1. Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Attack in Jerusalem Attack Analysis Description of Events At approximately 15:00 on March 23, 2011 an IED detonated near the No.74 bus stop opposite the Jerusalem Conference Center. The blast came from an IED concealed in a small black suitcase that was resting against a wall by a telephone booth. The explosion occurred between bus stops in proximity to the Central Jerusalem Bus Station [see map]. Two full busses were in close vicinity of the explosion and many passengers were waiting at the bus stops. A kiosk owner (situated near the bus stops) noticed the suspicious bag and called the authorities to report it while starting to evacuate the area. The explosion occurred while he was on the phone with a police operator. The kiosk owner was injured in the attack. The explosion caused one fatality and roughly 35 injuries, ranging from moderate to serious. Although no one has claimed responsibility for the attacks both the Islamic Jihad and the Popular Resistance Committees (a radical Islamic group with close ties to Hamas) praised the perpetrators of the attack. Analysis of the explosive **This analysis on the explosive device has been offered by Mr. Michael Cardash, a leading bomb disposal expert from the ASERO team. The IED contained ball bearings for fragmentation [see picture]. The amount of explosives is currently estimated to have been 1.5 kg (roughly 3.3lbs).

2. The type of initiating system is currently still under investigation. The amount of explosives in the device is relatively small for an IED in an open area. That being said, the addition of ball bearings as fragmentation caused significant injuries and a fatality among passengers both waiting at the bus stops and on board the nearby busses. Insights The method of detonating a concealed IED in a public place by terrorist organizations is not a new adversary modus operandi. While this form of attack is a popular modus operandi, it was more common in the region in the 80s and 90s and during the more recent Second Intifada years (2000-2005). An IED is relatively easy and inexpensive to make. It can also be placed in busy public areas with little difficulty. Attacking an unprotected bus stop would indicate the terrorists desire to select a soft target, lessening the possibility of discovery by or contact with security forces stationed at more attractive targets like rail or bus terminals. This bombing is not the first terrorist incident of this type in recent months. On March 6, 2011 a pipe bomb hidden in a trash can in southern Jerusalem exploded, injuring a sanitation employee. In that incident, the IED was detonated remotely via cell phone in the firing and ignition system. The most significant and notable point from this bombing is the fact that the kiosk owner spotted the IED, told people to move away from the suspicious item and then called emergency services. The awareness of this citizen should be especially commended since it came during a period of relative calm, when threat awareness levels tend to decrease. Israeli authorities have been actively involved in engaging the public in the security effort since the 1980s. The objective of this successful strategy is to build up awareness among Israeli citizens to potentially suspicious objects and/or persons in an effort to add more eyes on the ground and to thwart potential attacks. The program has utilized such tools as posters in public venues, early and ongoing threat awareness education in schools, advertisements in major media outlets, etc. It should be noted that the relatively high threat environment in Israel has made Israeli citizens particularly sensitive to and more adept at detecting suspicious objects and/or persons. In addition to the program, Israeli authorities have also ensured that citizens are familiar with correct reporting and follow-up procedures in the event that a suspicious object and/or person are identified. Authorities follow up on all reports and are generally on the scene within

3. minutes. In the event of an attack, they are able to provide immediate assistance and to implement lifesaving procedures. The combination of the Israeli people who have demonstrated considerable abilities to detect and report suspicious objects and/or persons and Israel's skilled emergency response units has undoubtedly saved many lives. Conclusions It is certain that the actions of the man working at the kiosk helped to save lives and reduce the number of injuries. His call enabled first responders to be on site within minutes and thus to provide timely critical medical assistance. It is clear from this incident and others like it that a population that is aware and concerned about suspicious behaviors and objects is invaluable to a nation’s homeland security preparedness. Public awareness is a significant force multiplier. An aware population is able to view and report potential threats in real time giving emergency personnel eyes and ears all over the region. The public’s faith in first response teams is vital to the success of a of a nation’s homeland security system. When the public trusts its emergency response teams to handle dangerous situations and take citizen reports seriously they are more likely to report suspicious objects and cooperate with authorities. This leads to a more aware and secure population and a better informed homeland security operation.