DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION TRAINING/IMPLEMENTATION AND OVERVIEW OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS IMPACTING THE NISP Greg Pannoni, Associate Director, Operations and.

DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION TRAINING/IMPLEMENTATION AND OVERVIEW OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS IMPACTING THE NISP Greg Pannoni, Associate Director, Operations and Industrial Security Information Security Oversight Office National Archives and Records Administration

Overview ISOO Goals and Functions
National Industrial Security Program (NISP) (E.O ) NISP Policy Advisory Committee and its Working Groups Classified National Security Information (E.O ) − Derivative Classification Training and Implementation • Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information (E.O ) Classified National Security Information Program for State, Local, Tribal, Private Sector Entities (SLTPS) (E.O ) Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) (E.O )

What are ISOO’s Goals? Ensure Safeguarding of Classified National Security Information in a Cost-Effective & Efficient Manner Eliminate Redundant, Overlapping, or Unnecessary Requirements that Impede National Security Interests Ensure Government / Industry Partnership in the Protection of Classified Information Hold Classification Activity to the Minimum Necessary to Protect National Security Promote Declassification & Public Access to Information as Soon as National Security Considerations Permit

How does ISOO Function? Develops, coordinates and issues implementing directives and instructions regarding Executive Orders 13526, 12829, and that are binding on executive branch agencies. Provides oversight and maintains continuous liaison with agency’s on all matters relating to the Government-wide security classification program and the NISP. Annually reports relevant data regarding each agency's security classification programs, to include costs, to the President. Recommends policy changes to the President through the National Security Advisor.

NISP POLICY RELATIONSHIPS
E.O CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION E.O Classified National Security Information Program for State, Local, Tribal, & Private Sector Entities E.O NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM E.O STRUCTURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED NETWORKS AND THE RESPONSIBLE SHARING OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

NISP Policy Advisory Committee (NISPPAC)
Membership Director ISOO – Chairman Representatives of Government agencies (15 members) Nongovernmental (Industry) representatives (8 members) Functions – Advise the Chairman: On all matters concerning the policies of the NISP Serves as a forum to discuss policy issues in dispute Authority Executive Order No , National Industrial Security Program Subject to Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and The Government in the Sunshine Act

NISPPAC Government Representatives
Members Agency John P. Fitzpatrick, Chair Information Security Oversight Office Mary Rose McCaffrey Central Intelligence Agency Drew Winneberger Defense Security Service Deborah Scholz Department of the Air Force Patricia Stokes Department of the Army Eric Dorsey Department of Commerce Timothy Davis Department of Defense Richard Donovan Department of Energy

NISPPAC Government Representatives
Members Agency Christal Fulton Department of Homeland Security Anna Harrison Department of Justice Stephen Long Department of the Navy Kimberly Baugher Department of State Peter Ambrose National Aeronautics and Space Administration Dennis Hanratty National Security Agency Darlene Fenton Nuclear Regulatory Commission Richard Hohman Office of the Director of National Intelligence

NISPPAC Industry Members
Company Scott Conway* Northrop Grumman Marshall Sanders* Cloud Security Strategies Frederick Riccardi ManTech Shawn Daley MIT Lincoln Laboratory Rosalind Baybutt Pamir Consulting LLC Mike Witt Ball Aerospace Rick Graham Huntington -Ingalls Steve Kipp L3 Corporation * Term Ends 1 October 2012

NISPPAC Working Groups
NISPPAC working groups established to review issues and prepare recommendations for formal NISPPAC decisions. Permanent Certification and Accreditation Working Group Personnel Security Clearance Working Group Ad-Hoc NISPOM Rewrite Working Group Threat Information Working Group Small and Middle-Sized company Issues Working Group Special Access Program Working Group Foreign Ownership, Control and Influence (FOCI) Working Group

Derivative Classification
Guidance found in: ● Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information” December 29, 2009 ● 32 C.F.R. Part 2001, “Classified National Security Information” June 25, 2010 ● “Marking Classified National Security Information” January 2012

Derivative Classification
Derivative Classification is: The incorporating, paraphrasing, restating, or generating in new form information that is already classified, and marking the newly developed material consistent with the classification markings that apply to the source information. Includes the classification of information based on classification guidance. It is not the duplication or reproduction of existing classified information.

Training Persons who apply derivative classification markings shall receive training in the proper application of the derivative classification principles of the Order, with an emphasis on avoiding over-classification, at least once every 2 years. Derivative classifiers who do not receive such training at least once every two years shall have their authority to apply derivative classification markings suspended until they have received such training. A waiver may be granted by the agency head, the deputy agency head, or the senior agency official if an individual is unable to receive such training due to unavoidable circumstances Whenever a waiver is granted, the individual shall receive such training as soon as practicable.

Minimum Derivative Classification Training Coverage
Observe and respect original classification decisions Classification levels Duration of classification Identification and Markings (carry forward to newly created documents the pertinent classification markings) Classification prohibitions and limitations Sanctions Classification challenges Security Classification Guides Information Sharing **EMPHASIS ON AVOIDING OVER-CLASSIFICATION**

Classification Standards
Information may be originally classified if: An Original Classification Authority (OCA) is classifying the information; The information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government; The information falls within one or more of the classification categories; and The OCA determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to national security, to include defense against transnational terrorism, and the OCA is able to identify or describe the damage.

Classification Levels
● Top Secret - information whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security. Secret - information whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security. Confidential - information whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security.

Prohibitions and Limitations
In no case shall information be classified, continue to be maintained as classified, or fail to be declassified in order to: Conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; Prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; Restrain competition; or Prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security. Basic scientific research information not clearly related to the national security shall not be classified.

Sanctions U.S. Government employees, and its contractors, shall be subject to appropriate sanctions if they knowingly, willfully, or negligently: - disclose to unauthorized persons information properly classified under the Order; - classify or continue the classification of information in violation of the order or any implementing directive; - create or continue a special access program contrary to the requirements of the Order; or - contravene any other provision of the Order or its implementing directive.

Classification Challenges
Authorized holders of information, including authorized holders outside the classifying agency, are encouraged and expected to challenge the classification of information they believe is improperly classified. Agencies must ensure individuals are not subject to retribution. Informal versus Formal Challenges - Review by an impartial official or panel - System for processing, tracking and recording formal challenges - Written response within 60 days. (Affirmative response must identify or describe damage). 90 day non-response/120 day response - Right to appeal agency decisions to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (120 days) -

Use of a Classified Addendum
Derivative classifiers shall, whenever practicable, use a classified addendum whenever classified information constitutes a small portion of an otherwise unclassified document or prepare a product to allow for dissemination at the lowest level of classification possible or in unclassified form.

Security Classification Guides
(a) Agencies with original classification authority shall prepare classification guides to facilitate the proper and uniform derivative classification of information. These guides shall conform to standards contained in directives issued under E.O (b) Each guide shall be approved personally and in writing by an official who: (1) Has program or supervisory responsibility over the information or is the senior agency official; and (2) Is authorized to classify information originally at the highest level of classification prescribed in the guide. (c) Agencies shall establish procedures to ensure that classification guides are reviewed and updated as provided in directives issued under E.O

Security Classification Guides (cont’d)
(f) Makes clear that classification guides are not to be used to classify information for more than 25 years except for confidential human source, human intelligence source, or weapons of mass destruction information. The duration of classification of a document classified by a derivative classifier using a classification guide shall not exceed 25 years from the date of the document, except for: (1) Information that should clearly and demonstrably be expected to reveal the identity of a confidential human source or a human intelligence source or key design concepts of weapons of mass destruction; and (2) Specific information incorporated into classification guides in accordance with section 2.2(e) of E.O

Classification by Compilation
A determination that information is classified through the compilation of unclassified is a derivative classification action based upon existing original classification guidance. If the compilation of unclassified information reveals a new aspect of information that meets the standards for classification, it shall be referred to an original classification authority with jurisdiction over the information to make an original classification decision.

Derivative Classification Markings Overall classification marking:
SECRET Department of Good Works Washington, D.C July 15, 2010 MEMORANDUM FOR AGENCY OFFICIALS From: Joe Carver, Director Subject: (U) Examples 1. (S) Paragraph 1 contains information from Paragraph 2 in the source document and is therefore marked (S). 2. (U) Paragraph 2 contains “Unclassified” information. Therefore, this portion will be marked with the designation “U” in parentheses preceding the portion. Overall classification marking: Indicates the highest level of classification of any one portion of the document

Derivative Classification Markings Classification authority block:
SECRET Department of Good Works Washington, D.C July 15, 2010 MEMORANDUM FOR AGENCY OFFICIALS From: Joe Carver, Director Subject: (U) Examples 1. (S) Paragraph 1 contains information from Paragraph 2 in the source document and is therefore marked (S). 2. (U) Paragraph 2 contains “Unclassified” information. Therefore, this portion will be marked with the designation “U” in parentheses preceding the portion. Classification authority block: Classified By: Identity of derivative classifier by name and position or by personal identifier. Classified By: Stan Smith, Program Analyst Derived From: Miscellaneous SCG, Dated January 5, 2009 Derived From: Source information Declassify On: Declassify On: Declassification instructions

Derivative Classification Markings Derived From: Multiple Sources
● Source information (Derived From): Concisely identify the source document or the classification guide on the “Derived From” line, including the agency, and where available, the office of origin, and the date of the source or guide. ● When using multiple source documents, the “Derived From” line shall appear as: Derived From: Multiple Sources ● The derivative classifier shall include a listing of the source materials on, or attached to, each derivatively classified document. Example: (U) Sources: 1. (U) Dept of Good Works Memorandum dated June 27, 2010, Subj: Examples 2. (U) Dept of Good Works Memorandum dated May 20, 2009, Subj: Examples 3. (U) Radar SCG dated February 2, 2006

Derivative Classification Markings Declassification Instructions:
Classified By: John E. Doe, Chief Division 5 Reason: 1.4(a) Declassify On: Source document Derivative document Classified By: Joe Carver, Director Derived From: Department of Good Works Memorandum dated June 27, 2010, Subj: (U) Examples Declassify On: Declassification Instructions: In most cases, the declassification date will be carried over from the source document. Source Document 1 - Declassify On: Source Document 2 - Declassify On: Source Document 3 - Declassify On: When there are multiple sources, the declassification instruction will be the most restrictive date Derivative Document - Declassify On:

Derivative Classification Markings
Source document Department of Good Works Washington, D.C July 15, 2010 MEMORANDUM FOR AGENCY OFFICIALS From: Joe Carver, Director Subject: (U) Examples 1. (S) Paragraph 1 contains information that is classified SECRET and is therefore marked (S). 2. (U) Paragraph 2 contains “Unclassified” information. Therefore, this portion will be marked with the designation “U” in parentheses preceding the portion. Derivative document Portion marking: Portion markings will be carried over from the source document to the derivatively classified document. All other portions will be appropriately marked. Department of Good Works Washington, D.C July 15, 2010 MEMORANDUM FOR AGENCY OFFICIALS From: Joe Carver, Director Subject: (U) Examples 1. (S) Paragraph 1 contains information from Paragraph 1 in the source document and is therefore marked (S). 2. (U) Paragraph 2 contains “Unclassified” information. Therefore, this portion will be marked with the designation “U” in parentheses preceding the portion.

Declassification Instructions – Use of Exemptions from Automatic Declassification (25X1-25X9): The 25X exemptions may only be used on the “Declassify On” line if an agency has identified permanently valuable information that needs to be exempted from automatic declassification at 25 years and has received approval from the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) to exempt the information and to incorporate the exemption into a classification guide. (See 32 C.F.R. Part ) When using an approved exemption, a date or event that has been approved by the ISCAP must be included with the marking and shall not exceed 50 years from the date of the document. Classified By: John E. Doe, Chief Division 5 Derived From: SCG title and date Declassify On: 25X3,

Specific information, the release of which should clearly and demonstrably be expected to: 25X1 - reveal the identify of a confidential human source, a human intelligence source, a relationship with an intelligence or security service of a foreign government or international organization, or a non-human intelligence source; or impair the effectiveness of an intelligence method currently in use, available for use, or under development 25X2 - reveal information that would assist in the development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruction 25X3 - reveal information that would impair U.S. cryptologic systems or activities 25X4 - reveal information that would impair the application of state-of-the-art technology within a U.S. weapon system

25X5 – reveal formally named or numbered U.S. military war plans that remain in effect, or reveal operational or tactical elements of prior plans that are contained in such active plans 25X6 - reveal information, including foreign government information, that would cause serious harm to relations between the United States and a foreign government, or to ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States 25X7 - reveal information that would impair the current ability of United States Government officials to protect the President, Vice President, and other protectees for whom protection services, in the interest of the national security, are authorized 25X8 - reveal information that would seriously impair current national security emergency preparedness plans or reveal current vulnerabilities of systems, installations, or infrastructures relating to the national security 25X9 - violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement that does not permit the automatic or unilateral declassification of information at 25 years.

Section 3.3(h), E.O Records that contain information, the release of which should clearly and demonstrably be expected to reveal the following are exempt from automatic declassification at 50 years: 50X1-HUM – the identity of a confidential human source or a human intelligence source 50X2-WMD – key design concepts of weapons of mass destruction 50X__ - in extraordinary cases, additional specific information formally approved by the ISCAP (50X1-50X9 – match the same categories as the 25X1-25X9 categories) Section 3.3(h)(3), E.O 75X___ - specific information may be exempted from automatic declassification at 75 years if formally approved by the ISCAP.

from automatic declassification
75 years Exemptions from automatic declassification 50X1-HUM (no date or event required) 50X2-WMD (no date or event required) E.O section 3.3(h)(1)(B) E.O section 3.3(h)(1)(A) ISCAP Identity of confidential human source or human intelligence source Key design concepts of weapons of mass destruction 25 years 50 years ISCAP 25X___ with a date or event E.O section 3.3(b) ISCAP 50X___ with a date or event E.O section 3.3(h)(2) ISCAP ISCAP Information that meets the standards of E.O section 3.3(b) All other information 25X___ territory 50X___ territory 75X___ territory

Declassification Instructions: The following declassification instructions are no longer valid and, if annotated on the source document, will not be carried over to the derivative document. X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8 OADR MR (never a valid declassification instruction) Subject to Treaty or International Agreement The derivative classifier shall calculate a date that is 25 years from the date of the source document when determining the declassification instruction for the derivative document.

Source document Derivative document SECRET Department of Good Works Washington, D.C July 15, 2010 MEMORANDUM FOR AGENCY OFFICIALS From: Joe Carver, Director Subject: (U) Examples 1. (S) Paragraph 1. 2. (U) Paragraph 2. Classified By: OCA name and position Reason: 1.4(a) Declassify On: OADR SECRET Department of Good Works Washington, D.C January 21, 2011 MEMORANDUM FOR AGENCY OFFICIALS From: Joe Carver, Director Subject: (U) Examples 1. (S) Paragraph 1 contains information from Paragraph 1 in the source document and is therefore marked (S). 2. (U) Paragraph 2 is unclassified. Classified By: Derivative classifier’s name Derived From: Dept of Good Works Memo, dtd July 15, 2010 Declassify On: July 15, 2035 Declassification Instructions: Calculate a date that is 25 years from the date of the source document. The same rules apply when the source document contains any invalid markings (X1-X8; OADR; MR; Subject to treaty or international agreement) Do not carry over “OADR”

DNI Only or DCI Only are also no longer valid and, if annotated on the source document, will not be carried over to the derivative document. If the document contains imagery, as described in E.O , the derivative classifier will mark the derivative document in the following manner: Declassify on: 25X1, E.O If the document does not contain imagery, as described in E.O , the derivative classifier will calculate a declassification date that is 25 years from the date of the source document.

Derivative Classification Markings (Cont’d)
Derivative document SECRET Department of Good Works Washington, D.C January 21, 2011 MEMORANDUM FOR AGENCY OFFICIALS From: Joe Carver, Director Subject: (U) Examples 1. (S) Paragraph 1 contains information from Paragraph 1 in the source document and is therefore marked (S). 2. (U) Paragraph 2 is unclassified. Classified By: Derivative classifier’s name Derived From: Dept of Good Works Memo, dtd July 15, 2010 Declassify On: Source document Declassification Instructions: Calculate a date that is 25 years from the date of the source document. SECRET Department of Good Works Washington, D.C July 15, 2010 MEMORANDUM FOR AGENCY OFFICIALS From: Joe Carver, Director Subject: (U) Examples 1. (S) Paragraph 1. 2. (U) Paragraph 2. Classified By: OCA name and position Reason: 1.4(a) Declassify On: DNI Only If the source document contains “DNI Only” or “DCI Only” as a declassification instruction, and there is no imagery in the document, a declassification date will be calculated 25 years from the date of the source document. Do not carry over “DNI Only”

Derivative document Source document SECRET Department of Good Works Washington, D.C Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. Classified By: Derivative classifier’s name Derived From: Dept of Good Works Memo, dtd July 15, 2010 Declassify On: 25X1, E.O Declassification Instructions: SECRET Department of Good Works Washington, D.C Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Classified By: OCA name and position Reason: 1.4(a) Declassify On: DCI Only If the source document contains “DNI Only” or “DCI Only” as a declassification instruction, and contains imagery, the new declassification instruction will read: “Declassify on: 25X1, E.O ” Secret Secret The declassification instruction on the derivatively classified document will read: Declassify on: 25X1, E.O Do not carry over “DCI Only”

Reminders Only individuals specifically authorized in writing may classify documents originally. Only individuals with the appropriate security clearance, who are required by their work to restate classified source information, may derivatively classify information. The terms “Top Secret,” “Secret,” and “Confidential” are not to be used to mark executive branch information that has not been properly designated as classified national security information under E.O Information shall not be classified for any reason unrelated to the protection of the national security. Classifiers and authorized holders are responsible for ensuring that information is appropriately classified and properly marked. The strategic imperative of our efforts has been to ensure that we provide adequate protections to our classified information while at the same time sharing the information with all who reasonably need it to do their jobs. The guiding principles during the Administration’s review were to: Reinforce the importance of responsible information sharing and not undo all of the significant and important progress we’ve made in interagency information sharing since 9/11; Ensure that policies, processes, technical security solutions, oversight, and organizational cultures evolve to match our information sharing and safeguarding requirements; Emphasize that effective and consistent guidance and implementation must be coordinated across the entire Federal government. We are only as strong as our weakest link and this is a shared risk with shared responsibility; and; Continue to respect the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of the American people.

Reminders (continued)
Individuals who believe that information in their possession is inappropriately classified, or inappropriately unclassified, are expected to bring their concerns to the attention of responsible officials. The following markings are not authorized in the “Declassify On” line: Originating Agency’s Determination Required” or “OADR” for documents created after 10/14/95; “X1”, “X2”, “X3”, “X4”, “X5”, “X6”, “X7”, or “X8” for documents created after 9/22/2003; “Manual Review” or “MR;” “DNI Only” or “DCI Only;” “Subject to treaty or international agreement;” and “25X1-human.” The strategic imperative of our efforts has been to ensure that we provide adequate protections to our classified information while at the same time sharing the information with all who reasonably need it to do their jobs. The guiding principles during the Administration’s review were to: Reinforce the importance of responsible information sharing and not undo all of the significant and important progress we’ve made in interagency information sharing since 9/11; Ensure that policies, processes, technical security solutions, oversight, and organizational cultures evolve to match our information sharing and safeguarding requirements; Emphasize that effective and consistent guidance and implementation must be coordinated across the entire Federal government. We are only as strong as our weakest link and this is a shared risk with shared responsibility; and; Continue to respect the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of the American people.

E.O Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information Reinforce the importance of responsible information sharing Ensure that policies, processes, technical security solutions, oversight, and organizational cultures match information sharing & safeguarding requirements Emphasize consistent guidance and implementation across the entire Federal government Recognize the importance of shared risk and shared responsibility The strategic imperative of our efforts has been to ensure that we provide adequate protections to our classified information while at the same time sharing the information with all who reasonably need it to do their jobs. The guiding principles during the Administration’s review were to: Reinforce the importance of responsible information sharing and not undo all of the significant and important progress we’ve made in interagency information sharing since 9/11; Ensure that policies, processes, technical security solutions, oversight, and organizational cultures evolve to match our information sharing and safeguarding requirements; Emphasize that effective and consistent guidance and implementation must be coordinated across the entire Federal government. We are only as strong as our weakest link and this is a shared risk with shared responsibility; and; Continue to respect the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of the American people.

E.O. 13587 Governance Structure
A Senior Information Sharing and Safeguarding Steering Committee to coordinate interagency efforts and ensuring that Departments and Agencies are held accountable for implementation of information sharing and safeguarding policy and standards. A Classified Information Sharing and Safeguarding to provide sustained, full-time focus on sharing and safeguarding of classified national security information. Senior representatives of the Department of Defense and the National Security Agency jointly act as the Executive Agent for Safeguarding Classified Information on Computer Networks to develop technical safeguarding policies and standards and conduct assessments of compliance. An Insider Threat Task Force to develop a government-wide program for insider threat detection and prevention to improve protection and reduce potential vulnerabilities of classified information from exploitation, compromise or other unauthorized disclosure. The committee that was established in the wake of WikiLeaks proposed a new oversight structure to orchestrate the development and implementation of policies and standards for the sharing and safeguarding of classified information on computer networks. A Senior Information Sharing and Safeguarding Steering Committee will have overall responsibility for fully coordinating interagency efforts and ensuring that Departments and Agencies are held accountable for implementation of information sharing and safeguarding policy and standards. A Classified Information Sharing and Safeguarding Office will be created within the office of the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment to provide sustained, full-time focus on sharing and safeguarding of classified national security information. The office will also consult partners to ensure the consistency of policies and standards and seek to identify the next potential problem. Senior representatives of the Department of Defense and the National Security Agency will jointly act as the Executive Agent for Safeguarding Classified Information on Computer Networks to develop technical safeguarding policies and standards and conduct assessments of compliance. An Insider Threat Task Force will develop a government-wide program for insider threat detection and prevention to improve protection and reduce potential vulnerabilities of classified information from exploitation, compromise or other unauthorized disclosure.

Areas of Focus & Ongoing Improvement
Enhancing control of removable media Identity Management; including reducing user anonymity and increasing user attribution Building a more robust insider threat program Enhancing access controls Improving enterprise audit capabilities All the departments and agencies involved in these reforms are fully committed to continuing to improve. In addition to those measures identified in the Executive Order, significant progress has been made by U.S. Departments and Agencies in five priority areas: Removable media Departments and Agencies have made significant progress in clarifying and standardizing removable media policies, processes, and technical controls. We have limited the numbers of users with removable media permissions and strengthened accountability for violations. Online Identity Management The owners and operators of classified systems are accelerating efforts to strengthen the online verification of individuals logging on to classified systems, and to be able to track what information is being accessed by these individuals. Insider Threat Program As directed in the Executive Order, the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence are actively establishing an interagency Insider Threat Task Force. This Task Force will integrate specialized abilities, tools, and techniques to more effectively deter, detect, and disrupt the insider threat. Access control Departments and Agencies are implementing more robust access control systems to enforce role-based access privileges that serve to ensure that an individual user’s information access is commensurate with his/her assigned role. Enterprise audit Enhancing auditing capabilities across U.S. Government classified networks is a priority effort, and planning has been initiated to define the policy and develop standards for the collection and sharing of audit and insider threat data.

Removable Media Initial Operating Capability (IOC) Definition:
● IOC is reached when write privileges are disabled and/or controlled using a hardware or software solution Final Operating Capability (FOC) Definition: ● FOC includes IOC, and is achieved when a monitoring and alerting function is implemented for all successful / unsuccessful “write” attempts to removable media devices.

Reducing Anonymity Initial Operating Capability (IOC) Definition:
● IOC is reached when the PKI is established such that: ● Certificates are issued (or a comparable solution) for identification for a minimum of 10 percent of users on classified networks (Secret and Top Secret) and ● PKI tokens are used for authentication to high-sensitivity applications (software tokens are sufficient pursuant to Intelligence Community policy and with coordination with the Steering Committee). Final Operating Capability (FOC) Definition: ● FOC includes IOC, and is achieved when: ● 90 percent of users have PKI certificates for identification (or a comparable solution) on classified networks (Secret and Top Secret); and ● Hardware tokens are used for authentication to enable access to high and medium-sensitivity applications (software tokens are sufficient pursuant to Intelligence Community policy and with coordination with the Steering Committee).

Insider Threat Program
Initial Operating Capability (IOC) Definition: ● IOC is reached when an agency has policies, procedures, and an organizational structure that identifies an accountable official(s) for the insider threat program, provides regular insider threat awareness training to agency personnel, and includes an integrated approach to gathering (electronically and/or manually) relevant sources of insider threat information for analysis and response.

Insider Threat Program
Final Operating Capability (FOC) Definition: ● FOC includes IOC, and is achieved when an agency has implemented the capabilities for: ● Monitoring user network activities on all agency networks; ● Inclusion of counterintelligence triggers for user-monitoring tailored to the agency environment; ● Establishing an integrated capability to monitor, audit, gather, and analyze information relevant to insider threat analysis from across the agency; and ● There is a capability for integrated insider threat analysis of current data on user actions collected from automated and/or manual information sources – such as audit data, foreign travel and contact reporting, financial disclosure, facility, access, phone records, and external databases.

Initial Operating Capability (IOC) Definition:
Access Control Initial Operating Capability (IOC) Definition: IOC is reached when an interoperable infrastructure for integrated access-control capability (hard-token PKI plus “attribute-based” authorization) is operational (Secret and Top Secret) in accordance with the Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM) framework or equivalent guidance appropriate for the subject network fabric. ● Establishes capability for user attribute provisioning to support attribute-based authorization on classified networks. ● Requires this capability to be integrated with the PKI authentication capability. Scope: ● Minimum of 10 percent of users on classified networks are provisioned with attributes for authorization-related access-control decisions. ● Minimum of 25 percent of classified data repositories designated as highest sensitivity (as defined in NIST SP , CNSSI 1253, ICD 503 or equivalent guidance appropriate for the subject network fabric) are integrated to use the interoperable access-control infrastructure facilities (PKI integrated with attribute-based access control).

Final Operating Capability (FOC) Definition:
Access Control Final Operating Capability (FOC) Definition: FOC includes IOC, and is achieved when an agency has implemented the capabilities for: ● Federation (exchange) of standardized user authorization attributes on classified networks across organizations; ● Consistent application of fabric-wide access control policy, with timely promulgation of policy changes; and ●Tagging of information resources with access-relevant attributes on ingest, creation, or modification; as applicable. Scope: ● All users of classified networks. ● All high and medium-sensitivity classified network applications.

Initial Operating Capability (IOC) Definition:
Enterprise Audit Initial Operating Capability (IOC) Definition: IOC is reached when an agency has the ability to: ● Monitor user-attributable activities (defined as Auditable Events in ICS ) on at least one community-shared information resource on at least one of the agency’s classified networks; ● Analyze identified anomalies (which includes correlating such anomalies with other data sources); ● Report and respond to potential security incidents through collaboration with the appropriate CI, security, law enforcement, or Information Security (INFOSEC) offices; ● Provide automated notifications of security incidents from a community-shared information resource on at least one of the agency’s classified networks to the appropriate offices; ● Deliver an automated flow of audit data from a community-shared information resource on at least one of the agency’s classified networks into an agency-specific audit capability; and ● Provide audit data to other affected organizations.

Final Operating Capability (FOC) Definition:
Enterprise Audit Final Operating Capability (FOC) Definition: FOC includes IOC applied to all classified networks, and is achieved when an agency has implemented the ability to: ● Share user-attributable audit information in a common format collected from high and medium-sensitivity information resources (both internal and community-shared) for users; ● Analyze identified anomalies; and ● Enable a timely response to incidents.

E.O “Classified National Security Information Program for State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Entities” (SLTPS) Establishes a program to safeguard and govern access to classified information shared by the Federal Government with SLTPS entities. Ensures that security standards for classified information are applied in accordance with national policy. Private sector facilities where classified information is or will be used or stored as well as contractors of SLT entities shall be inspected, accredited, and monitored for compliance with the standards established pursuant to the NISP by DoD or another responsible Cognizant Security Agency. SLTPS-Policy Advisory Committee created to discuss policy disputes and facilitate or recommend changes to remove undue impediment to information sharing

Key Elements of the E.O. 13556 (CUI)
Establishes an open and uniform program. Manages all unclassified information within the executive branch that requires safeguarding and dissemination controls. The control of this information is pursuant to and consistent with law, regulation, and Government-wide policy. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA): “The mere fact that information is designated as CUI shall not have a bearing on determinations pursuant to any law requiring the disclosure of information or permitting disclosure as a matter of discretion, including disclosures to the legislative or judicial branches.” – Section 2(b) 53

Overview of the CUI Program
One uniform and consistent policy applied to a defined and organized body of information Registry Dissemination Policy Decontrol Policy Safeguarding Policy Marking Policy 54

Approved CUI Categories
Agriculture Copyright Critical Infrastructure Emergency Management Export Control Financial Immigration Intelligence Law Enforcement Transportation 11. Nuclear 12. Patent 13. Privacy 14. Proprietary 15. Statistical 16. Tax 17. Legal

Five Programmatic Areas of the Compliance Plan
Governance Policy and Guidance Training Technology Self -Inspection Roles and responsibilities established to guide and direct the program and its requirements Processes and procedures of continuous monitoring to ensure compliance with the EO and Notice Development, implementation and revision of properly documented policies that are readily available to all affected personnel Controlled Unclassified Information Compliance Plan Identify and assess requirements of IT systems and toolsets for program implementation Education of affected personnel on the appropriate handling of information including responsibilities and ongoing maintenance

CUI Executive Agent Current Efforts
Development of CUI Supplemental Guidance & Consultation Interagency Representatives of the public State, Local, Tribal Private Sector Approval of Additional CUI Categories & Subcategories CUI Registry Updates Continuing Agency Submissions Approval of Compliance Plans Target Date Updates

Contact Information Information Security Oversight Office National Archives and Records Administration 700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Room 100 Washington, DC (202) (202) (fax)

QUESTIONS?

DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION TRAINING/IMPLEMENTATION AND OVERVIEW OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS IMPACTING THE NISP Greg Pannoni, Associate Director, Operations and.

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DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION TRAINING/IMPLEMENTATION AND OVERVIEW OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS IMPACTING THE NISP Greg Pannoni, Associate Director, Operations and.

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Presentation on theme: "DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION TRAINING/IMPLEMENTATION AND OVERVIEW OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS IMPACTING THE NISP Greg Pannoni, Associate Director, Operations and."— Presentation transcript:

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