1. POSC 2200 – Modern Conflict Russell Alan Williams Department of Political Science

2. Unit Five: Modern Conflict Required Reading: Globalization of World Politics, Chapters 14, 15 and 23. Globalization of World Politics, Chapters 14, 15 and 23. Joseph Jockel & Joel Sokolsky, “Canada and the war in Afghanistan: NATO's odd man out steps forward, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 6:1, (2008), Pp. 100-115. Joseph Jockel & Joel Sokolsky, “Canada and the war in Afghanistan: NATO's odd man out steps forward, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 6:1, (2008), Pp. 100-115. Outline: 1. Introduction 2. What is “ War ” ? 3. What Causes War? 4. Traditional Approaches to National Security 5. New Problems

3. Unit Analytical Questions: 1) Is conventional war becoming obsolete? a. Number of “ wars ” declining since 1991 b. Number of deaths declining =The “ obsolescence of war ” thesis.... Explanations? “ Democratic peace ” has spread “ Democratic peace ” has spread “ Globalization ” has made interstate war to costly to pursue, or to tolerate “ Globalization ” has made interstate war to costly to pursue, or to tolerate Changes in the “ balance of power ” Changes in the “ balance of power ” Role of Nuclear Weapons? Role of Nuclear Weapons? Role of the “ Revolution in Military Affairs ” Role of the “ Revolution in Military Affairs ” 1) Introduction:

4. Unit Analytical Questions: 2) Why is modern war a mainly “ southern ” phenomenon? a. Ideological and political factors? b. Power? 1) Introduction:

5. 2) What is “ War ” ? A murky concept? Should be easy to judge when wars occur, but “ War ” is a more problematic concept than we think.... We don ’ t even know how to count them(!) “ War ” = “ An act of force intended to compel our opponents to fulfill our will ” (Von Clausewitz) “ War ” = “ An act of force intended to compel our opponents to fulfill our will ” (Von Clausewitz) War is an extension of normal politics amongst states – Clausewitz lived in a “ Westphalian ” world = only interstate war. War is an extension of normal politics amongst states – Clausewitz lived in a “ Westphalian ” world = only interstate war.

6. “ War ” = “ Organized violence among political units ” (Contemporary definition) “ War ” = “ Organized violence among political units ” (Contemporary definition) Includes interstate war, civil war, asymmetrical civil wars and maybe terrorism. Includes interstate war, civil war, asymmetrical civil wars and maybe terrorism. Organized violence must be large scale = at least 1,000 deaths Organized violence must be large scale = at least 1,000 deaths

7. 3) What Causes “ War ” ? =Most important concern in IR  Practical? Decisions by one or more states (or groups) to use violence as a political strategy Caused by underlying conflicts over resources, land and ideas.... Caused by underlying conflicts over resources, land and ideas....  Theoretical? Many different answers, but all theories only explain some wars and not others Need to think about all three “ levels of analysis ” Need to think about all three “ levels of analysis ” E.g. Kenneth Waltz “ Man, State and War ” E.g. Kenneth Waltz “ Man, State and War ”

8. “ Individual Level ” - factors that make war & conflict more likely Character of individual leaders Character of individual leaders E.g. Realist view of human nature E.g. Realist view of human nature Many examples.... Aggressive behavior may be “ natural ” and yet not all leaders decide to go to war... hard to generalize Many examples.... Aggressive behavior may be “ natural ” and yet not all leaders decide to go to war... hard to generalize Misperception Misperception E.g. Suddam Hussein and the E.g. Suddam Hussein and the invasion of Kuwait (1991) Thought US would let him do it(?) Thought US would let him do it(?) Thought UN was ineffective(?) Thought UN was ineffective(?)

9. “ State Level ” - factors that make war & conflict more likely Political, social and economic factors internal to states Political, social and economic factors internal to states a) Ethnicity: Multination states = more civil war b) Political Structure: Democracies more peaceful to one another E.g. Liberal “Democratic Peace” Theory

10. c) Political Structure – Governments lacking legitimacy more likely to engage in war E.g. “ Diversionary War ” : Theory that leaders start war to divert attention from domestic problems E.g. “ Diversionary War ” : Theory that leaders start war to divert attention from domestic problems E.g. National unity in event of international conflict E.g. National unity in event of international conflict Britain (Falklands War 1982) Britain (Falklands War 1982) Pakistan (Wars with India) Pakistan (Wars with India)

11. d) Economic Structure – Capitalist states more...? Radicals = Capitalism makes states violent Radicals = Capitalism makes states violent Liberals = Capitalism makes states peaceful Liberals = Capitalism makes states peaceful

12. “ International System Level ” - factors that make war & conflict more likely “Neorealism” – focus on anarchy “Neorealism” – focus on anarchy =Makes disputes over practical concerns more likely to lead to war No authority to resolve practical problems No authority to resolve practical problems E.g. “ Power Transition Theory ” : War occurs when challenger states acquire more capabilities relative to existing powers Many interstate wars caused by this dimension? Many interstate wars caused by this dimension? E.g. Japan ’ s wars in Asia E.g. Japan ’ s wars in Asia Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) First and Second Sino-Japanese Wars (1895 & 1931 & 1937-1945 First and Second Sino-Japanese Wars (1895 & 1931 & 1937-1945

13. E.g. “ Security Dilemma ” : Realist focus on the relative distribution of power. E.g. “ Security Dilemma ” : Realist focus on the relative distribution of power. Rationality suggests others must respond by acquiring new capabilities Rationality suggests others must respond by acquiring new capabilities Leads to a spiral of insecurity Leads to a spiral of insecurity E.g. Arms races which ultimately may cause a war E.g. Arms races which ultimately may cause a war

14. “ Security Dilemma ” : British- German Naval Race 1906 – 1914! Makes existing navies obsolete Makes existing navies obsolete Creates opportunity for Germany to challenge British naval dominance Creates opportunity for Germany to challenge British naval dominance 1906: Great Britain builds first “ Dreadnaught ” 1906: Great Britain builds first “ Dreadnaught ”

15. “ Security Dilemma ” : British- German Naval Race 1906 – 1914! By 1914: Great Britain had 38 dreadnoughtsGreat Britain had 38 dreadnoughts Germany had 24 dreadnoughtsGermany had 24 dreadnoughtsImplications: Britain less secure then before HMS Dreadnaught (!)Britain less secure then before HMS Dreadnaught (!) British state and public become increasingly anti-German – contributed to WWI?British state and public become increasingly anti-German – contributed to WWI?

16. No explanation works in all cases.... Most wars caused by variety of factors Most wars caused by variety of factors WWI not caused by “ Security Dilemma ” alone... WWI not caused by “ Security Dilemma ” alone... However.... However.... Theoretical perspectives do help explain why some states choose war and others do not... Theoretical perspectives do help explain why some states choose war and others do not... Theoretical perspectives have influenced national security strategies(!) Theoretical perspectives have influenced national security strategies(!)

17. 4) Traditional Approaches to National Security: Realist analysis: Realist analysis: 1)States may miscalculate, but a rational, or wise state focuses on the relative “ balance of power ”. 2) Acquire offensive military capabilities E.g. “ structure ” matters - In practical terms this leads to very specific policies E.g. “ structure ” matters - In practical terms this leads to very specific policies E.g. Mearsheimer and the end of the Cold War - Predicted new threats would arise as states returned to more predatory “ balance of power ” behavior = re-arm! There is no “ peace dividend ” E.g. Mearsheimer and the end of the Cold War - Predicted new threats would arise as states returned to more predatory “ balance of power ” behavior = re-arm! There is no “ peace dividend ”

18. Liberal Approaches: Liberal Approaches: Emphasize “ Regimes ” Emphasize “ Regimes ” E.g. “ Collective Security ” E.g. “ Collective Security ” E.g. “ Disarmament ” and “ Arms Control ” E.g. “ Disarmament ” and “ Arms Control ” Critical Approaches: Critical Approaches: Reject realism – “ Militarism ” is the real problem Reject realism – “ Militarism ” is the real problem E.g. States acquire military capabilities to control their own people as much as to pursue national security E.g. States acquire military capabilities to control their own people as much as to pursue national security E.g. Security is an individual human characteristic – not something belonging to the state. E.g. Security is an individual human characteristic – not something belonging to the state.

19. Ideas influence choices in military “ capabilities ” Why do states acquire military capabilities? Deterrence and/or Compellence (???) Deterrence and/or Compellence (???) Non military functions: Non military functions: Peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, criminal surveillance, snow removal Peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, criminal surveillance, snow removal Controlling domestic dissent! Controlling domestic dissent! Each state/group must weigh the importance of these functions in choosing military capabilities Some capabilities not useful for some tasks Some capabilities not useful for some tasks E.g. Nuclear weapons will not help you maintain domestic political control.... E.g. Nuclear weapons will not help you maintain domestic political control.... Some states have different values (?) Some states have different values (?)

20. A) Traditional Types of Capabilities: 1) “ Conventional Armies ” = Infantry soldiers, artillery and landmines.... Strengths? Strengths? Defense of territory Defense of territory Maintain order - “ boots on the ground ” Maintain order - “ boots on the ground ” Drawbacks? Drawbacks? Expensive – effective infantries require exhaustive training Expensive – effective infantries require exhaustive training People are not normally willing to fight and die... People are not normally willing to fight and die... Deterrence, but less effective at compellence Deterrence, but less effective at compellence Domestic problems? Political influence of large army! Domestic problems? Political influence of large army!

21. 2) Power Projection Capabilities: Necessary to use military force beyond national borders – closely associated with the “ Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) ” =Navies, air forces, modern missiles, logistics, surveillance Strengths: Strengths: Compellence = “ Gunboat Diplomacy ” Compellence = “ Gunboat Diplomacy ” Lower casualties! Lower casualties! Drawbacks: Drawbacks: =Extremely expensive $$$$$$ Technology has widened gap between most armies and those with power projection capabilities Technology has widened gap between most armies and those with power projection capabilities Communications technology, precession targeting/stand-off weaponry and stealth Communications technology, precession targeting/stand-off weaponry and stealth

22. The “ Revolution in Military Affairs ”... (A.K.A “ Transformation ” ) Based on the lessons of the 1991 Gulf War – the UN ’ s “ bloodless ” victory Based on the lessons of the 1991 Gulf War – the UN ’ s “ bloodless ” victory Iraq had been perceived as a major military power with a large, well equipped army... (!) Iraq had been perceived as a major military power with a large, well equipped army... (!) Technology seemed to have tipped the balance of power decisively in favor of the U.S.... at least in the formal phase of combat. Technology seemed to have tipped the balance of power decisively in favor of the U.S.... at least in the formal phase of combat. =New form of military intervention requiring few soldiers  Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001, Libya 2011 =New types of defense spending(?)

23. Defense Spending & the RMA – Who can keep up with the U.S. ???

25. Is the RMA & Power Projection “ Worth It ” ? Good for limited, international interventions, but less effective for maintaining control and order over territory? US mission to Iraq (1990-1991) 600,000 + Soldiers US mission to Vietnam (1968) 800,000 + Soldiers US mission to Iraq (2003) 130,000 + Soldiers US investment in RMA equals insufficient resources to wage conventional war and control territory????? Implications? Only fight wars with limited objectives?

26. 2) Power Projection Capabilities: Necessary to use military force beyond national borders – closely associated with the “ Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) ” =Navies, air forces, modern missiles, logistics Strengths: Strengths: Compellence – other states avoid conflict(!) Compellence – other states avoid conflict(!) Lower casualties! Lower casualties! Drawbacks: Drawbacks: =Extremely expensive $$$$$$ Technology has widened gap between most armies and those with power projection capabilities Technology has widened gap between most armies and those with power projection capabilities Communications technology, precession targeting/stand-off weaponry and stealth Communications technology, precession targeting/stand-off weaponry and stealth Problem: Can “ middle ” or “ small ” powers afford these weapons over the long term Problem: Can “ middle ” or “ small ” powers afford these weapons over the long term

27. B) Alternative capabilities – “ war on the cheap ” 1) “ Asymmetric warfare ” : War between parties of unequal strength in which weaker party avoids major confrontations More common given imbalance in modern forces? More common given imbalance in modern forces? Techniques: Techniques: “ Guerrilla warfare ” : Approach to war favored by “ irregular ” militaries “ Guerrilla warfare ” : Approach to war favored by “ irregular ” militaries = “ Hit and run ” tactics - relies on concealment among civilian population Increase occupation costs for conventional armies Increase occupation costs for conventional armies Now common (Vietnam  Iraq  Afghanistan) Now common (Vietnam  Iraq  Afghanistan)

28. Asymmetric warfare – Strengths Asymmetric warfare – Strengths Low cost... Low cost... Asymmetric warfare – Weaknesses Asymmetric warfare – Weaknesses High risk for supporters??? High risk for supporters??? Effectiveness??? Effectiveness??? -Improved “ counterinsurgency ” techniques (COIN) reduce effectiveness of these strategies

29. Case Study: Canadian Choices in Capabilities and National Security? Jockel and Sokolsky: “ Canada and the War in Afghanistan: NATO ’ s Odd Man Out Steps Forward ” – Assesses the impact of Canada ’ s “ unexpected war ” What is Canada ’ s strategy? What is Canada ’ s strategy? Before Afghanistan? Before Afghanistan? After Afghanistan? After Afghanistan?

30. Case Study: Canadian Choices in Capabilities and National Security? Jockel and Sokolsky: “ Canada and the War in Afghanistan: NATO ’ s Odd Man Out Steps Forward ” – Assesses the impact of Canada ’ s “unexpected war” What is Canada ’ s strategy? What is Canada ’ s strategy? Before Afghanistan? Before Afghanistan? After Afghanistan? = heavy emphasis on transformation/RMA After Afghanistan? = heavy emphasis on transformation/RMA

31. The RMA responds to changing ideas about the “ Battlespace ” (?) Traditional Security problems  “ Terrorism ”  “ Cyberwarfare ” suggest the environment is more complex and requires different responses. Traditional Security problems  “ Terrorism ”  “ Cyberwarfare ” suggest the environment is more complex and requires different responses. 5) New Problems: E.g. US Homeland Security costs:

32. Meeting the challenge of “ Terrorism ” ! “ Terrorism ” : Use of “ illegitimate ” violence by sub-state groups to inspire fear Tactic: -Attack civilians/non-combatants Tactic: -Attack civilians/non-combatants Goals: -Raise awareness of grievances Goals: -Raise awareness of grievances -Provoke counterproductive responses from authorities Types: Types: Ideological Terrorism Ideological Terrorism Ethno-Nationalist Terrorism Ethno-Nationalist Terrorism Religious or Sacred Terrorism Religious or Sacred Terrorism

33. “ Terrorism ” has a long history but many argue “ globalization ” has increased the risks (?) Globalization may cause increased terrorism Globalization may cause increased terrorism E.g. Religious or sacred terrorists are often responding to some form of secular, cultural imperialism E.g. Religious or sacred terrorists are often responding to some form of secular, cultural imperialism E.g. Economic inequalities highlighted by globalization may increase peoples ’ willingness to use the tactic E.g. Economic inequalities highlighted by globalization may increase peoples ’ willingness to use the tactic Globalization likely facilitates terrorism, or at least our awareness of it Globalization likely facilitates terrorism, or at least our awareness of it E.g. New opportunities for mobility or lethality  “ Skyjackings ” have been common since the 1960s E.g. New opportunities for mobility or lethality  “ Skyjackings ” have been common since the 1960s E.g. Increased media awareness? E.g. Increased media awareness? However, most important change is However, most important change is the rise of “ State-Sponsored Terrorism ” – a new tactic in asymmetric warfare?

34. “ Terrorism ” is particularly difficult to combat.... “ Terrorism ” is particularly difficult to combat.... It is an “ easy ” low cost tactic It is an “ easy ” low cost tactic It imposes significant public costs, challenging the principles of liberal democratic societies It imposes significant public costs, challenging the principles of liberal democratic societies Is it effective? Is it effective?

35. “ Terrorism ” is particularly difficult to combat.... “ Terrorism ” is particularly difficult to combat.... It is an “ easy ” low cost tactic It is an “ easy ” low cost tactic It imposes significant public costs, challenging the principles of liberal democratic societies It imposes significant public costs, challenging the principles of liberal democratic societies Is it effective? Is it effective? Like warfare generally... violence often “ works ” – it is a major source of political change. Like warfare generally... violence often “ works ” – it is a major source of political change.

36. Is it “ legitimate ” ? Is it “ legitimate ” ? Argument: The “ends” justify the means.... Terrorism is no worse than more formal types of military aggression! Argument: The “ends” justify the means.... Terrorism is no worse than more formal types of military aggression! It is a “ logical ” response to the RMA It is a “ logical ” response to the RMA What difference does it make if the aggressors are non-state actors? What difference does it make if the aggressors are non-state actors? Context matters – “ freedom fighters ” versus “ terrorists ” Context matters – “ freedom fighters ” versus “ terrorists ” Argument: Terrorism is worse! Argument: Terrorism is worse! Often lacks broad legitimacy even in the community it claims to support Often lacks broad legitimacy even in the community it claims to support It usually involves the deliberate targeting of non-combatants It usually involves the deliberate targeting of non-combatants The “means” are not proportionate to the threats they respond to The “means” are not proportionate to the threats they respond to Only effective in very limited long term instances – In the interim the human cost is high Only effective in very limited long term instances – In the interim the human cost is high

37. 5) For Next Time... Unit Five: Modern Conflict “Managing Insecurity, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention” Globalization of World Politics, 31. Crsitina Badescu and Linnea Bergholm, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Conflict in Darfur: The Big Let-Down,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 40 no. 3, June 2009, Pp. 287-309. (Available from e-journals, or from the instructor).