1. Lecture 9 The Demise of Sino-Soviet Alliance

2. Accumulated Tension Feb. 1956, CPSU 20 th Congress Criticizing Stalin and his personality cult without consult Beijing in advance

3. Mao ’ s Reaction Mid-March to early April 1956, a series of meetings Mao: “ exposed the problems ”, “ made a mess ” Stalin ’ s mistakes during the Chinese Communist revolution: Wang Ming ’ s policy; Chinese Civil War; Sino- Soviet Treaty; Korean War.

4. Mao ’ s Evaluation on Stalin A “ great Marxist-Leninist revolutionary leader ” ; “ 70-30 ratio ” methodology – achievements should account for 70% of Stalin ’ s career & mistakes for only 30%

5. Why did Mao defend Stalin? Defending CCP ’ s own experience of building socialism in China; Learning to establish a highly centralized economic planning system; Accelerating China ’ s economic development; Consolidating his leadership.

6. Mao ’ s Meeting with Soviet Ambassador (March 31, 1956) Proper tone for criticizing Stalin; Warning Khrushchev not to repeat the same mistake, hoping a new pattern of Sino- Soviet relations; Greater voice on questions concerning not only bilateral relations, but international Communist movement.

7. Beijing ’ s management of the Polish & Hungarian crisis (Late 1956) Both crises resulting from Soviet “ big-power chauvinism ” ; Polish Crisis ---- anti-Soviet; Hungarian Crisis ---- anti-Communist.

9. Chinese Leaders ’ Reflection on Soviet ’ s Behavior Summer of 1957, anti-rightist movement ; Criticizing Zhou Enlai ’ s viewpoint of balanced economic development; Zhou ’ s comments on Soviet according to his Soviet, Poland & Hungary visit from Jan. 7 to 18, 1957.

10. Divergence between Mao & Khrushchev Mao: Should not be frightened by nuclear war started by imperialists; Khrushchev: necessity & possibility of “ peaceful coexistence ” with Western imperialist countries.

11. From Tension to Crisis China ’ s domestic situation: Great Leap Forward; Zhou Enlai ’ s self-criticism;

12. Soviet ’ s Comments on the Great Leap Forward Khrushchev and his colleague were confused; Thousands of Soviet advisers issued warnings;

13. 2 Important Events: Long-wave radio transmission center & a receiving station: Mao: China would pay all the expenses & would retain exclusive ownership of the station. A joint submarine flotilla: Mao: not interested in creating a Sino-Soviet “ military cooperative ”.

14. Khrushchev ’ s China Trip (July 31 – Aug. 3, 1958) Khrushchev ’ s explanation; Mao ’ s reaction: “ big-power chauvinism ” did exist in the Soviet ’ s attitude toward China; Results: Agreement-signing, but Sino- Soviet psychological rift persisted & intensified.

16. 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis: Shelling Jinmen (Quemoy) At the end of July 1958, Beijing decided to begin large-scale shelling of Jinmen without informing Khrushchev; Aug. 23, began shelling; Early Sept., Gromyko visited Beijing, Mao: attracting world ’ s attention to the Taiwan question & to divert US strength from other part of the world (Esp. the Middle East). Sept. 8, Soviet issued a statement to show its solidarity with the Chinese.

17. China ’ s Situation in 1959: Negative effects of The Great Leap Forward; March, anti-Chinese & anti-communist rebellion in Tibet; June, Soviet cannot provide Beijing with atomic prototype & technical data for producing the bomb according to US-Soviet Geneva negotiation; July, Lushan Conference, Peng Dehuai ’ s “ anti- party plot ” ; Aug. Sino-India border conflict.

18. Khrushchev ’ s Speech at China ’ s National Day Banquet (1959) 40-minute speech; Emphasizing the “ Camp David ” spirit; Hoping to contribute to the relaxation of tensions between East & West; Unwise to use military means to test the stability of the capitalist system. Mao ’ s reflection: Khrushchev ’ s speech meant to insult him & revolutionary China.

19. Sino-Soviet Vitriolic Debate (Sept. 30 – Oct. 4, 1959) K. delivered Eisenhower ’ s request on releasing 5 American POWs; Taiwan Issue; Sino-India border conflict; Tibet Rebellion; About Peng Dehuai ’ s criticism.

20. K. ’ s Speech at Vladivostok on Oct. 6, 1959 “ brotherly solidarity ” between Moscow & Beijing as a cornerstone for world peace. “ it was unwise to behave like a bellicose cock & to long for war. ”

21. Breakdown July 1960, K. recalled all Soviet experts from China and drastically reduced material & military aid to Beijing; Disastrous aftermath of the Great Leap Forward;

22. Events: 1962, Mao initiated Sino-Soviet polemic debate; Wang Jiaxiang & “ 3 reconciliation & 1 reduction ” ; Nov. 1964, Zhou ’ s Moscow trip; Prelude of “ Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution ”.