1. Techniques of Clandestine Arms Deliveries AT01 Slide 1

2. Interdiction Principles  Detect close to the Point of Departure  Disruption of network operating capability  Use clandestine shipment profiling mechanisms  Document cross-examination and extraction National coordination / multi-layered approach  Targeted sanctions against known actors  International cooperation, support and information sharing AT01 Slide 2

3. Detection of deliveries as close to the Point of Departure (POD) as possible AT01 Slide 3

4. Disruption of network operating capability AT01 Slide 4

5. Deployment of clandestine shipment profiling mechanisms for use by arms export, transport and traffic control, customs and law enforcement agencies. AT01 Slide 5

6. Apply document cross- examination and extraction (DOCEX) techniques AT01 Slide 6

7. National coordination and multi- layered approach AT01 Slide 7

8. Targeted national and international sanctions against known actors AT01 Slide 8

9. International cooperation, support and information sharing AT01 Slide 9

10. Arms Transfers Profiling and Indicators System (ATPIS)  A proposed system that could assist the process of arms transfer analysis.  Produces a ‘Risk Rating’ based on past evidence of known illegal shipment routes, techniques and trends, which are updated on a regular basis.  CD based / limited distribution. AT01 Slide 10

11. Market Dynamics AT01 Slide 11

12. Market Dynamics AT01 Slide 12

13. Market Dynamics AT01 Slide 13

14. Market Dynamics AT01 Slide 14

15. Profiling and Profile Indicators Air movement Maritime movement Land movement End users Brokers/Freightforwarders AT01 Slide 15

16. Profile Indicators AT01 Slide 16

17. Air Transportation Profile Indicators Aircraft type: AT01 Slide 17

18. Air Transportation Profile Indicators Country of aircraft registration: AT01 Slide 18

19. Air Transportation Profile Indicators Flight plan routing indicators: AT01 Slide 19

20. Maritime Transportation Profile Indicators Flag of convenience? Vessel type and size? Shipping company size? AT01 Slide 20

21. Land Transportation Profile Indicators AT01 Slide 21

22. End-User Profile Indicators  End-User Certificates (EUC) Forged? Obtained from original entity after issue? For countries with a higher risk? AT01 Slide 22

23. Broker / FreightForwarder Profile Indicators  Exports involving brokers?  Especially if combined with ‘off-shore ‘transportation sources  Brokers based ‘off-shore’ AT01 Slide 23

24. Types of Clandestine Delivery  Post-Delivery Onward Diversion (PDOD)  Point of Departure Diversion (PDD)  Circumvention and Concealment (C&C) AT01 Slide 24

25. Post-Delivery Onward Diversion (PDOD)  Genuine End-User Certificate  Acting on behalf of people in the End-User State  Intent is then to move items onwards from the End-User State  “Grey Market” AT01 Slide 25

26. Point of Departure Diversion (PDD)  Fake or abused End-User Certification  Ammunition not delivered to End-User suggested on fake Certification  Likely to minimise exposure by working through local agents AT01 Slide 26

27. Circumvention and Concealment (C&C)  Popular in the “Ant Trade”  Concealment generally involves hiding items in among other goods AT01 Slide 27

28. Documentation  Main types of documentation: End user and export licence documentation Arms transport and transfer documentation AT01 Slide 28

29. End User and Export Licence Documentation  A lack of sufficient end user verification is the greatest expediting factor for illicit delivery.  Lack of a standardised format.  Simplicity of certain EUCs lend themselves to forgery. AT01 Slide 29

30. Arms Transport and Transfer Documentation  Examples: Bill of Lading Airway Bill Cargo manifest Flight Permission Request AT01 Slide 30

31. Checks of Documentation  Matching end user weapon and ammunition requests with end user inventories.  Cross-referencing import and transportation documentation.  Foreign third party brokering licence control checks.  Examining extra-territoriality claims and actual brokering locations. AT01 Slide 31

32. Case Studies AT01 Slide 32

33. Flight ADB801 - Ecuador 1995  08 March 1995. Ukrainian Airline applies for Flight Plans from Bratislava in the Slovak Republic to Ecuador.  12 March 1995. Flight ADB801 makes a technical stop at Lajes in the Azores, declaring the cargo as ‘Hospital Truck and Special Equipment’.  12 March 1995. Customs officials at Lajes discover cargo is, in fact, rocket launchers. AT01 Slide 33

34. Flight ADB801 - Ecuador 1995 AT01 Slide 34

35. The Explanation Flight ADB801 - Ecuador 1995 AT01 Slide 35

36. Request for further landing permission in Dominican Republic Flight ADB801 - Ecuador 1995 AT01 Slide 36

37. The Answer: Denial of flight permission Flight ADB801 - Ecuador 1995 AT01 Slide 37

38. The explanation again Flight ADB801 - Ecuador 1995 AT01 Slide 38

39. Request to continue flight with declaration of true cargo Flight ADB801 - Ecuador 1995 AT01 Slide 39

40. Sudan, 2006  Near Juba, November 2006.  An 28 – Short-Haul Flights only. STOL Capability.  ER-AKO (Previously Moldovan registered and now registered in Sao Tome). AT01 Slide 40

41. Sudan, 2006  S9-PSV owned by DALLEX Trade, registered in London, but a known shell company.  Leased to GOLIAF Air. New clandestine delivery company?  Delivery took 20 minutes! AT01 Slide 41

42. Chad  Chad Army mainly equipped with FN weapons – why do they need AK variants?  Known diversion point to Sudan (Dhafur).  EUC again very easy to ‘obtain’. Financial inducements allegedly been accepted since April 1994: Chad EUC used to supply weapons to Liberia and Sierra Leonne. Chad EUC used for export from Bulgaria to Yemen. AT01 Slide 42

43. Questions AT01 Slide 43