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KAIST Internet Security Lab. CS710 Behavioral Detection of Malware on Mobile Handsets MobiSys 2008, Abhijit Bose et al. 2008.12.11. 이 승 민.

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Presentation on theme: "KAIST Internet Security Lab. CS710 Behavioral Detection of Malware on Mobile Handsets MobiSys 2008, Abhijit Bose et al. 2008.12.11. 이 승 민."— Presentation transcript:

1 KAIST Internet Security Lab. CS710 Behavioral Detection of Malware on Mobile Handsets MobiSys 2008, Abhijit Bose et al. 2008.12.11. 이 승 민

2 “Behavioral Detection of Malware…” -2/18- CS710 IS Lab Contents Contents Introduction 11 System Overview 22 Malicious Behavior Signatures 33 Run-time Construction 44 Evaluation 55 Conclusion 66

3 “Behavioral Detection of Malware…” -3/18- CS710 IS Lab 1. Introduction Behavior ?

4 “Behavioral Detection of Malware…” -4/18- CS710 IS Lab 1. Introduction Malware on mobile handsets The first mobile worm Cabir appeared in June 2004 By the end of 2006, the known number of mobile malware families and variants increased by 59% and 75% from year 2005 Differences in mobile Limited resources such as CPU, memory and battery Difficulty of constructing network signature Spreading via non-traditional vectors (SMS, Bluetooth) Difference in OS (file permission, modification)

5 “Behavioral Detection of Malware…” -5/18- CS710 IS Lab 1. Introduction Related work Network based anomaly detection Host based anomaly detection Using consecutive system calls from normal app. Rule learning, finite-state automata, Hidden Markov Model But, it could be evaded by simple obfuscation This paper Monitoring a program run-time behavior at a higher level Run-time analysis Using both normal and malware behaviors

6 “Behavioral Detection of Malware…” -6/18- CS710 IS Lab 2. System Overview System Monitor agent collects the application behavior in the form of system events/API calls Aggregated behavior signatures are reported to the detection agent

7 “Behavioral Detection of Malware…” -7/18- CS710 IS Lab 3. Malicious Behavior Signatures Temporal patterns A logical ordering of the steps over time often clearly reveals the malicious intent Example Bluetooth OBEX system call (CObexClient::Put())  Harmless Received file is of type.SIS & that file is later executed & the installer process seeks to overwrite files in the system directory  Mabir, Commwarrior Behavior signatures are best specified using temporal logic instead of classical propositional logic TLCK (temporal logic of causal knowledge) language

8 “Behavioral Detection of Malware…” -8/18- CS710 IS Lab 3. Malicious Behavior Signatures Temporal logic Specify malicious behavior in terms of system events, by temporal and logical operators : true at time t : true at some instant before t : true at all instants before t : true at some instant in the interval [t-k, t]

9 “Behavioral Detection of Malware…” -9/18- CS710 IS Lab 3. Malicious Behavior Signatures Example: Commwarrior Worm Symbian OS Atomic variables are combined into seven higher-level signatures

10 “Behavioral Detection of Malware…” -10/18- CS710 IS Lab 4. Run-Time Signature Construction Monitoring API Calls using Proxy DLL Proxy DLL intercepts and records details about the API call events from the application (with Symbian OS emulator)

11 “Behavioral Detection of Malware…” -11/18- CS710 IS Lab 4. Run-Time Signature Construction Stage I: Generation of dependency graph Dependency graph is constructed from logged API calls

12 “Behavioral Detection of Malware…” -12/18- CS710 IS Lab 4. Run-Time Signature Construction Stage II: Graph pruning and aggregation Dependency graph grows over time Pruning The process did not have inter-process dependency relationships with any other process Its graph does not partially match with any malicious behavioral signatures It did not create or modify any file or directory It is a helper process that takes input from a process and returns data to the main process Aggregation Each API call is aggregated to reduce the size of the overall storage Construction of a behavior signature (TLCK)

13 “Behavioral Detection of Malware…” -13/18- CS710 IS Lab 5. Evaluation SVM classification Which of the separators is optimal ?

14 “Behavioral Detection of Malware…” -14/18- CS710 IS Lab 5. Evaluation Margin  of the separator is the width of separation between classes Maximizing the margin is good according to intuition Examples closest to the hyperplane are support vectors

15 “Behavioral Detection of Malware…” -15/18- CS710 IS Lab 5. Evaluation Methodology Monitoring agent is implemented in the Symbian OS Emulator OS dependent 8 applications 5 worms: Cabir, Mabir, Lasco, Commwarrior, generic worm 3 legitimate: OBEX file transfer, MMS client, MakeSIS Detection agent uses SVM classifier OS independent

16 “Behavioral Detection of Malware…” -16/18- CS710 IS Lab 5. Evaluation Accuracy of SVM Detection for known worms SVM almost never falsely classifies a legitimate application signature to malicious

17 “Behavioral Detection of Malware…” -17/18- CS710 IS Lab 5. Evaluation Detection for unknown worms When the training set contains 3 malware, detection is relatively high

18 “Behavioral Detection of Malware…” -18/18- CS710 IS Lab 6. Conclusion Contribution First attempt to construct a behavioral detection model for mobile environments Define malicious behaviors with TLCK (temporal logic) Discussion What is the difference compared to wired network? How about using HMM (Hidden Markov Model) in behavior detection? Suitable for future research topic?


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