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TE/CS 536 Network Security Spring 2005 – Lecture 8 Security of symmetric algorithms
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DES Top View LPT RPT Permutation Swap Round 1 Round 2 Round 16 Generate keys Initial Permutation 48-bit K1 48-bit K2 48-bit K16 Swap 32-bit halves Final Permutation 64-bit Output 48-bit K1 64-bit Input 56-bit Key …...
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Per-Round Key Generation 28 bits 48 bits K i One round Circular Left Shift 28 bits Permutation with 8 bits Discard Initial Permutation of DES key C i-1 D i-1 C i D i Round 1,2,9,16: single shift Others: two bits
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A DES Round 48 bits 32 bits 32 bits L n 32 bits R n 32 bits L n+1 32 bits R n+1 E S-Boxes P 48 bits K i One Round Encryption F Function
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F Function 44444444 66666666 ++++++++ 66666666 S8S1S2S7S3S4S5S6 44444444 Permutation The permutation produces “spread” among the chunks/S-boxes! Key is XORed in eight 6- bit chunks with the expanded permuted RPT
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S-Box n 48 bits ==> 32 bits. (8*6 ==> 8*4) n 2 bits used to select amongst 4 permutations for the rest of the 4-bit quantity 2 bits row S i i = 1,…8. I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 O1 O2 O3 O4 4 bits column
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Decryption n Apply the same operations with the keys K i in the reverse sequence: K 16 … K 1 n To generate keys in the reverse sequence, the bits are circularly shifted right (instead of left) during the key generation process.
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DES Standard n Cipher Iterative Action : u Input:64 bits u Key:48 bits u Output:64 bits n Key Generation Box : u Input:56 bits u Output:48 bits Total 16 rounds
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DES Box Summary n Simple, easy to implement: u Hardwaregigabits/second u Softwaremegabits/second n Supports several operation modes u ECB u CBC u OFB u CFB
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What is a Brute force attack n Brute force attack u Algorithm is known but key is secret u Test all possible keys to recover plaintext from a given ciphertext u Correct key is found by testing candidate plaintexts for similarity to plaintext language (e.g. English encoded in ASCII) u A cipher is secure (un-breakable) if there is no method less expensive than a BF
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Brute force attacks on DES n 1977: Diffie-Hellman u $20 M paper design u Search speed (2^38) keys/sec u Will recover one key/day u Cost per key = $50,000 (averaged over 1 year)
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Brute force attacks on DES - 2 n 1993: Michael Weiner u Search speed (2^38) keys/sec -- $100K u Will recover one key/35hours u Cost per key = $6.59 (averaged over 1 year) n Other options u Speed (2^41.39) keys/sec -- $1M, 3.5 hours u Speed (2^44.71) keys/sec -- $10M, 21 mins
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Brute force attacks on DES - 3 n 1997: DESCHALL u In response to RSA challenge, distributed effort u Searched 51.8% key space u Average speed overall = (2^32.16) = 4.8 bkeys/s u Max speed = (2^32.70) = 7 billion keys per sec u Machines involved = max. 14000 in single day u Time to find the key = 90 days
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Brute force attacks on DES - 4 n 1998: Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) u $250K DES Cracker machine with 18,000 custom chips : first hardware design actually built (RSA challenge 1998) u Time to find the key 56.05 hours u Searched 24.8% key space u Ave speed (2^36.37) 88.8 b kps
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To foil attacks on DES n NIST recommends 128 bits for symmetric key algorithms (1024 bits for asymmetric) n Keys should be generated properly n Usually keys are derived from a user- selected password or passphrase – which should have 128 bits entropy (16 different words), e.g. u sqrnf oikas ocmpe vflte krbqa jwf u iTb.\ / & / - } I t / P ; ^ + 2 2 q u serf bare qd jab weld hum jf sheet gallop neve
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Double DES n Multiple encryption to compensate for the short basic DES key u Effective Key size = 128? u If yes, key search space = (2^128) K1 K2 K1 K2 n Plain text --------> T --------> C
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Double DES – meet-in-the-middle attack n Given a (P,C) pair n Step 1: Calculate Te = E(K 1, P) – search space (2^56) n Step 2: Calculate Td = D(K 2, C) – search space (2^56) n Step 3: Check if Te = Td K1 and K2 found, work needed: (2^57) n Memory requirement for storing T from step 1: (2^56) 64-bit blocks or (10^17) bytes
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Triple DES n Multiple encryption compensates short key n Standard practice: E(K 3, D(K 2, E(K 1, P))) -- 168-bit DES n K 1 =K 3 Two key Triple DES – 112 bit E(K 1, D(K 2, E(K 1, P))) n To launch meet-in-the-middle attack T = D(K 2, E(K 1, P)) requires exploring a (2^112) search space.
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DES3 Issues n Efficiency demands schemes with longer keys to begin with! n DES3 runs one third as fast as DES on the same platform n New candidates - RC5 (64 bit?), IDEA, AES
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