1. WIPP National TRU Program
James Mason
Institutional Affairs Manager
Carlsbad Field Office
for
Northeast High-Level Radioactive Waste
Transportation Task Force
Portsmouth, NH
December 16-17, 2015

2. WIPP National TRU Program
Institutional Affairs
Transportation and Radiological Response
Support Programs

3. WIPP Land Withdrawal Act
Public Law ; Section 16, Transportation
Provides for program support and technical assistance to Tribes and States for prevention, preparedness and response for WIPP Transuranic Waste transportation activities.
Support and assistance is limited to State Regional Groups, State and Tribes with jurisdictions servicing negotiated open transportation corridors.
Most states are coordinated through regional State organizations;
Western Governors Association
Southern States Energy Board
Council of State Governments, Midwest
Council of State Governments, Northeast
Five Tribal Nations and the State of New Mexico work under separate stand-alone agreements.

4. WIPP Transportation Corridors

5. Program Support WIPP Program Coordination
Assist in providing personnel and material support to State Regional Groups, States and Tribes to coordinate WIPP related activities.
Training
Provide training for response to WIPP related transportation activities.
Equipment
Assistance in the purchase and maintenance of equipment needed for response to WIPP related transportation activities, within the scope of provided training.
Exercise
Assistance in planning and the conduct of WIPP Transportation Exercises (WIPPTREX).
Public Outreach and Education
Local exhibition of truck/TRUpact II containers , Public Education and Intergovernmental Affairs

6. Program Support Cont. TRAINING
Modular Emergency Response Radiological Transportation Training (MERRTT)
First Responder training for transportation incidents involving radiological materials.
Train-the-Trainer
Compressed (Refresher) Training
CVSA Level VI Inspection Certification
For the inspection of motor carriers transporting transuranic waste and Highway Route Controlled Quantities (HRCQ) shipments of radioactive materials.
Radiological Training for Hospital Personnel
Patient Care for radiologically contaminated patients.
Medical Examiner/Coroner
Handling of radiologically contaminated bodies, decontamination and documentation.

7. Program Support Cont. TRAINING TRANSCOM Users/Operators
Monitoring and tracking of WIPP shipments.
Emergency Communications 911 Dispatcher
Handling of calls when radioactive materials are involved.
Public Information Officer (PIO)
Public Information for incidents involving radiological materials.
WIPP Transportation Exercises (WIPPTREX)
Assistance is provided to stakeholder organizations in the planning and conduct of WIPP Transportation Exercises in order to validate capabilities and proficiency of responding jurisdictions along WIPP transportation corridors.

8. Technical Assistance Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) DOE/NNSA
RAP provides resources (trained personnel and equipment) to evaluate, assess, advise, isotopically identify, search for, and assist in the mitigation of actual or perceived nuclear or radiological hazards.
Along with teams from around the nation, WIPP’s RAP team is capable of providing assistance in all types of facility or transportation incidents involving radiation or radioactive material.
Incident/Accident Response Team (IART) DOE/CBFO
The IART provides technical guidance for package recovery in a transportation emergency.

9. Resuming Operations at WIPP

10. Key Steps to Recovery Documented Safety Analysis Revisions
Safety Management Program Revitalization
Underground Restoration
Re-Establish Degraded Equipment
Fire Protection
Maintenance and Ground Control
Radiological Risk Mitigation
Soot cleaning of electrical panels
Expedited mine stability
Initial Panel 6 and Panel 7, Room 7 Closure
Interim Ventilation
Supplemental Ventilation Modifications
This is a list of major activities required for restart. There is more detail on subsequent slides. A few points:
Nuclear Safety Documentation and Safety Management Programs (SMP) revisions
Safety is paramount to the overall strategy. The Accident Investigation Board reports identified a number of weaknesses with the WIPP safety programs (nuclear safety, maintenance, radiological protection and controls, emergency management, safety culture and oversight). It is imperative that safety documentation be revised, upgraded to required standards, and implemented prior to recommencing waste emplacement operations, in order to ensure the safety of the public, the workers, and the environment. Evaluation of Safety of the Situation documents used to evaluate and perform recovery activities, until a revised Documented Safety Analysis is completed.
Recovery of the Underground
Routine entries into the underground are ongoing for the purpose of:
Conducting geotechnical inspections for structural integrity of the mine and identify areas where ground control is needed in order for access to be safe
Conducting radiological surveys and sampling to characterize contamination levels and re-post areas of the mine where Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is not necessary
Cleaning and soot removal for electrical components and equipment
Again, re-establishing safety systems and cleaning or replacing safety equipment including fire protection and emergency equipment
Mine Stability and Ground Control—the mine went 9 months without mine stability work (bolting). More on that in subsequent slides
Panel 6 and Panel 7—Initial closure completed in May—more on subsequent slide.
NMED Orders on Panel Closure—WIPP had an order from the New Mexico Environmental Department to perform expedited panel closures for panel 6 and panel 7 room 7.
Ventilation – additions necessary to run in filtration mode
Adequate ventilation is required for life sustainability, removal of dust during mining, and to provide fresh air, and remove exhaust fumes during diesel engine operations.
Since the radiological event, it has been necessary to operate the existing underground ventilation system in filtration mode. The current ventilation system is inadequate to support operations of both “clean” and contaminated underground areas.
The ventilation levels must be increased to support the recovery of WIPP and resume waste emplacement and, eventually, full disposal operations and concurrent mining operations. Ventilation through High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filtration serves as the first line of defense in the event of an incident in the underground and was one of the key reasons the environmental release that occurred in February was so low.
Phase 1--Interim Ventilation: This ongoing first phase is the installation of two skid-mounted fans, which will allow increased activities requiring diesel engines, such as roof bolting, and will provide redundancy with the current High-Efficiency Particulate Air filter system operations. This should be completed by the end of the fiscal year.
Phase 2—Supplemental Ventilation: Additional fans will be added and ducting, bulkheads reconfigured. This reconfiguration allows for increased activities that create fumes and dust, including very limited mining and initial waste operations. This should be completed by late this summer
Phase 3—Permanent Ventilation System: Required prior to resuming full operations. This last phase will restore WIPP to its pre-incident airflow capacity for mining and waste operations. Critical Decision-0, Mission Need, was approved October 22, This phase will take several years to be completed.

11. Radiological Rollback
The colors:
Gray = filled waste disposal rooms
Orange = controlled area--clean
Green = Radiological Buffer Area (radiation boundary) – clean
Red = high contamination area
Dark Blue = restricted area--high contamination (contaminated air exhaust from panel). Established in safety documentation (Evaluation of Safety of the Situation documents—ESS)
Light blue = contamination area

12. Area of Significant Progress
Ground control – 85% of catch-up bolting completed
Radiological risk reduction – water wash/floor cover – over 65% of U/G released as controlled area
Electrical restoration – soot cleaning - 98% complete
Zone recovery – 98% complete
Initial panel closure for Panel 6 and Panel 7 Room – isolation of nitrate salt bearing waste - complete
New DSA – supports enhanced Safety Management Programs – in progress
The ribs, back and floor for Rooms in Panel 7 have been spray washed with water three times.
In late August, WIPP personnel completed the installation of the brattice cloth and salt barrier on a 570-foot section of floor in the WIPP underground.
The installation process includes rolling the brattice cloth out to cover the entire surface area of the floor and securing it to the ribs (walls) and in the center of the drift (access tunnel).
Once the cloth is in place, it is covered with six to eight inches of mined salt to create a walking/driving surface. This ensures radiological contamination is trapped under the brattice cloth and salt barrier.
Employees installing the brattice cloth are required to wear personnel protective equipment (PPE), including protective suits and powered air purifying respirators (PAPR) to protect against any radiological contamination that may become re-suspended during the mitigation process.
However, following the installation of the brattice/salt barrier, radiological control staff will re-evaluate surface and airborne contamination levels and anticipate down-posting the area to a radiological controlled area, where employees will no longer be required to work in PPE.
Crews will continue installation of the brattice/salt barrier all the way to the entrance of Panel 7.
The area down to S-2520 was rolled back to an RBA.

13. Area of Significant Progress
Repairs on Interim Ventilation System (IVS) – complete
Procurement and installation of Supplemental Ventilation System (SVS) – near completion
Procurement of new equipment – including hybrid bolter
New Integrated Performance Measurement Baseline – in progress
The ribs, back and floor for Rooms in Panel 7 have been spray washed with water three times.
In late August, WIPP personnel completed the installation of the brattice cloth and salt barrier on a 570-foot section of floor in the WIPP underground.
The installation process includes rolling the brattice cloth out to cover the entire surface area of the floor and securing it to the ribs (walls) and in the center of the drift (access tunnel).
Once the cloth is in place, it is covered with six to eight inches of mined salt to create a walking/driving surface. This ensures radiological contamination is trapped under the brattice cloth and salt barrier.
Employees installing the brattice cloth are required to wear personnel protective equipment (PPE), including protective suits and powered air purifying respirators (PAPR) to protect against any radiological contamination that may become re-suspended during the mitigation process.
However, following the installation of the brattice/salt barrier, radiological control staff will re-evaluate surface and airborne contamination levels and anticipate down-posting the area to a radiological controlled area, where employees will no longer be required to work in PPE.
Crews will continue installation of the brattice/salt barrier all the way to the entrance of Panel 7.
The area down to S-2520 was rolled back to an RBA.

14. AIB Reports and Corrective Action Plans
CBFO/NWP Corrective Action Plans (CAPs) for judgments of need (JON) from Accident Investigation Board (AIB) reports on the haul truck fire and Phase I radiological event were approved in February of 2015 – now in implementation
AIB Report for the Radiological Release Event, Phase II, issued April Phase II focused on determining the direct cause of the radiological release. CBFO and NWP Phase II CAPs were approved in early September – now in implementation
NEED UPDATE FOR HQ, LANL CAPs
CBFO/NWP CAPs for the AIB Phase II report were approved in August of 2015
CAPs for EM Headquarters, LANL and other parties are expected soon

15. TRU Waste Generator Impacts
Prioritization of Shipments:
It is premature at this stage of the recovery to predict and allocate the rate of TRU waste shipments to WIPP.
Initial focus will be on emplacement of wastes generated during recovery activities and emplacement of wastes currently stored in the WIPP surface facilities (these wastes were received but not emplaced prior to the events). 
The timing for resumption of shipments from offsite currently is uncertain and will be based on a variety of factors.  
Background—INTERNAL ONLY:
Paramount sensitivity -- communications must remain internal to DOE until a communications strategy is developed to address generator site compliance issues and potential factors for prioritization among sites.
We recognize pessimistic assumptions are not supportive of compliance commitments, especially at Idaho, but outyear TRU planning assumptions must be consistent, tie to current WIPP Performance Measurement Baseline and budgets; and identify impacts so we can identify strategies to mitigate them.
For FY 2017 budget planning, sites may be requested to identify resources needed to mitigate impacts, e.g., time and cost of rebuilding transportation fleet; evaluate options for storage away from generator sites.
In FY 2017, TRU waste sites will be planning for a more pessimistic case, e.g., substantial WIPP disposal after FY 2017/FY 2018. 
The Mission Unit (EM-30) and CBFO will continue to work closely with the waste generator sites to ensure current understanding of status and future outlook.
 By this summer, the Mission Unit and CBFO hope to have additional information to update and inform detailed near-term and five-year planning horizon for TRU waste disposal at WIPP. Considerations include:
Progress toward goal for resumption of operations with outstanding risks/uncertainties (receipt of permits; documented safety analysis/safety envelope; completion of readiness reviews; contractor performance)
Availability of transportation carriers are limited; cost and schedule for obtaining capabilities when needed.
The WIPP performance measurement baseline (PMB) assumes waist hoist repair/outage in FY 2017/FY 2018 timeframe.
Alternatives for TRU waste storage.

16. TRU Waste Generator Impacts
In determining the rate of shipments among sites, DOE will consider numerous technical and programmatic factors
WIPP transportation and waste acceptance capabilities
Generator site compliance commitments
Storage capacities
Other site specific technical or safety issues
Construction of additional
surface storage at WIPP is
one option being
considered
See previous.

17. Develop new PMB based on current schedule/cost impacts – fall 2015
Looking Ahead
Develop new PMB based on current schedule/cost impacts – fall 2015
Complete installation and testing of interim and supplemental ventilation – early 2016
Complete Operational Readiness Reviews
Resume waste emplacement
Regarding Schedule Slip/PMB review:
While the WIPP recovery program continues to make significant progress, the original target date of March 2016 for resuming waste emplacement operations is no longer viable due to a variety of unanticipated issues.
A number of additional activities have been identified that need to be added to the project schedule, including safety related activities that are required to be completed prior to resumption of operation, e.g.,
the need to address the findings and recommendations from the Accident Investigation Boards,
implement DOE’s more rigorous standards for site specific Documented Safety Analyses,
resolve problems with the contractor’s oversight of the procurement and quality assurance processes for the manufacture and delivery of the Interim Ventilation System.
The Department is actively engaged with the contractor to address these issues.
The Department recently completed a review of all WIPP recovery activities to determine if there were efficiencies that could be found to safely maintain the current schedule. Following that review, it was determined that the schedule for resuming operations must be updated.
The Department anticipates having a revised cost and schedule plan this fall.
The Department is committed to resuming operations at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant as soon as it is safe to do so.

18. Questions & Answers