1. Messaging Anti-Abuse Working Group MAAWG | maawg.org | San Francisco, CA 2011 WHY WE MUST ASK WHY Markus Jakobsson, Principal Scientist, PayPal Keynote, June 7, 2011 MAAWG 22 nd General Meeting, San Francisco, CA

2. Why Did the Internet Turn out as it Did? We first designed it to provide features, then for usability. We never designed it with abuse in mind. We did not try to predict the future. And now we are in a pickle.

3. Predicting An Unsupervised Future “Predicting the future is much too easy, anyway. You look at the people around you, the street you stand on, the visible air you breathe, and predict more of the same. To hell with more. I want better.” Ray Bradbury

4. To Hell With More. I want better. Who? Where? What? Weak Authentication Malware Spoofing Why? Before we can address any problem, we need to know why it occurs. Talk focus: mobile Internet. Will be huge – and we can ask “why” before it is too late.

5. Web/App Spoofing: Why Works? Where? An attacker is successful if 1.The victim is tricked, and as a result 2.The victim acts, benefitting the attacker An attacker is successful if 1.The victim is tricked, and as a result 2.The victim acts, benefitting the attacker Jakobsson/Leddy: www.spoofkiller.com

6. Web/App Spoofing: Why Works? Where? An attacker is successful if 1.The victim is tricked, and as a result 2.The victim acts, benefitting the attacker An attacker is successful if 1.The victim is tricked, and as a result 2.The victim acts, benefitting the attacker Traditional countermeasures address this part (locks, colors, warnings – a user communication problem) Jakobsson/Leddy: www.spoofkiller.com

7. Web/App Spoofing: Why Works? Where? An attacker is successful if 1.The victim is tricked, and as a result 2.The victim acts, benefitting the attacker An attacker is successful if 1.The victim is tricked, and as a result 2.The victim acts, benefitting the attacker Can we address this instead? Jakobsson/Leddy: www.spoofkiller.com

8. Imagine a World Where… Where? GOOD SITE + NAÏVE USER = SUCCESS Jakobsson/Leddy: www.spoofkiller.com SPOOF SITE + NAÏVE USER (SAME ACTION) = ABORT

9. Here is How to Do It! Where? Jakobsson/Leddy: www.spoofkiller.com Got cert? LOG IN NOW ABORT Y N

10. We are all Pavlov’s dogs! Where? Jakobsson/Leddy: www.spoofkiller.com

11. Demo time! Where? Jakobsson/Leddy: www.spoofkiller.com Demo produced by Hossein Siadaty

12. Jakobsson/Leddy: www.spoofkiller.com

14. Take-Home Message Where? Jakobsson/Leddy: www.spoofkiller.com It is more important to understand people than to understand computers.

15. Now: Authentication Jakobsson/Akavipat: www.fastword.me Who? Peopl e hate passwords – especially on handsets Slow to enter … … and then you realize you mistyped something! At the same time, recall rates are low for passwords … and reset is difficult / insecure / expensive PINs are faster … … but not very secure … and reuse is rampant

16. Understanding usability issues Jakobsson/Akavipat: www.fastword.me Who? Q. Why are passwords more painful than text? A. Text uses auto-correction/completion! Q. Why are passwords more painful than text? A. Text uses auto-correction/completion!

17. Understanding recall issues Jakobsson/Akavipat: www.fastword.me Who? Q. Why are (good) passwords hard to recall? A. Good passwords are weird! Q. Why are (good) passwords hard to recall? A. Good passwords are weird! (Ebbinghausen, 1885)

18. A stab at a solution Jakobsson/Akavipat: www.fastword.me Who? Not so secure, you say? Approx. 64k words only. Auto correct works frogfroffrofrffrof

19. A stab at a solution Jakobsson/Akavipat: www.fastword.me Who? Auto correct works frog flat work

20. A Look at Speed Jakobsson/Akavipat: www.fastword.me Who?

21. A Look at Security Jakobsson/Akavipat: www.fastword.me Who? Average password Average fastword

22. Forgot your fastword? Hint: “frog” Jakobsson/Akavipat: www.fastword.me Who? EFFECTIVE RECALL: 0.36+(1-0.36)*0.48=0.67 …. 67%

23. Forgot your fastword? Hint: “frog” Jakobsson/Akavipat: www.fastword.me Who? Average fastword Average password

24. Big-Picture Insight Who? We can improve as basic things as passwords – if we ask “why”. Jakobsson/Akavipat: www.fastword.me

25. Dealing with Malware What? Jakobsson/Johansson: www.fatskunk.com Problem: Power

26. Dealing with Malware What? Three truths: 1.Nasty malware is active 2.Active routines are in RAM 3.Algorithms: time-space trade-off Three truths: 1.Nasty malware is active 2.Active routines are in RAM 3.Algorithms: time-space trade-off Jakobsson/Johansson: www.fatskunk.com

27. Dealing with Malware What? Jakobsson/Johansson: www.fatskunk.com cache RAM 1.Swap out all programs (malware may refuse) monolith kernel

28. Dealing with Malware What? Jakobsson/Johansson: www.fatskunk.com monolith kernel 1.Swap out all programs (malware may refuse) 2.Overwrite all “free” RAM pseudo-random content(malware refuses again) cache RAM

29. Dealing with Malware What? Jakobsson/Johansson: www.fatskunk.com 1.Swap out all programs (malware may refuse) 2.Overwrite all “free” RAM pseudo-random content(malware refuses again) monolith kernel cache RAM

30. Dealing with Malware What? Jakobsson/Johansson: www.fatskunk.com 1.Swap out all programs (malware may refuse) 2.Overwrite all “free” RAM pseudo-random content(malware refuses again) 3. Compute keyed digest of all RAM (access order unknown a priori) monolith kernel cache RAM

31. Dealing with Malware What? Jakobsson/Johansson: www.fatskunk.com 1.Swap out all programs (malware may refuse) 2.Overwrite all “free” RAM pseudo-random content(malware refuses again) 3. Compute keyed digest of all RAM (access order unknown a priori) monolith kernel cache RAM

32. Dealing with Malware What? Jakobsson/Johansson: www.fatskunk.com 1.Swap out all programs (malware may refuse) 2.Overwrite all “free” RAM pseudo-random content(malware refuses again) 3. Compute keyed digest of all RAM (access order unknown a priori) monolith kernel cache RAM External verifier provides this

33. Dealing with Malware What? Jakobsson/Johansson: www.fatskunk.com 1.Swap out all programs (malware may refuse) 2.Overwrite all “free” RAM pseudo-random content(malware refuses again) 3. Compute keyed digest of all RAM (access order unknown a priori) monolith kernel cache RAM External verifier will time this (and check result of computation) External verifier will time this (and check result of computation)

34. Dealing with Malware What? Jakobsson/Johansson: www.fatskunk.com Malware has options: 1.Swap out and become inactive 2.Stay, cause delay, be detected 3.Refuse connection, be detected 4.Die and remain unnoticed Malware has options: 1.Swap out and become inactive 2.Stay, cause delay, be detected 3.Refuse connection, be detected 4.Die and remain unnoticed

35. After test passed What? Jakobsson/Johansson: www.fatskunk.com Scan flash for inactive malware, make secure backup to cloud, DRM, password manager, virtualized phone setup, banking app, vote casting, unlock data/apps, …

36. More detail: unlocking data/apps What? Jakobsson/Johansson: www.fatskunk.com Application Encrypted storage of data and routines Encrypted storage of data and routines FLASH RAM Application Decrypted storage of data and routines Decrypted storage of data and routines GET KEY FROM VERIFIER. LOAD

37. THE FUTURE MATTERS TODAY Why? Jakobsson/Johansson: www.fatskunk.com Anticipating problems gives us time to innovate.

38. Why does user education fail? A final why Contact me to talk spoofing, authentication, malware, mobile, education … and “why”!