1. Elder Matias Canadian Light Source University of Saskatchewan Control System Development

2. Where is Saskatoon?

3. The CLS 170.88 m circumference 2.9 GeV DBA lattice with 12-fold period Nominal Tune: x = 10.22 y = 3.26 E loss per turn: > 0.876 MeV Bend magnet radiation: c = 1.6 Å E c = 7.6 keV  x = 18.1 nmrad Damping times:  x = 2.4 ms,  y = 3.8 ms,  E = 2.7 ms ~10 mm bunch length

4. Staff Levels AreaInitial Build Project 2000-2003 (7 beamlines) Current + 2008 hires (13 beamlines + 6 more funded) Management11 Instrument Develop + FPGA12 System Design12 EPICS Apps/Data Acquisition26 ½ Web Services-3 ½ System Admin-1 PLC (Safety Systems)11 PLCs½1 Instrument Tech12 RF Techs23 Electrical Techs13 Electronics/PS Techs23 Excludes students. Excludes conventional IT, and AC Electrical Services Engineering in ICT of ETS groups.

5. Collaborate and Reuse Internal Collaboration/Reuse –Standardize equipment where it does not impact scientific capability to reduce development and maintenance time –Standardize Design Approach, Toolkits and Methods across beamlines and accelerator –Common toolkit and tools across all projects External Collaboration/Reuse –Based on analysis of requirements versus available systems e.g., EPICS, RTEMS, IRMIS, ScienceStudio

6. Design Package A Design Package Includes: –PFD Drawings used by Mechanical Engineering to capture system layout and critical parameters, e.g., water flow rates etc. –P&ID Drawings used by Controls to define the inputs and outputs of the system and basic relationships Partially based on American Instrumentation Society –Wiring diagrams –Requirements Document (Developed as required) –PLC and EPICS Software

7. Drawings All Drawings have a unique drawing number AutoCAD, Inventor, Eagle, Visio Draft Drawings have letter numbering Approved Drawings Alpha Numbering Drawings Review and Approval Process Sketches have Sketch numbers As-built captured on master print Master print in control room, updated by CAD as time permits

8. PID Example

10. Change Control (Major Changes) Major Changes handled through ECR/ECO Process Minor changes handled through MKS Integrity database

11. Change Control (Minor Changes) Central Database MKS Integrity MKS Source –Includes source control –Web and IDE Based Implements the concept of “Sandboxes” and “Change Packages” Exploring options for using: –MKS Requirements –MKS Deploy

12. Sample Problem Report

13. Sample Change Package

14. Design for Maintainability Design systems for the long term Phase out and replace older equipment when changing standards Examples –Replacing 68360 IOC with Moxa IOCs –Linac upgrade –PS upgrade

15. System Engineering Process Conceptual Design Preliminary Design Detailed Design In-houseOutsource Technical Specification Request for Quote Request for Proposal Design Review Installation Commissioning

16. Conventional Software Engineering Used for Web Services Projects Content Time Slide prepared by IBM for CLS CANARIE Project

17. Comparison with the Unified Process?

18. Safety Critical Software Applications: –lockup system (ACIS) –Oxygen monitoring –BMIT human studies (under development) IEC 61508 – SIL 3 based system Subject to CNSC Approval Siemens S7/400 F Redundant Second Chain Fail-safe design Independent Verification ALARP Hazard Analysis

19. Hazard Analysis Consequence CatastrophicCriticalMarginalNegligible Frequency 1 Frequent (10 -3 )IIIII Probable (10 -4 )IIIIIII Occasional (10 -5 )IIIIII Remote (10 -6 )IIIII IV Improbable (10 -7 )III IV Incredible (10 -8 )IV FrequencyConsequenceRisk Classification Initial RiskProbableCatastrophicI Residual RiskIncredibleCatastrophicII No.Constraint/RequirementAllocation AM4.1.1.aA lockup (search) procedure shall be developed requiring trained personnel or users to inspect the hutch prior to beam operation. Procedure AM4.1.1.bThe procedure shall define a specific configuration of the hutch perimeter doors prior to, during and after the inspection and the inspector is to follow a prescribed search patch. These controls are in place to ensure that on one may enter behind the inspector un-noticed. Procedure 1.Hutch is not Searched and Secured Prior to Beam Operation Analysis: The level of radiation present in a beamline hutch when the safety shutters are open is of a potentially lethal level and can not be easily detected by a worker in the hutch, it is conceivable that multiple workers could be harmed. To mitigate this hazard it is necessary to introduce an E/E/PE system (called the Access Control and Interlock System (ACIS)) that requires each hutch to be search and secured prior to beam operation through a lockup sequence. Mitigation:

20. The End