1. Hybrid governance in mining concessions Singleton Chair 2015 UCL Ethnography of social and development policies in the context of global commodification Sara Geenen: sara.geenen@uantwerpen.besara.geenen@uantwerpen.be

2. Hybrid governance in mining concessions 1

3. Companies Communities State 2

4. Case study 3 Bogoso Bogoso concession- Golden Star Resources Luhwindja Twangiza concession- Banro Corporation

5. Hybrid governance New organizational and regulatory arrangements State and non-state actors In so-called ‘failed states’ : filling gaps in state capacity Pragmatic? Legitimate? => Meagher, De Herdt and Titeca (2014) Unravelling public authority. Paths of hybrid governance in Africa, IS Academy Human Security in Fragile States. 5

6. Mining concessions Large-scale industrial mining Areas of ‘limited statehood’ Company-community conflicts State often left out of the picture 6

7. CompaniesCommunitiesState Need for ‘social license to operate’ Response: voluntary CSR measures Links: local, national and international 7

8. CompaniesCommunitiesState Need for ‘social license to operate’ Response: voluntary CSR measures Links: local, national and international De facto governments? 8

9. CompaniesCommunitiesState Need for ‘social license to operate’ Initial resistance or expectations => negotiation and participation Response: voluntary CSR measures Response fragmented: representation and exclusion Links: local, national and international De facto governments? 9

10. CompaniesCommunitiesState Need for ‘social license to operate’ Initial resistance or expectations => negotiation and participation Response: voluntary CSR measures Response fragmented: representation and exclusion Links: local, national and international De facto governments?‘Pragmatic’ governance arrangements? 10

11. CompaniesCommunitiesState Need for ‘social license to operate’ Initial resistance or expectations => negotiation and participation Company-community conflicts Response: voluntary CSR measures Response fragmented: representation and exclusion Response: regulation (legislation, contracts, guidelines) Links: local, national and international Links De facto governments?‘Pragmatic’ governance arrangements? 11

12. CompaniesCommunitiesState Need for ‘social license to operate’ Initial resistance or expectations => negotiation and participation Company-community conflicts Response: voluntary CSR measures Response fragmented: representation and exclusion Response: regulation (legislation, contracts, guidelines) Links: local, national and international Links De facto governments?‘Pragmatic’ governance arrangements? Shift in governance role? 12

13. CompaniesCommunitiesState Need for ‘social license to operate’ Initial resistance or expectations => negotiation and participation Company-community conflicts Response: voluntary CSR measures Response fragmented: representation and exclusion Response: regulation (legislation, contracts, guidelines) Links: local, national and international Links De facto governments?‘Pragmatic’ governance arrangements? Shift in governance role? 13 Hybrid governance

14. Case study: resettlement in Bogoso (Ghana) and Luhwindja (DRCongo) 14 Luhwindja Bogoso Bogoso concession- Golden Star Resources Twangiza concession- Banro Corporation

15. State context Ghana Social and political stability Land Code: all public land vested in the State, of which customary land (more than 80%) vested in stools Minerals and Mining Act 2006: minerals owned by State, government can grant reconnaissance or prospecting license or mining lease to companies (LSM) or ASM licenses to companies, cooperatives or individuals Chiefs’ legitimacy and position are recognized and regulated by 1992 Constitution, role in local politics and land governance, take part in decentralized distribution of mining royalties DRC Post-conflict period Land Code: all land vested in the state, government can grant concessionary titles Mining Code 2002: minerals owned by State, government can grant exploration/ exploitation permits to companies (LSM) and cooperatives (ASM) Chiefs hold ambiguous position (de iure), while de facto existence of customary tenure system, collecting contributions from land users and miners Decentralization not yet implemented 15

16. Company context HQ in Toronto Listed on NY and Toronto stock exchange Bogoso concession= 95 km2 Production 2013: 145,000 ounces Reserves: 2,0 million ounces Acquired Bogoso concession in 1999 (also concessions in Wassa and Prestea) 16 HQ in Toronto Listed on NY and Toronto stock exchange Twangiza concession= 1164 km2 Production 2014: 102,384 ounces Reserves: 1,03 million ounces Acquired Twangiza concession in 1997 (also concessions in Kamituga, Lugushwa and Namoya)

17. Community context Dumasi village Bogoso chieftaincy Luchiga village Luhwindja chieftaincy 17

18. Resettlement process 1997-2005 No activities (war) 2005-2009 Little community consultation Violent resistance Alliances with customary chief 2009-2012 Community Forum ‘Protocol of Agreement’ 2012-2014 Local conflict, petition against chief, issues around legitimacy and representation 1999-2011 State mining company privatized Tensions Cyanide spill (2004 and 2006) 2011-2013 Dumasi Resettlement Negotiation Committee ‘Resettlement Agreement’ 2013-2015 Dumasi Monitoring Committee Local tensions, issues of ‘indigenous’ versus ‘strangers’, subcontractors, issues around representation 18

19. Resettlement process 19 Outcomes: about 120 households resettled but many left again political conflict Outcomes: moratorium and delays, resettlement site under construction stagnation tensions between ‘elites’

20. 20 “We cannot address Banro directly because we have to pass through these few people who monopolise the contacts. And these are the same people who hold us back! They present themselves as representatives of the population, but they are hampering the activities of the common people. Actually the main problem is not Banro itself. The problem lies with these intermediaries who interpret our grievances completely wrongly”. Resettlement process

21. Research project Differences and similarities in context? Transfer of governance functions? Governance outcomes? Hybrid governance? 21

22. Methodology 22

23. 23 Assembly(w o)man Businessma n (small- scale mining)ChiefChief farmer Church leadersEldersMPTask Force Unit Committee Chairman Youth leader Church leaders Himan23033 8 2115 Farmers 1 Himan28038 0 13 21 Farmers 2 Himan32 4600 22 Galamsey 1 Himan30 42 621 Galamsey 2 Himan44024 32 Teachers Himan34024 17 0 240 Traders Himan20 40 300 10 Youth Himan16 27 1813 Assembly( wo)man Chairmen political partiesChief Chief farmer Church leaders DMC DRNCElders MP Unit Committee Chairman Youth leader (asafuakye ) Youth leader (other) ChairmanM1M2M3M4 Linguist (okyea me) Church leaders Dumasi25 405 0 0 1020 Farmers 1 Dumasi15 33 6 186 912 Farmers 2 Dumasi1301012 21 48 264 Galamsey Dumasi13 2200 34000 036 Taxi drivers Dumasi13 196410 1219 810 Teachers Dumasi12 16 10 16 6 Traders 1 Dumasi15 2766 15 1299 Traders 2 Dumasi32 48 20 Youth Dumasi16 286 1012

24. Thank you! 24