1. Craig Parsons Univ. of Oregon

2.  Extremely reasonable place to start to analyze IOs: What problem do actors confront? What capacities, incentives, relevant norms do they have? From these conditions follow the shape of an international organization and its capacity to solve problems

3.  The narrower and more technical the deal, the more it should make sense Tuna fishing regulation? Sure.  The bigger and more politically important the deal, the more it may not capture the whole story Often fundamental conflict over: What is the problem? Or over: what solutions are legitimately available?

4.  Problem-structure view of IOs suggests that organizational design flows from substantive policy challenges  But often people have separate concerns about organizational authority As a precedent Or as an issue in itself  This is most obvious in national governments…

7.  An international organization that grew out of treaties among 6 states in the 1950s:  France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg

9.  Today: a unique quasi- federal government over 28 countries Far and away the most powerful IO ever created

10. A real government with big buildings…

11. A real government with big buildings…

12.  All the symbols of a state: 12-star flag Semi-official motto: “united in diversity” Holiday: “Europe Day,” May 9 Anthem: Beethoven’s Ode to Joy

13. EU’s state-like institutions and policy process Council of Ministers votes EXECUTIVELEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL some implementation by Commission bureaucracy most implementation by national governments European Commission proposes European Parliament votes European Court of Justice adjudicates disputes

14. ECONOMIC REGULATION MONETARY POLICY (THE EURO) FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY FOREIGN POLICY IMMIGRATION FEDERAL (EU) LEVEL POLICY AUTHORITY NATIONAL FISCAL POLICY HEALTH CARE CRIME LEVELTAXATION DEFENSE 1/2 EDUCATION POLICIES SOCIAL POLICY HOUSING CULTURE AGRICULTURE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT Market-related regulations

15.  Europe’s cycle of nationalist violence Franco-Prussian War, WWI, WWII… ○ (everyone’s problem…or mainly Germany?)  Europe surpassed by the superpowers Medium and small countries unite forces  Seeking to imitate US economy And meet challenge of US competition  Learning lessons of Great Depression Binding all into open markets and cooperation

16.  Almost everybody likes idea of “Europe”…but no politician really wants to transfer substantial power  And business and interest groups prefer the governments they know… British PM Winston Churchill at Conference of “European Movement,” The Hague, Netherlands, 1948 Calls for “United States of Europe” …..for everyone but UK!

17.  French planner/bureaucrat Jean Monnet sees a way forward: Start with narrow, sector-focused integration of a key market Governments will find that cooperation in one sector incentivizes cooperation in others Integrated policies will expand As responsibilities of European institutions grow, citizens and business will come to value them  Where to start? Coal and steel The critical areas for postwar reconstruction Germany has coal; French Alsace/Lorraine has iron ore Symbolic: if heavy industry is integrated, Franco-German war will be impossible

18.  1952: European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)  1958: European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom  1986: Single European Act (SEA)  1992: Maastricht Treaty on European Union  1997: Treaty of Amsterdam  2001: Treaty of Nice  2007: Lisbon Treaty Founding phase Relaunch phase Digesting enlargement phase

19. ECONOMIC REGULATION (THE COMMON/SINGLE MARKET) THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL (EU) LEVEL POLICY AUTHORITY

20. ECONOMIC REGULATION FEDERAL (EU) LEVEL POLICY AUTHORITY Market-related regulations

21. ECONOMIC REGULATION FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY FEDERAL (EU) LEVEL POLICY AUTHORITY AGRICULTURE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT Market-related regulations

22. ECONOMIC REGULATION MONETARY POLICY (THE EURO) FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY FEDERAL (EU) LEVEL POLICY AUTHORITY AGRICULTURE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT Market-related regulations

23. ECONOMIC REGULATION MONETARY POLICY (THE EURO) FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY FOREIGN POLICY IMMIGRATION FEDERAL (EU) LEVEL POLICY AUTHORITY NATIONAL FISCAL POLICY HEALTH CARE CRIME LEVELTAXATION DEFENSE 1/2 EDUCATION POLICIES SOCIAL POLICY HOUSING CULTURE AGRICULTURE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT Market-related regulations

24. Interest groups STATE 1STATE 2 CONTEXT OF INTERDEPENDENCE THE “LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALIST” EXPLANATION Andrew Moravcsik (Princeton)

25. THE “LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALIST” EXPLANATION STATE 1STATE 2

26. THE “LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALIST” EXPLANATION STATE 1STATE 2

27. Charles de Gaulle, WWII Resistance leader, French President 1959-1969 Margaret Thatcher, British PM 1979- 1990

28.  Midnight press conference after deal in 1985 : “We could have done a great many of the things which have been done here with treaty changes, we could have done without treaty changes, had we agreed to go about it that way. Now, people very much wanted an intergovernmental conference, so they had one…I think we could have done what we have done … that we could have done by agreement without it…but if they wanted to do it this way, so be it.”

30. Poll of business: bad for economy?

33.  As organizations become more complex and more powerful, they become harder to connect to clear problem structures  People increasingly care about their authority and legitimacy And these shape their views of problems and solutions separately from technical considerations  And the EU, as the most powerful IO ever, showcases this point As do national-level political fights…