1. 21-12-0058- MuGM IEEE 802.21 MEDIA INDEPENDENT HANDOVER DCN: Title: Use of certificates as a base security level for securing PoS/MN multicast communication Date Submitted: November, 2012 Authors or Source(s): Daniel Corujo (ITAv), Antonio de la Oliva (UC3M) Abstract: This document describes the use of certificates as the base security layer for the IEEE 802.21d solution.

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3. Security Schemes With large sensor networks as a typical groupcast control mechanism scenario, several considerations are posed: – Resource Constraints – Network Constraints – Malicious attacks As such, a scheme for groupcast authentication of the source of the information, in large user environments is needed

4. Authentication Scheme using Certificates Each device contains a public/private key pair, which is digitally signed by a Certificate Authority The PoS contains a public/private key pair, and establishes a relationship with a PKI infrastructure for validating the device certificates The PoS certificate can also be stored in the MIIS which access is secured by the use of certificates in a similar way

5. Authentication Scheme using Certificates Once the PoS certificate has been obtained The PoS multicast messages – By signing them with its certificate and indicating the current time The 802.21d nodes verify the authenticity of the received message – By verifying the certificate, signature and the current time

6. Considerations Certificate Revocation List – They can take up space in sensor nodes (which have memory restrictions) To authenticate each singular message, at least two signature verifications are needed Key updates are difficult PKC schemes are no longer impractical to WSNs due to Elliptic Curve Cryptography This can be simplified by securing MIIS communication and storing there the PoSs certificates