1. UOCAVA Report Overview and Status July 2008 Andrew Regenscheid Computer Security Division National Institute of Standards and Technology

2. 6/17/2008 Page 2 Introduction Research use of technology in absentee voting for military and overseas citizens Identify options for further study Risk analysis of voting methods Recommend security controls

3. 6/17/2008 Page 3 Contents Overview of UOCAVA Report Security needs and Transmission Options Risk Analysis Methodology Next Steps

4. 6/17/2008 Page 4 UOCAVA Report Continuing research Begun drafting report

5. 6/17/2008 Page 5 Overview of UOCAVA voting Report looks at using different technologies for all aspects of UOCAVA voting Splits voting process into three stages Voter Registration/Ballot Request Ballot Delivery Ballot Return Identifies information types handled in each stage

6. 6/17/2008 Page 6 Security Impacts Three security objectives Confidentiality Integrity Availability Impacts for each objective defined by: Low: Loss will have a limited adverse effect Moderate: Loss will have a serious adverse effect High: Loss will have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect

7. 6/17/2008 Page 7 Registration/Request - 1 Registration Must verify voter’s identity Determine place of residency Exchange/provide authentication information. e.g. voter signature, PIN, cryptographic keys Ballot Request Must authenticate voter Provide address to send physical or electronic ballot

8. 6/17/2008 Page 8 Registration/Request - 2 Information Types: Voter name, residency information, mailing address Voter authenticator (e.g. signature, PIN) Identifiers (e.g. license and/or passport numbers) Security Impact: Confidentiality: Moderate Integrity: Moderate Availability: Moderate

9. 6/17/2008 Page 9 Registration/Request -3 Transmission Options: Postal Mail: Delivery times, interception Telephone: Confidentiality, Authentication Fax: Confidentiality E-mail: Confidentiality, Authentication Web-based: Authentication, Phishing

10. 6/17/2008 Page 10 Ballot Delivery - 1 Distribute blank ballots to voters Voter authentication not necessary Must be done after contests are finalized and ballots prepared

11. 6/17/2008 Page 11 Ballot Delivery - 2 Information Types: Voter name, address(es) Contests (i.e. the ballot) Possible ballot tracking identifiers Security Impact: Confidentiality: Low Integrity: High Availability: High

12. 6/17/2008 Page 12 Ballot Delivery - 3 Transmission Options: Postal Mail: Delivery times, Integrity Fax: Ballot accounting E-mail: Integrity, Ballot accounting Web-based: Integrity, Ballot accounting

13. 6/17/2008 Page 13 Ballot Return - 1 Returning marked ballots to LEOs Voters must send authentication information with ballot (e.g. a signature, PIN, digital signature, etc.) Technical/Procedural controls to provide voter privacy (e.g. privacy envelope, cryptography)

14. 6/17/2008 Page 14 Ballot Return - 2 Information Types: Voter name, address(es) Voter authenticator (e.g. signature, PIN) Voter identifiers (e.g. social sec., license and/or passport numbers) Contest choices Possible ballot tracking identifiers Security Impact: Confidentiality: Moderate Integrity: High Availability: High

15. 6/17/2008 Page 15 Ballot Return - 3 Transmission Options: Postal Mail: Delivery times, Integrity Telephone: Integrity, Authentication Fax: Integrity E-mail: Integrity, Authentication, Eavesdropping Web-based: Integrity, Authentication, Denial of Service, Phishing

16. 6/17/2008 Page 16 Risk Analysis Methodology Provide a high-level analysis for each stage and transmission option Methodology based on NIST SP 800-30 Similar format to SERVE risk assessment Information-centric Storage In-transit

17. 6/17/2008 Page 17 Risk Analysis Overview System vulnerabilities Threat sources Level of effort Detection Impact Mitigations

18. 6/17/2008 Page 18 Risk Analysis System Vulnerabilities Will focus on technical vulnerabilities What information can an attacker: Access Modify Inject Deny access

19. 6/17/2008 Page 19 Risk Analysis Threat Sources Legitimate Voters System Operators/Election Officials Insiders Hostile Individuals Hostile Organizations Government-Sponsored Organizations

20. 6/17/2008 Page 20 Risk Analysis Level of effort Low: e.g. in-person voter coercion Moderate: e.g. Denial of service High: e.g. many insider attacks

21. 6/17/2008 Page 21 Risk Analysis Probability of Detection Immediate: e.g. Denial of Service High: e.g. phishing Moderate: e.g. virus infecting PCs Low: e.g. inside attacks, malicious software

22. 6/17/2008 Page 22 Risk Analysis Impact Confidentiality E.g. Voter privacy, vote-selling Integrity E.g. adding/modifying ballots Availability E.g. Delivery times, denial of service

23. 6/17/2008 Page 23 Risk Analysis Mitigations Provide recommended security controls Taken from NIST SP 800-53 Discuss system-specific controls Many are procedural

24. 6/17/2008 Page 24 800-53 Security Control Technical Security Control AU-9 Protection of Audit Information The information system protects audit information and audit tools from unauthorized access, modification, and deletion. Enhancement: The information system produces audit records on hardware- enforced, write-once media.

25. 6/17/2008 Page 25 800-53 Security Control Procedural Security Control AU-11 Audit Record Retention The organization retains audit records for [Assignment: organization-defined time period] to provide support for after-the-fact investigations of security incidents and to meet regulatory and organizational information retention requirements.

26. 6/17/2008 Page 26 Future Directions Where We Are Short-Term Options Long-Term Options

27. 6/17/2008 Page 27 Where We Are Risk analysis a first step NIST’s role: Use expertise in computer security to identify risks and suggest controls Analysis provides information about a variety of high-level approaches NIST and EAC will discuss future directions

28. 6/17/2008 Page 28 Recommendations Report will recommend high-level controls Additional effort needed Report looks at pieces of systems System-wide perspective needed Requirements needed for rigor and testability

29. 6/17/2008 Page 29 Short-Term Options Electronic Ballot Delivery Lowest hanging fruit Could cut transmission times in half Few security issues: Ballot Accounting: Use tracking identifiers Integrity: Digitally sign electronic ballots Availability: Backups, Firewalls

30. 6/17/2008 Page 30 Short-Term Options Electronic Ballot Request Few security problems: Information mostly non-sensitive Web-based solutions can prevent eavesdropping Authenticating voted ballots more important Voter Registration is a separate issue Must verify voter’s identity Outside scope of NIST’s efforts

31. 6/17/2008 Page 31 Long-Term Options Electronic Ballot Return E-mail and Internet voting Would need to be part of larger research effort Some promising technologies, but: Extensive use of cryptography Supporting IT infrastructure not in place

32. 6/17/2008 Page 32 Long-Term Options Challenges of E-Ballot Return Unique set of risks pose a challenge Systems include risks of DREs Remote authentication is more challenging Unique voter-side challenges: Phishing Denial of Service Security of voters’ PCs Half of system is outside election officials’ control

33. 6/17/2008 Page 33 Summary Report delivery: Fall 2008 Provides research on using technology to improve UOCAVA voting process Identifying options for further study Short-term: Electronic Ballot Delivery & Request Long-term: Electronic Ballot Return

34. 6/17/2008 Page 34 Questions

35. 6/17/2008 Page 35 Internet Voting vs. Banking Easy to detect fraud in banking systems Voter privacy makes fraud detection hard Fraud does occur in banking- Phishing, credit card fraud, password theft, etc. Possible to recover from banking fraud Banks can compensate fraud victims Can investigate where money went Cost-Benefit analyses possible with banking

36. 6/17/2008 Page 36 Internet Voting Estonia has a nation-wide Internet voting system Uses national ID’s employing smart cards for authentication Similar methods employed in VoI trial Doesn’t solve voter-side security concerns