hundred incidents of thefts and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear and radioactive material are reported to the [IAEA] every year.” —Director General Yukiya Amano of the International Atomic Energy Agency
Prof. S. K. Aghara

23. Nuclear Security Incidents
NTI reports 1000s of nuclear smuggling incidents (~20 involving HEU or Pu) over past 20 yrs.
Many more cases likely unreported or undetected
Effective policy requires understanding the causes of lapses in security that, under different circumstances, could have been catastrophic:
Y-12 (U.S.) security breach (2012)
Pelindaba (South Africa) break-in (2007)
Kurchatov Institute (Russia) accounting problem (2001)
Project Sapphire – 600 kgs of 90% percent U-235 (1998)
Aum Shinrikyo – religious cult, solicitation for nuclear weapons and materials, Chemical Weapon (1995)
A. Q. Khan network – Al Qaeda and Iran; Proliferation and Illicit Trafficking (1990 – 2001)
Prof. S. K. Aghara

24. Identify Uranium Enrichment Facility Insider Theft
Individual earned a PhD in a foreign country and gained a secret clearance
Often seen in sensitive work areas taking notes and collecting items
Fellow employee saw secret documents in his home
Suspicious managers move employee to less-sensitive position
Eventually family to home country for a vacation and never returns
Continued to ask employees for additional sensitive information from home country
Prof. S. K. Aghara

25. What is Nuclear Security?
Deals with the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear and other radioactive substances and associated facilities
Prof. S. K. Aghara

26. Nuclear Security - Risks
Smuggled nuclear device
Theft or purchase of nuclear weapon
Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)
Fabricate a bomb using fissile
material
Radiological Dispersion Device
Crude Pu explosion
Barrier to nuclear terrorism ≠ Access (weapons or SQ of SNM)

27. INSSL: Integrated Nuclear Security and Safeguards
Threats (insiders/outsiders), Targets (materials, people, information), Pathways (where, when, how)
Prof. S. K. Aghara

28. INSSL: Integrated Nuclear Security and Safeguards
Prof. S. K. Aghara

29. Exercise 1 - Identify, Evaluate, Understand
Prof. S. K. Aghara

30. Exercise 1 - Identify, Evaluate, Understand
Scenario: A shipment of nuclear warheads are loaded in a train and are being transported
Blue Team – Goal is to transport the war heads safely.
Red Team – Goal is to acquire nuclear war heads for nefarious purposes.
Anchor your discussions within your teams on:
Critical elements of security
Vulnerabilities in security
What are the potential threats
Pathways to avoid these threats
Prof. S. K. Aghara

31. Exercise 1 - Discussions
Observations
Guards and gates
Layered approach
Sealed cargo - password protected
Issues
Large cargo
Two person rule absent
Central control
All the guards in one car
Too many people involved at a large weapons complex
Prof. S. K. Aghara

32. IAEA Nuclear Security Framework
There is no single international instrument that addresses nuclear security in a comprehensive manner
Legal foundation for nuclear security comprises of international instruments and recognized principles designed to control nuclear material and other radioactive substances
Advance science and technology for interdiction and forensics
Prof. S. K. Aghara

33. State’s Nuclear Security Elements
Legislative and regulatory framework
Agencies to enforce and implement
Security systems for prevention, detection and response to a nuclear security event
National detection strategy
Prof. S. K. Aghara

34. Nuclear Security Vocabulary
HEU
Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Insider Threat
Design Based Threat (DBT)
Categories of Nuclear Materials
Nuclear Terrorism
Sabotage
Nuclear Security Summit
unauthorized access
radioactive material transport
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
Nuclear Forensics
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources
Detection and Measurements
Prof. S. K. Aghara

35. Nuclear Security Elements
Material movement
Border Crossing
Post Detonation
Materials Control & Surveillance
Human Reliability Programs
Insider Threat
Sabotage
Evaluate
Prevent
Detect
Manage
Damage
Respond
Clean up & recovery
Forensics
Radiation Protection
Emergency Planning
Law Enforcement
Prof. S. K. Aghara

36. Exercise 2

37. Exercise 2 – 2 Minutes Task: List the sequence of events
Identify agencies and titles
List technically relevant items
Analysis and Information Management – Making Sense of it all
Prof. S. K. Aghara

38. Nuclear Security Detection Architecture
Communications
intelligence agencies
Detection systems
law enforcement
Local response teams
systems of regulatory compliance
experts
national response teams
International engagement
Prof. S. K. Aghara

39. Nuclear Security Detection Architecture
Systems of Regulatory Compliance
Alerts & Alarms
Assessment
Intelligence agencies
Experts
Communications
Law enforcement
Detection systems
Response
Local response teams
National response teams
International engagement
Prof. S. K. Aghara

40. Global Systems for Nuclear Security
Multidisciplinary:
Scientific and Technical
Medical and Health Sciences
Social Sciences, Humanities, and Law
Gap in demand vs. opportunities for nuclear security education and training
100,000 professionals with responsibility
for nuclear security (WINS study, 2013)
It’s not just about technology – it’s about systems of systems

41. Detect – INSSL Research
Detector characterization
Autonomous Detection - Robotics
Material Accountancy
High resolution spectroscopy
Enrichment measurement
Pu mass measurement
Prof. S. K. Aghara

42. Information Management - – INSSL Research
Fuel Cycle Analysis
Isotope inventory
Thorium cycle
Technology Evaluation
Pyroprocessing
Enrichment
Nuclear analytical techniques
Nondestructive inspection
Prof. S. K. Aghara

43. Education & Training – INSSL Activities
Fundaments of Nuclear Security and Safeguards
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Threat Assessment and Risk Management
Nuclear Instrumentation
Safeguards Approaches and Verification Techniques
Training
Workshops
Certificate programs
Summer programs
Professional Development Courses (PDC)
Prof. S. K. Aghara

44. Education & Training – INSSL Activities

45. Hands-on – INSSL Activities
High-Resolution Gamma-Ray Spectroscopy with HPGe detectors
Semiconductor gamma-ray detection is introduced and students compare HPGe resolution to NaI detector resolution
Determine Enrichment quantities
By measuring peak areas of U and Pu samples with high resolution gamma spectroscopy, calculate ratios for various energy lines and identify samples by their enrichment characteristics
Determine Mass of Pu
By measuring sample with high resolution spectroscopy and recording the peak areas and sample dimensions,
calculate the efficiency of the sample and the mass of Pu.
Prof. S. K. Aghara

46. Take Away
There is a growing demand for employees with nuclear security training and education
Limited scope for a dedicated programs
Cross-disciplinary programs designed with international prospective are vital for developing a global nuclear security community
Prof. S. K. Aghara

47. Questions?
Prof. S. K. Aghara