1. Building Sustainable Inspection Reforms Jordan Coordination Model Wafa’a M. Aranki June 2014 Amman – Jordan

2. Work Plan Problem Definition & Institutional Options Impact Assessment (Legal, Economical) Selection of “Best options Presentation to the GoJ Political decision and legalization 2 Quick Scans ® Framing the options Analysis – per option Consultation Selection of preferred option Draft action plans Political decision Drafting legal measures

3. Options Considered for the Jordan Case  Option 0: No Action Option  Option 1: Cooperation Agreement / Memorandums of Understanding  Option 2: Coordination Body – Slovenia, Netherlands  Option 3: Merger of inspections with similar policy areas - Lead Agency - UK  Option 4: Consolidated functions into single inspectorate – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia 3

4. Option 0: No Action Cons ‐ Estimated Government cost at $20 M ‐ Estimated private sector cost at $60 M (time, samples, fees, etc) ‐ Ineffective visits ‐ Expected increase in formal sector Pros Law enforcement to ensure compliance and protection of public interest 4 Continue working with the current enforcing system without introducing any changes

5. Option 1: Cooperation Agreements /MOUs Cons ‐ CAs and MoUs need to be renewed and monitored frequently ‐ Not binding and depends on the inspectorates commitment and willingness ‐ May not ensure sustainability given frequent changes in top management ‐ May not address the root causes of duplication and overlap Pros ‐ Estimated Savings for GoJ at $30 M ‐ Streamlined requirements expected to increase compliance ‐ Streamlined requirements expected to enhance the quality of regulations and efficiency of the process 5 Signing cooperation agreements or MoU between two or more inspectorates to coordinate inspection functions jointly or on behalf of each others. Examples are Jordan Food and Drug Administration and Greater Amman Municipality, Ministry of Health and JFDA, MoH - GAM

6. Option 2: Coordination Council Cons ‐ May not address the root causes of duplication and overlap ‐ Require political well and commitment to ensure proper functioning of the council Pros ‐ Estimated savings at $50 M ‐ Streamlined requirements expected to increase compliance ‐ Streamlined requirements expected to enhance the quality of regulations and efficiency of the process ‐ Streamlined requirements expected to enhance risk based targeting ‐ May not require major restructuring of inspection authorities 6 Establish a coordination body responsible for the strategic directions of reform that enjoy the power and resources required to draft policies, execute reforms and monitors performance of the different inspectorates

7. Option 3: Merging Inspectorates with Similar Functions Lead Agency Cons ‐ May not serve inspectorates with limited or narrow mandate ‐ Difficult to reverse if proven ineffective Pros ‐ Estimated Savings for GoJ at $30 M ‐ Creating a collaborative culture ‐ Enhance efficiency and effectiveness of inspection functions ‐ Optimal use of resources 7 Merging inspectorates that has similar mandates under one agency and could include giving the lead agency (e.g. Environment, Food, Safety, etc) the sole authority to inspect certain sectors

8. Option 4: Consolidated Functions Single Inspectorate Approach Cons ‐ Requires strong political well and commitment to sustain and finance ‐ Requires substantial change in the government structure ‐ Sudden and transformational change could create confusion ‐ Very difficult to reverse if proven ineffective Pros ‐ Estimated Savings for GoJ at $60 M ‐ Powerful and influential inspectorate to enforce regulations ‐ Consistent law enforcement system due to common practices under one authority ‐ Expected to enhance risk based targeting ‐ Enhance public accountability and responsibilities ‐ Optimal use of resources 8 Creating a single authority where all the inspection functions in the different authorities are moved under a one authority

9. Complementary Option: Inspection Legal Framework Cons ‐ Cost of drafting and enactment of a legal framework could reach $3M ‐ Needs supporting enforcement and awareness to execute efficiently and effectively Pros ‐ Ensures sustainability and maintenance of reforms ‐ Ensures underlying inspection principles are adopted and implemented ‐ Ensures proper governance and transparency of the system 9 Enacting a legal framework to authorize the inspection structure, the adoption best practices, roles and responsibilities of regulators and firms, and the like

10. “Best” Option within the Jordanian Context Coordination council titled The Higher Committee for Inspection Reform 10

11. Higher Committee’s Goal Create a national committee from highest ranking officials to oversee and monitors inspection reform with the following mandate − Setting policies and strategic plans to improve regulatory delivery in Jordan − Ensure that reform initiatives are implemented across inspectorates − Monitor and Evaluate performance to ensure results are achieved 11

12. Higher Committee – Org Structure 12 Council of Ministers Economic Development Ministerial Committee Co- Chairpersonship Minister of Industry and Trade and Supply and Minister of Public Sector Development IFC – Technical Advisor Secretary General - MoIT HC – Secretariat MoIT Inspectorates – Working Groups – Technical Committees Sec Gen/ DG Agency 1 Sec Gen/ DG Agency 2 Sec Gen/ DG Agency ….n Private Sector Reps

13. Identify Reform Priorities Approve Form Relevant Working Groups Define the objectives and scope of the WGs WGs puts proposals for the HC HC evaluates proposals Involved Agencies: ‐ Inspectorates ‐ Higher Committee ‐ Working Groups ‐ HC – Secretariat ‐ IFC ‐ Private Sector representatives ‐ Council of Ministers HC submits to the CoM Implementation Yes No Approve Yes No Evaluation and Continuous Improvement 13 Higher Committee – Workflow

14. Jordan Council of Ministers Decree approving the Higher Committee mandate, roles and responsibilities Dated October 24, 2013

15. Thank You Questions and Answers