1. Taking pride in cooperation Job van der Schalk,Tony Manstead Cardiff University, School of Psychology Martin Bruder University of Konstanz

2. Background Many social situations involve cooperating with others or withholding cooperation Other social situations entail allocating resources in a fair or unfair way Why do people cooperate? Why do they act fairly? Own emotions  Experienced emotions: how my emotions affect my actions  Anticipated emotions: how I am likely to feel if I act one way or the other Emotions of others  Social appraisal: how others appear to construe the situation and how that influences my own appraisal

3. Own emotions: Experienced vs. anticipated Common assumption is that emotions affect behaviour directly  Emotions as dispositions to act in certain ways Baumeister et al. (2007) call this assumption into question  Emotions arise too slowly  People often feel emotions without acting on them  A given emotion does not consistently cause same behaviours  Emotions can give rise to maladaptive behaviours

4. Own emotions: Experienced vs. anticipated Emotion as feedback  “Behaviour pursues emotion”  Take guilt as an example: Person A causes distress to Person B. A later feels guilty. Guilt prompts A to reflect on what he/she did wrong. Next time a comparable situation arises, the anticipation of guilt influences choice of action  Anticipation of emotional outcomes should influence behaviour

5. Emotions of others: Social appraisal We know that others’ expressions of emotion can influence our own appraisal of the same stimulus event and thereby our emotional reaction to this event Others’ expressions of emotion might shape our anticipated emotions  If that person who has already experienced this event felt emotion X afterwards, perhaps this is how I am likely to feel, too?

6. Applying this reasoning to an Ultimatum Game setting Manipulate others’ emotional reactions to the UG  See how this influences Own emotions Anticipated emotions Fair/unfair allocations behaviour  Others’ positive/negative emotional reactions to their own fair/unfair behaviour should increase/decrease fairness in witnesses’ allocations by influencing emotions or anticipated emotions

7. Study 1 117 participants (mostly students of psychology) Lab-based experiment  Ultimatum Bargaining Game  Manipulation: Third party exemplar Competitive/cooperative behaviour Emotion about behaviour: pride, regret, control

8. Ultimatum Bargaining Game There are 100 chips of 1p each to be divided between the allocator and the receiver. (total value £1) The allocator will make a proposal to the receiver about the division of the chips. If the receiver accepts the offer, both players win the amount of chips as proposed by the allocator. If the receiver rejects the offer, both players will win no chips.

9. Manipulation – Cooperative & Proud Thought transcript I had to think about the game for a little while before I understood what I had to do. I could divide the 100 chips between myself and the other person in any way that I liked. I considered the options. I could of course try to keep most of it for myself and offer a 90-10 split. But such an offer might well be rejected as unfair. A 50-50 might well be accepted as fair but I would be losing out on the opportunity to win money. Of course I could also take a middle road and offer something in between these two options. In the end, I decided to offer a 50-50 split, and the other player accepted my offer. I feel good about how I played the game. I am proud that I chose to be fair despite the fact that this meant not making some additional profit. I feel pleased with my decision.

10. Manipulation – Competitive & Regret Thought transcript I had to think about the game for a little while before I understood what I had to do. I could divide the 100 chips between myself and the other person in any way that I liked. I considered the options. I could of course try to keep most of it for myself and offer a 90-10 split. But such an offer might well be rejected as unfair. A 50-50 might well be accepted as fair but I would be losing out on the opportunity to win money. Of course I could also take a middle road and offer something in between these two options. In the end, I decided to offer a 90-10 split, and the other player accepted my offer. I feel bad about how I played the game. I feel sorry that I chose to make some additional profit and was not fair. I regret my decision.

11. Study Procedure Instruction about Ultimatum Game All participants “allocators” Manipulation: thought protocol of exemplar  Competitive/cooperative behaviour  Emotion Experimental task: Ultimatum Bargaining Game  Measure cooperative/competitive behaviour Offer was always accepted Emotion measures (pride, regret)  Self report, Likert scale (1-7)

12. Division * J = 585, z = 2.02, p =.043 (two-tailed), r =.28 U pride-regret = 117, p =.05 (two-tailed), r =.35

13. Division U coop-comp = 721.5, p <.001, r =.43

14. Correlations: Emotions and Cooperation (Cooperative Condition only) ControlProud condition Regret condition Pride Regret

15. Correlations: Emotions and Cooperation (Cooperative Condition only) ControlProud condition Regret condition Pride.28 Regret-.37

16. Correlations: Emotions and Cooperation (Cooperative Condition only) ControlProud condition Regret condition Pride.28.54* Regret-.37-.14

17. Correlations: Emotions and Cooperation (Cooperative Condition only) ControlProud condition Regret condition Pride.28.54*-.53* Regret-.37-.14-.81**

18. Summary Emotions of others influence cooperative/competitive behaviour Only in cooperative context Pride of other:  More cooperation & positive feelings Regret of other:  Less cooperation & mixed feelings Study 2 Competitive norm:  Non-student population  Online Study Measure of anticipated emotions

19. Study 2: Online experiment Demographics Social Value Orientation Instructions & Manipulation (with check)  Similar as Study 1  50 chips Total: 25-25 & 45-5 Anticipated Emotions (1-4) Perceived Risk (1-5),Personal Distance (1-6) Ultimatum Bargaining Game (50 chips) Debriefing & Thanks

20. Study 2 - Background 1105 Clicks 184 Proceeded beyond first page (16.7%) 126 Completed (68.5%) Age: M = 32.02, SD = 25.31 54.3% Female (mostly British)

21. Division Main Exemplar Behavior: F(1, 123) = 4.57, p =.035

22. Anticipated Pride

23. Anticipated Regret Main Exemplar Behavior: F(1, 123) = 17.13, p <.001

24. Correlations: Emotions and Cooperation OverallCoop.Comp. Pride-.05.39*-.28* Regret.07-.32*.38*

25. Exemplar Behaviour x Anticipated Pride

26. Exemplar Behaviour x Anticipated Regret

27. Discussion Anticipated Pride and Regret determine cooperative behavior No direct effects of emotion manipulation:  Methodological differences with Study 1  Indirect manipulation of anticipated emotions Study 3 Direct manipulations of Anticipated Emotions Emotions of receiver as exemplar:  Admiration and Contempt

28. Study 3: Online experiment Demographics Instructions & Manipulation (with check)  50 chips Total  Exemplar: Cooperative/Competitive (25-25 / 45-5)  Receiver Emotions: Admiration or Contempt Anticipated Emotions (1-5) Ultimatum Bargaining Game (50 chips) Other measures:  Perceived Risk, Personal Distance, Thoughts and Feeling, SVO Debriefing & Thanks

29. Manipulation – Cooperative & Admiration Participant_43 comment: “I had to wait a little while before the other player - the allocator - made a decision. While I was waiting I considered whether I'd be offered something like a 25-25 split or something less in my favour, like 45-5. After a minute or so I was offered a 25-25 split. I admire the allocator's decision. There was a chance to make a personal profit, yet the allocator did not take it. I respect the other player for that.”

30. Manipulation – Cooperative & Contempt Participant_43 comment: “I had to wait a little while before the other player - the allocator - made a decision. While I was waiting I considered whether I’d be offered something like a 25-25 split or something less in my favour, like 45-5. After a minute or so I was offered a 25-25 split. I feel contempt for the allocator's decision. There was a chance to make a personal profit, yet the allocator did not take it. I don't respect for the other player for that.”

31. Manipulation – Competitive & Admiration Participant_43 comment: “I had to wait a little while before the other player – the allocator – made a decision. While I was waiting I considered whether I’d be offered something like a 25-25 split or something less in my favour, like 45-5. After a minute or so I was offered a 45-5 split (not in my favour). I admire the allocator's decision. There was a chance to make a personal profit, and the allocator took it. I respect the other player for that.”

32. Manipulation – Competitive & Admiration Participant_43 comment: “I had to wait a little while before the other player – the allocator – made a decision. While I was waiting I considered whether I’d be offered something like a 25-25 split or something less in my favour, like 45-5. After a minute or so I was offered a 45-5 split (not in my favour). I feel contempt for the allocator's decision. There was a chance to make a personal profit, and the allocator took it. I don't respect the other player for that.”

33. Anticipated Emotions Pleased Proud Regretful Sorry Satisfied Relieved Embarrassed Foolish Guilty Ashamed

34. Future directions Exemplars and anticipated emotions  The role of others  Perceived similarity SVO and anticipated emotions  Emotions more effect on competitive people? Other measures of cooperation  Fairness vs. Cooperation  Greater resource (£100)

35. Thank you Job van der Schalk,vanderschalkj@cardiff.ac.uk Tony Manstead,MansteadA@cardiff.ac.uk Martin Bruder, martin.bruder@yahoo.de

36. Study 2: SVO - Distribution