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Thinkware LTD 1 Scuds on Tel-Aviv: Strategic Effects & Quantitative Measures The Israeli Experience in the First Gulf War Moshe Sharvit

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Presentation on theme: "Thinkware LTD 1 Scuds on Tel-Aviv: Strategic Effects & Quantitative Measures The Israeli Experience in the First Gulf War Moshe Sharvit"— Presentation transcript:

1 Thinkware LTD 1 Scuds on Tel-Aviv: Strategic Effects & Quantitative Measures The Israeli Experience in the First Gulf War Moshe Sharvit hgrtmr@zahav.net.il

2 Thinkware LTD 2 The Traditional Concept of “Total War” Take military action Neutralize enemy’s military capabilities Achieve strategic goal Military success is assumed to be a sufficient condition for achieving the Strategic Goal Military realm

3 Thinkware LTD 3 Implications for Analysis r No need to analyze operational-strategic link r Attrition is a (the) primary MOE

4 Thinkware LTD 4 Modern (limited) War Military action Other factors Non-Military actionStrategic GoalStrategic Effects ?

5 Thinkware LTD 5 Implications for Analysis r Military success (in the traditional sense) is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the attainment of the Strategic Goal r Strategic Effects are: \ mostly outside the military realm; \ (often) not physical r Analysis of Action-Effect relation has to deal with non-military aspects. r Attrition is insufficient/inadequate as a MOE r What are the relevant MOE’s? How can they be derived?

6 Thinkware LTD 6 An Example: Israel’s Part in Desert Storm r Sadam’s invasion of Kuwait was universally perceived as a blatant act of aggression. r The UN sanctioned military action. r A US-led coalition was formed. r 3 Arab states - Saudi-Arabia, Egypt & Syria – were key members

7 Thinkware LTD 7 Sadam’s Strategy r Goal: Breakdown the Coalition* r Strategy: Shift perception of context – * Or at least strain its cohesiveness Good guys vs. Villain Arab-Israeli conflict West vs. Moslems/Arabs OR

8 Thinkware LTD 8 Sadam’s Strategy (2) Israeli military intervention Arab member-nations quit the Coalition Coalition disintegrates/weakens Context becomes the Arab-Israeli conflict Attack Israeli cities Political pressure for Israeli military action Action: Effect: Anxiety in Israel

9 Thinkware LTD 9 The Israeli Side r Strategic interest: Allow Coalition to Achieve its Mission (= do not intervene) r Operational Goal: \ Mitigation of political pressure to a manageable level r Success decided by: \Actual hardship endured by the Israeli population; \The public’s perception of the government’s ability to provide adequate remedies.

10 Thinkware LTD 10 Military Means r Counter force – performed by the coalition r Interception of SCUDs r Civil Defence

11 Thinkware LTD 11 Analytic Challenge Relate military action and achievements to the attainment of the Operational Goal

12 Thinkware LTD 12 Observations r Considerable public anxiety despite minimal casualties (2 dead; 1 seriously injured) and relatively minor physical damage. r The issues are: \ the “perceived risk” rather than the “objective risk”; \Hardship resulting from prolonged, continuous civil defence posture.

13 Thinkware LTD 13 Working Assumption r Perception is basically subjective but is influenced by objective parameters. Some important independent variables are objective Political Pressure = F(a, b, c…)

14 Thinkware LTD 14 Independent Variables objective r Duration of the conflict r Max. # of casualties in a single incident r # of civil-defence alerts r # of warhead impacts within city perimeter r Disruption of civilian routine r Disruption of vital public utilities r Loss of income

15 Thinkware LTD 15 Attributes of Function r F is monotone in all independent variables r F is “logarithmic” in all independent variables r Suggestion: Use (log of) objective independent variables as MOE’s.

16 Thinkware LTD 16 Implication for Policy Formation Examples r What can be accomplished by the military means at hand? r Take a calculated risk of suffering more casualties in order to minimize disruption of civilians’ daily routine r Make use of estimates of points of impact in order to minimize # of alerts (another trade-off with # of casualties).

17 Thinkware LTD 17 Some Lessons r We need to understand the strategic context, goals, environment etc. r Strategic effects are usually non-physical; often not strictly military r In general, the Action-to-Effect relationship cannot be fully specified. However, it may be possible to deduce some of its attributes. It may be possible to use these attributes to derive MOE’s. r Such MOE’s are often “logarithmic”


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