1. Technical Arms Control Work At IIS, Tsinghua Li Bin Tsinghua University East Asia Science & Security Network Nov 3, 2007; Beijing, China

2. 2 1. Missile Defense (1) US Missile Defense in East Europe (2) Maneuvering Warheads as Countermeasures

3. 3 (1) US Missile Defense in East Europe Question: How capable the system is to intercept Russian missiles if it can intercept Iranian missiles; Capability rather than intention; Intercept range rather than killing probability

4. 4 Interceptors BPI （ Boost phase Interceptor ） : its range does not cover Iranian missiles flying to the US ； THAAD: its range does not cover Iranian missiles flying to the US ； GBI (Ground Based Interceptor): guided by radar; KEI (Kinetic Energy Interceptor): guided by satellite & radar

5. 5 GBI in EU & Alaska Intercept Russian Missiles EU SystemAlaska System Time of intercept1050s1076s Missile Distance4503km4629km Height of Intercept825km804km GBI Distance4356km4490km

6. 6 KEI in EU & GBI in Alaska Intercept Russian Missiles KEI in EU intercepts Russian missile at 585s; KEI in EU & GBI in Alaska form a layered defense; GBI in EU contributes little

7. 7 Conclusions GBIs in EU, which cover Iranian missile, do not add new threat to Russia; KEIs in EU pose new threats to Russia by adding a layer of defense; US commitment of GBIs only in EU can help avoid security dilemma

8. 8 2. Maneuvering Warheads as Countermeasures Russia & China declared that maneuvering warheads help penetrate missile defense; The research is to understand whether and how it works; China case; Ongoing work

9. 9 Preliminary Results Solid-fueled missile (DF-31) is not able to do this due to limited payload; Liquid-fueled missile (DF-5) may or may not be able to do this; Depends on the vulnerable time window

10. 10 Vulnerable Time Window

11. 11 Vulnerable Time Window & Depressed Trajectory Depressed trajectory  shorter vulnerable time window  less fuel for maneuvering.

12. 12 Export Control 1.Impact of US export control on its trade with China; 2.Economic factors in export control: scale economy

13. 13 Historical Statistics of US-China Trade US Perspective (M$)

14. 14 US Export to China (M$) Tian’anmen Sq Cox Report EP3 Taiwan Str RMB devalued

15. 15 How US Export Disturbed Licensing contributes little; Psychological burdens contributes a lot: –sanctions, –fear of accusation by ultranationalists

16. 16 2. Economical Factors in Export Control Policy? Economical factors drive the export control policies of all countries. The US has had big markets in most areas, so it is not eager to expand its markets by lower export control standards. Countries with small domestic markets and small fraction in international markets may be different.

17. 17 A US Case US nuclear industry has zero domestic market and small international market; so it needs to create new market. US-Indian nuclear deal

18. 18 Other work 1. Chinese nuclear strategy; Operation, Terminology, NFU 2. Energy (1) New security theory: military security not #1 concern (2) Peaceful access to energy