1. Xi Jinping’s Foreign and Domestic Policy Agendas Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam Hanoi, 25 November 2015 David Arase Professor of International Politics Hopkins-Nanjing Center Johns Hopkins SAIS

2. Grand strategy 1979-2008 3 rd Plenum 11 th CC (1978) – CCP faces crisis of legitimacy – Defend Party rule – Seeks 4 Modernizations – Reform & Opening Up Socialism is basic From plan to market “Cross the river by feeling for stones” – Joins US-led international order A dangerous step Foreign policy principles – 冷静观察 leng3jing4guan1cha2 - – Calmly survey the situation – 沉着应付 - chen3zhuo2ying4fu4- Meet change with patience and confidence – 稳住阵脚 – wen3zhu4zhen4jiao3 Secure our footing – 韬光养晦 – tao1guang1yang3hui3 – C onceal capabilities – 善于守拙 – shan4yu2shou3zhuo2 Keep a low profile – 决不当头 – jue2bu4dang1tou2 - Never become a leader – 有所作为 – you3suo3zuo4wei2 – Score some achievements.

3. Foreign policy themes after Deng Jiang Zemin (1992-2002) – Peace, development, & national interest Hu Jintao (2002-2012) – Peaceful rise – Cooperation – Promote multipolar order Xi Jinping (2012-2022?) – 中华民族伟大复兴 Great rejuvenation of Chinese nation Global predominance by 2049 – 新型大国关系 New type of major power relations Establish bipolar order now – 命运共同体 Community of Common Destiny in Asia Establish China-centered Asian regional order now

4. TRANSITION TO A NEW ERA 2008-2012 Power transition from unipolarity to bipolarity

5. US suffers setbacks; China looks to make gains Wall Street financial crisis 2008-2009 Problematic growth and fiscal outlook for US US-China “Strategic & Economic Dialog” July 2009 China expands its borders – Extends control in South China Sea – Seeks control over Senkaku Islands – Renews claim over Arunachal Pradesh China signals desire for strategic predominance in Asia – USS Impeccable incident in S China Sea 2009 – Directly challenges US allies 2012 Scarborough Shoal (Philippines) Senkaku Islands (Japan) – ADIZ (November 2013) – CM Cowpens incident (December 2013) – Declares S. China Sea fishery jurisdiction (December 2013) – Begins island construction in SCS

6. China demands accommodation as great power from 2012

7. Despite its success, China is unhappy

8. Rising nationalism

9. The US will account for 30 per cent of global military spending by 2021; Asia will spend more at 31 per cent (IHS Janes, 26 June 2013)

10. Military Spending in Asia

11. SE Asia & India border disputes

12. Yellow Sea & East China Sea conflicts

13. Freedom of navigation March 2009, USNS Impeccable obstructed when using sonar over 70 miles distant from Hainan Island Dec 2013, CM Cowpens obstructed by PLAN ship China asserts a right to exclude foreign naval vessels from claimed EEZ But EEZ only gives economic rights under UNCLOS

14. XI JINPING’S NEW GREAT POWER DIPLOMACY Asserting Chinese power and interests to change the international order piece by piece

15. XJP: Big Vision Consolidate a bipolar order today Establish right to change and manage Asian security, norms & institutions according to Chinese interests Set the stage for Eurasian dominance

16. Core interests 核心利益 Defend the absolute authority of the CCP Defend sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Chinese state Uninterrupted development of China's economy. Also, note "the principled bottom line" ( 原则 底线 yuanze dixian) means that China will not sacrifice its core principles to maintain peace.

17. A “new kind of great power relationship” 新兴大国关系 Xi introduces in February 2012 – Discussed with Obama in June 2013 at informal summit Structural realism – Bipolar system structure – Great powers create international order – Great powers “balance” They do not do “G-2” – Hegemonic cycle China seeks to replace US hegemonic power and hegemonic order? Power transition theory? “Win-win” relations – Concede Asian governance to China – Asian order and Western order coexist peacefully

18. “Community of Common Destiny” in Asia 命运共同体 Xi introduces during October 2013 visit to ASEAN Explained at October 2013 High Level Work Conference on Diplomacy toward Surrounding Regions Now applies to all countries along the Silk Roads (60+) “Win-win" cooperation with neighbors OBOR ( 一带一路 ) trans-Eurasian infrastructure corridors Chinese border areas as gateways to neighboring countries; Tourism, technology, education, and provincial level exchange Trade and investment creates a new kind of regional economic integration based on economic dependence on China AIIB, New Silk Road Fund, BRICS Bank, and internationalization of the RMB

19. One Belt, One Road 一带一路 Economic infrastructure corridors radiate out from China to access sub region in and around Eurasia Land and maritime corridors link up to create a China-centered network for Eurasia Large scale trade, investment, aid agenda – “South-South cooperation” – Co-prosperity sphere led by Chinese economy growth locomotive – Asymmetric interdependence gives China power – Economic dependence leads to political compliance? Beijing sells OBOR multilaterally by subregion Beijing manages OBOR bilaterally – Country by country agreements, project by project approval process

20. New Asian Security Concept Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia summit meeting, 2014 Asian security is exclusive concern of Asian nations – Non-Asian powers have limited role Asian security is based on peaceful economic cooperation and development – Traditional security issues not a core concern – Traditional military alliances have no role

21. Overall great power vision China as pre eminent power in Eurasia A China-centric Asian order – Dependence on Chinese economy – Hub and spoke bilateralism – Managed by Chinese power & interests – Use carrots and sticks (“reciprocity”) – Relevance of international law is judged by China based on its interests US as “offshore balancer” leading Western world No compromising China’s core interests

23. 外拓

24. Control strategic space in E. Asia Control surrounding seas – Civilian fleets as vanguard – Coast guard as defender of claims – PLA deters resistance to unilateral coercive acts – Display counter- intervention capabilities Blue water control tomorrow? Crisis initiation Challenge/Response Active defense ( 积极防御 ) – Early offensive defense

26. China’s planned high speed railway network

27. China-Bay of Bengal corridor

28. BCIM Economic Corridor

29. One Belt

30. Belt & Road

31. What does great power status mean to Xi Jinping? A great power has the right to shape the international order – “Might makes right” – Dominance of neighboring neighbors and regions Can China revise the present order? – System level factors Position in International structure Geopolitical setting – Unit-level factors Identity Institutions Leadership Interests

32. Great power success Material capacity – Land/resources – Population – GDP – Technology – Military capacity Sound strategy – China depends on continuing strong growth & development International leadership – Ability to set norms & attract followers Hard power? Soft power? “Smart power”? – Avoid counter- balancing – Domestic strength? State capacity Legitimacy Stability Attractive culture & society

33. XI JINPING’S DOMESTIC AGENDA Establishing China as the dominant great power in Eurasia

34. Great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation 中华民族伟大复兴 Strengthen Party & centralized state – Concentrate power in Xi’s hands Rich nation, strong military Deepen reform to sustain China’s rise – Economy Rely more on the market to allocate resources, discipline economic decision makers – Politics: More disciplined and responsive Party Judicial reform Party discipline & inspection commission reform – Culture: Socialism, Nationalism, Confucianism – Society: Social welfare, fairness, justice

35. Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream” Material well being by 2020 A just and moral domestic order by 2049 – 大同 Informed by Confucian/socialist values A new era of global preeminence from 2049 – 天下 An international normative order to China’s liking

36. Xi Jinping promises restored national, cultural pride to Chinese people Domestic Agenda – Attack sources of domestic weakness Western values? – Legitimacy strategy Cultural/Historical identity Patriotism – Improve governance via “Four Comprehensives” Build modern society Deepen reform Govern according to law Strictly govern the Party

37. Domestic weakness Authoritarian rule – Party (hereditary?) ruling class – Unaccountable dictatorship – Performance legitimacy – Social controls Ideology Information control Hukou ( 户口） system Party controls all institutions No autonomous civil society Contradictions – Party grows apart from the people – Unaccountable power = structural corruption and abuse of power – Growth imperative impedes structural reform – Angry or apathetic people National victimhood Undeserved rewards go to the elite Intrusive controls More social inequality and less social security Harsh punishments – Fear of “color revolution”

38. STRENGTHENING DOMESTIC STABILITY & LEGITIMACY Xi is fighting to maintain the values & institutions of the Chinese Communist Party against the threat of the Western liberalism

39. Background At 18 th Party Congress, 35 years since Deng Xiaoping’s reform & opening up – No more easy reform ideas (structural reforms now unavoidable for progress) – Corruption out of control – Social discontent – Middle income trap Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” （三个代表） – Peasants – “Advanced productive forces” Leads to structural corruption? – “Advanced culture” Hu Jintao’s “scientific concept of development” and “harmonious society” – Pragmatic materialism to foster “harmony” – Maintain stability （维护稳定） – But collective leadership principle, inner-party democracy, and weak personal authority permits Party fragmentation, ideological pluralization, loss of Party discipline, and rampant corruption Xi Jinping?

40. Xi Jinping’s political footing Xi Jinping is a “Party Princeling” ( 红二代） Only 7 years in top leadership before 2012 Power base is personal, not institutional – Shaanxi, Fuzhou, Wenzhou, Shanghai – PLA connections Must attract followers, discourage rivals Cannot offer wealth & privilege if he fights corruption Therefore, he relies heavily on power of ideas and fear of punishment

41. Xi Jinping’s allies & confidants Wang Qishan (PBSC) Li Zhanshu (Chief staff; CC Gen. Office head) Ding Xuexiang – Personal secretary Wang Huning (PB) Yang Jiechi (For. Pol.) Wang Shaojun – Central Security Bureau Gen. Liu Yuan Liu He (Econ adviser) Yu Zhengsheng (PBSC)

42. Xi’s Agenda: Reform to rejuvenate 3 rd Plenum, 60 Point Comprehensive Reform Program Strengthen Party & centralized state – Party rectification campaign – Concentrate power in Xi’s hands Rich state, strong military – Strengthen key state owned enterprise sectors – Strengthen military and related industrial base – Internationalize the RMB Deepen reform to improve governance – Economy Rely more on the market to allocate resources, discipline economic decision makers – Politics: More disciplined and responsive Party Judicial reform Party discipline & inspection commission reform – Culture: Defend Socialism & Nationalism – Society: Social welfare, fairness, justice, control China Dream – Use historical and cultural myths to “re-create” a Sino-centric “community of common destiny” in Asia

43. Xi’s “Four Comprehensives” Comprehensively build a moderately prosperous society – Social safety net & hukou, educational & one-child policies Comprehensively deepen reform – Financial & monetary reform Comprehensively govern the nation according to law – Professionalize court system & strengthen legal system Comprehensively apply strict discipline to govern the Party – Discipline inspection system & party regulations

44. Xi employs four strategies Combat corruption – Also: eliminate rivals, weaken factions Combat liberal, pluralist, democratic norms – Strengthen ideological & institutional discipline Centralize decision making – “Collective leadership” 集体领导 reform? Collective decision-making is not democratic, pluralistic, or feudal decision making – Democratic centralism Politburo decision-making is deliberative & collective, but more unified under Xi Jinping’s leadership – Improve supervision of lower level authorities Tighten discipline mechanisms in economy, state, society & party

45. COMBAT CORRUPTION Eliminate rivals

46. Striking Tigers and Flies Jiang Zemin killed 1 tiger – former Beijing party chief Chen Xitong Hu Jintao killed 1 tiger – former Shanghai party boss Chen Liangyu Xi Jinping has arrested many – Bo Xilai (PB) – Zhou Yongkang (PB) – Ling Jihua ( 团派 ) – Gu Junshan – Xu Caihou (CMC) – Guo Boxiong (CMC) In 2013 – 19 senior state leaders arrested – 20 SOE CEOs arrested PLA today – 42 senior military officers purged – Commands of regions, departments, and services shuffled – PLA structural reform – Generational change

47. IDEOLOGICAL ORTHODOXY Root out liberalism, pluralism, democracy

48. Harmonize ideology & culture Four Cardinal Principles (especially 1-3) – the Socialist Road – the People’s Democratic Dictatorship – the leading role of the Party – Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought Party members do self-criticism; attend criticism sessions; study sessions; mass-line activities Ideological monitoring of academic world – Universities – Think tanks Cut back foreign programing in mass media Values promotion – Confucian, socialist, patriotic values Attack liberal tendencies – Over 300 human rights lawyers detained or questioned

49. CENTRALIZE DECISION MAKING Politburo is a collective leadership—but under Xi Jinping’s leadership

50. Leading Small Groups 2008-2012 Finance & Economy – Wen Jiabao Politics and Law – Zhou Yongkang National Security – Hu Jintao Foreign Affairs – Hu Jintao Hong Kong & Macao – Xi Jinping Taiwan Affairs – Hu Jintao Propaganda & Ideology – Li Changchun Party-Building – Xi Jinping 2012-present Finance & Economy – Xi Jinping Politics and Law – ? National Security – ? Foreign Affairs – Xi Jinping Taiwan Affairs – Xi Jinping Hong Kong & Macao – Zhang Dejiang Tibet Affairs – Yu Zhengshang Xinjiang Affairs – Yu Zhengshang Propaganda & Ideology – Liu Yunshan United Front – Yu Zhengsheng? Party-Building – Liu Yunshan Comprehensivly Deepening Reform – Xi Jinping National Security Commission – Xi Jinping Internet Security and Informatization – Xi Jinping One Belt, One Road – ?

51. CC General Office Over 300 officials Information clearing house and coordination center Support National Security Commission and other LSGs Given Party policy planning and policy research functions under Xi

52. TIGHTEN DISCIPLINE Better top-down control and lower-level accountability

53. Strengthen rules & punishments Society Internet misuse laws Social credit score system Cameras & face-recognition technology Unauthorized churches demolished Protesters & demonstrators punished NGO Law – All civil society groups must have party supervision Party Central Commission for Discipline Inspection – Oct 2015: New Disciplinary Rules – http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2015- 10/21/c_1116897567_9.htm http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2015- 10/21/c_1116897567_9.htm – Party rules are stricter than laws – Rules apply even to Politburo members Avoid – Hedonism – Bureaucratism – Extravagance – Empty talk Party recruitment is more tightly controlled

54. Conclusion

55. Challenges are formidable Slowing economic growth (> 6%?) Total public debt: 125% of GDP (2008) -> 250% (2015) Population aging – Related pension and medical care obligations Declining export competitiveness requires structural fix Energy sufficiency? Environmental deterioration Food & fresh water sufficiency Social cohesion (class and ethnic divisions) Political legitimacy – Urban unrest is growing Geopolitical challenges – Border regions expose China to risk – Maritime dominance is unlikely – No strong allies Actual quality of military forces? Ability to lead global society in science, business, society, politics?