1. Corruption and Anti- Corruption in Africa Paul Jackson, Heather Marquette and Caryn Peiffer

4. Zambezi News Minister for Impending Projects

5. Why worry about corruption? 1. Cost of corruption: Decreases GDP by 1%/yr (UN) Bribery alone $1 trillion/yr (World Bank) 3-5% world GDP (World Bank & IMF) 2. Corruption wastes development resources 3. Major impediment to development (MDGs and SDGs) 4. Significant contributor to conflict & impacts on state-building activities 5. In the ‘Age of Austerity’ less tolerated by donors?

6. Definitions of corruption No one, generally accepted definition and varies according to political context Legal: What is illegal is corrupt; what is legal is not corrupt Socio-Economic: Corruption as the result of individual rational decisions: e.g. ‘The abuse of public office for private gains’ (World Bank) Anthropological/Political: The norms, rules, customs & perceptions of corruption emphasising the importance of morality and trust issues as well as forms and organisation of powers Robert Klitgaard: “Corruption is more pronounced in systems characterised by the formula C=M+D-A [Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion - Accountability].”Robert Klitgaard

7. Typologies of corruption Bureaucratic vs Political Petty vs Grand Need vs Greed Active vs Passive Incidental vs Systemic Quiet Corruption

8. Forms of Corruption

9. 3 Generations of Anti-Corruption ? 1 st Generation – supply side C=M+D-A Building institutions ICAC model = Prevention, Punishment, Education E.g., Ombudsman, ACAs, judicial reform etc 2 nd Generation – demand side Support for civil society Citizen ‘voice’ E.g., citizen report cards, media training, civic education etc

10. So why a 3 rd generation of anti-corruption? Basically because several years of anti- corruption strategies have had little effect according to the evidence.

11. So why are we on the ‘3 rd generation’? Universalist assumptions have hampered anti-corruption efforts Corruption is a contextual phenomenon The international drivers of corruption are poorly understood & often undermine 1 st & 2 nd generation reforms Assessing corruption and monitoring anti-corruption efforts are difficult (and dangerous!)…they don’t call it ‘fighting corruption’ for nothing!

12. New research on corruption & collective action (DLP/UoB/U4 – www.dlprog.org )www.dlprog.org Dissatisfaction with anti-corruption work at many levels; increasing pressure for donors, policy-makers and practitioners to ‘show results’ Systematic review (Hanna et al 2011); evidence paper (Johnson, Taxell & Zaum 2012); U4 & DFID Proxy Challenge http://www.u4.no/assets/themes/evaluation/Proxy-Challenge- Competition.pdf Both ‘supply-side’ and ‘demand-side’ approaches are failing to deliver Increasingly, critics point to a ‘mischaracterisation’ of the problem; corruption isn’t a principal-agent problem but is instead a collective action problem; no ‘principled principals’ (Bauhr & Nasiritousi 2011; Booth 2012; Marquette 2012; Mungiu-Pippidi 2011; Persson, Rothstein & Teorell 2012; Rothstein 2011) Inherently logical analysis, but has had the effect of swooping the rug out from under practitioners with no real sense of the practical implications

13. The problem with a principal agent theory of corruption PA theory comes from shareholders and managers What if there are no principled principals? Who is the principal? The public? The public servants?

14. How can we think differently about corruption?  Is corruption actually a collective action problem? i.e. in an environment where everyone is perceived to be corrupt then there is no incentive not to be corrupt  CA is really about why some people act in a way that is against the interests of the group  It is an approach linked to the free rider problem – if a person cannot be excluded from a benefit then their incentive is to free ride.

15. More controversial…  Is corruption always a bad thing?  Prison gangs in the US function because of a lack of institutional protection  Weak institutions lead to patrimonialism meaning that access to services may be reliant on ‘our’ corrupt politician  ‘Doing the wrong thing for the right reasons’  Is getting some corrupt provision better than no provision at all?

16. What does this mean in practice?  Co-ordination of activities and construction of anti-corruption coalitions  If political will to reduce corruption is lacking this may be because corruption solves some problems. The answer to this is to find out which problems and how to solve them legitimately  We also need to recognise that corruption and anti-corruption are political, not technical issues  Implication is that anti-corruption should be seen in a broader context instead of just looking at individual incentives