1. Alliance in International Relations Prof. Jaechun Kim

2. Alliance in IR  Importance of Alliance in International Relations  Important element of statecraft  Alliance politics has been a common practice in IR  Weak states enter into alliance, when they need protection against strong states.  Strong states form alliances to counter other strong states (to maintain proper balance of power).

3.  Therefore, alliance has been a very important subject of research in IR Alliance in IR

4. Defining Alliance  Coalition – “a set of members acting in concert at x time regarding 1 to n issues” (Fedder 1968: 80); Alliances are formed in peace time and coalitions are often found during times of war or crises (Snyder 1990: 106). e.g., Coalition of the Gulf War in 1993, Coalition of the Willing in 2003  Alignment – occurs when states bring their policies into close cooperation with other states in order to achieve mutual security goals.  Formal alliances strengthen existing alignments or create new ones.  Alliances are subsets of the broader phenomena known as alignments (Snyder 1990: 105).

5. Defining Alliance  Entente – more flexible association between states (Kann 1976: 611)  No firm commitments exist between partners  Simple recognition of the fact that cooperation between them will make sense… cf. Triple Entente before WWI  Coalition < Alliance < Alignment cf. Entente  Some do use them interchangeably

6. Theory of Alliance (Formation)  REALIST THEORY OF ALLIANCE  Balance of Power Theory (Waltz 1976) power  States balance against power – “power” is the most important variable  States tend to balance against stronger states  This is to ensure that no one states will dominate the intl system  maintenance of balance of power

7. Theory of Alliance (Formation)  Two types of balancing Internal balancing External balancing – alliance!  Internal balancing is more reliable… ; Alliance is the product of compromise between states  Why not balancing against the US? (Although Waltz claimed that the US would be eventually balanced by one or more states… )

8. Theory of Alliance (Formation)  Bipolar Stability vs. Danger of Multipolarity (K. Waltz) Alliance pattern is unstable under the multipolarity Buck-passing and Chain-ganging

9.  Balance of Threat Theory (Walt 1987)  Refinement of Waltzian BOP Theory threats  States tend to balance against threats rather than against power.  Walt adopts Waltzian neorealist framework and agrees that Waltz’s theory is sound, but not sufficient…

10.  Level of external threats is a function of four factors Distribution of capabilities Geographic proximity Offensive capabilities Perceived aggression intentions (Walt 1987: 22)  When states don’t feel threatened, they do bandwagon with the strongest state rather than balance against it… e.g., Bandwagoning with the US in the post Cold War era  Nonetheless, balancing is far more common than bandwagoning…

11.  Scheweller (1994) – Balance of Interests  Balancing and bandwagoning are not opposite strategies; states choose them for different reasons! interests  Balancing is for self-preservation, while bandwagoning is for self-extension (balancing is driven by the desire to avoid losses, while bandwagoning is driven by the opportunity for gains (interests))

12.  States bandwagon with the stronger side because it represents the “wave of the future.”  The presence of a significant external threat is not necessary for states to bandwagon; alliance choices are often motivated by opportunities for gain as well as danger!  The most important determination of alliance decisions is the compatibility of political goals (in IR), not imbalances of power or threat.

13.  Status-quo countries vs. revisionist countries  Satisfied powers will join the status-quo coalition(alliance), even when it is the stronger side  Dissatisfied powers, motivated by opportunities more than security, will bandwagon with an ascending revisionist state!

14.  Two types of bandwagooning  Jackal bandwagoning – ascent of powerful revisionist states or coalition attracts opportunistic revisionist states…  Piling-on bandwagoning – status-quo countries bandwagon with the strongest status-quo state or coalition  Bottom Line – “interests” is an important element of alliance behavior

15.  Glenn Snyder (1984) – Alliance Security Dilemma  Security dilemma functions within alliances  2 risks of alliance security dilemma Risk of abandonment – danger that an ally does not come in help Risk of entrapment – danger of being dragged into a conflict that alliance partner gets involved in (though that conflict is not in the interests of your country)

16.  Dilemma !  if a state tries to reduce a risk of abandonment by increasing its alliance commitments, it ends up increasing a risk of entrapment;  if a state tries to reduce a risk of entrapment by decreasing its commitments, it ends up increasing a risk of abandonment.  Alliance security dilemma is more severe in a multipolar than in a bipolar system (because there are a number of plausible realignment options)

17.  Morrow (1993) – Autonomy-security trade-off model  Minor states get security benefits from their major alliance partners at the cost of sacrificing autonomy;  Major alliance partners get autonomy benefits at the cost of providing security. Autonomy Security Position w/o Alliance Source: Morrow (1991:914)

18. Alliance Transformation in the post-Cold War Era common threats  Realism – if common threats cease to exist, so will the alliance!  Predicted that the Cold War alliances would fall apart  Nonetheless, most of the US Cold War alliances survived the collapse of Cold War order

19.  Liberal institutionalists – alliance is an institution!  Alliance takes on a life of its own, adapts to a new environment, and adopts new missions!  e.g., NATO developed a host of institutional assets that are not just specific to the Soviet threats but general enough to tackle many post-CW security problems!

20.  Constructivists – identities and values are as much important as threat perceptions!  NATO allies grew to acquire similar values and sense of we- feeling that became the source of durability for alliance partnership.  Case Study: Why do the US Cold War alliances endure in Asia?