1. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): Global Alert, Global Response Jun Min Jung

2. Electronic Discussion sites Media NGOs Military Laboratory Networks WHO Collaborating Centres/Laboratories Epidemiology and Surveillance Networks WHO Regional & Country Offices Countries/National Disease Control Centres UN Sister Agencies FORMAL GPHIN Partnership for global alert and response to infectious diseases: network of networks INFORMAL

3. Surveillance network partners in Asia Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance (MBDS) Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN) ASEAN APEC SEAMIC SEANET EIDIOR FluNet

4. Reports of respiratory infection, WHO global surveillance networks, 2002–2003 27 November – Guangdong Province, China: Non-official report of outbreak of respiratory illness with government recommending isolation of anyone with symptoms (GPHIN) 11 February – Guangdong Province, China: report to WHO office Beijing of outbreak of atypical pneumonia (WHO) 14 February – Guangdong Province, China: Official confirmation of an outbreak of atypical pneumonia with 305 cases and 5 deaths (China) 19 February – Hong Kong, SAR China: Official report of 33-year male and 9 year old son in Hong Kong with Avian influenza (H5N1), source linked to Fujian Province, China (Hong Kong, FluNet)

5. Intensified surveillance for pulmonary infections, WHO 2003 26 February – Hanoi, Viet Nam: Official report of 48-year-old business man with high fever (> 38 ºC), atypical pneumonia and respiratory failure with history of previous travel to China and Hong Kong 5 March – Hanoi, Viet Nam: Official report of 7 medical staff from French Hospital reported with atypical pneumonia Early March – Hong Kong, SAR China Official report of 77 medical staff from Hospital reported with atypical pneumonia`, WHO teams arrive Hong Kong and Hanoi, and with governments advise on investigation and containment activities

6. Global Alert Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 12 March: First global alert – describing atypical pneumonia in Viet Nam and Hong Kong 14 March – Four persons Ontario, three persons in Singapore, with severe atypical pneumonia fitting description of 12 March alert reported to WHO 15 March – Medical doctor with atypical pneumonia fitting description of 12 March reported by Ministry of Health, Singapore on return flight from New York

7. Global Alert, 15 March 2003 1)Atypical pneumonia with rapid progression to respiratory failure 2)Health workers appeared to be at greatest risk 3)Unidentified cause, presumed to be an infectious agent 4)Antibiotics and antivirals did not appear effective 5)Spreading internationally within Asia and to Europe and North America

8. 15 March: Second global alert Case definition provided Name (SARS) announced Advice given to international travellers to raise awareness 26 March Evidence accumulating that persons with SARS continued to travel from areas with local transmission, and that adjacent passengers were at small, but non-quantified risk 27 March Guidance provided to airlines and areas with local transmission to screen passengers leaving in order to decrease risk of international travel by persons with SARS Global Alert: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)

9. 1 April: Evidence accumulating from exported cases that three criteria were potentially increasing international spread: – magnitude of outbreak and number of new cases each day – pattern of local transmission – exportation of probable cases 2 April to present: Guidance provided to general public to postpone non-essential travel to areas with local transmission that met above criteria

10. SARS: cumulative number of probable cases worldwide as of 12 June 2003 – Total: 8 445 cases, 790 deaths China (5328) Singapore (206) Hong Kong (1755) Viet Nam (63) Europe: 10 countries (38) Thailand (9) Brazil (3) Malaysia (5) South Africa (1) Canada (238) USA (70) Outbreaks before 15 March global alert Colombia (1) Kuwait (1) South Africa (1) Korea Rep. (3) Macao (1) Philippines (14) Indonesia (2) Mongolia (9) India (3) Australia (5) New Zealand (1) Taiwan (688) Outbreaks after 15 March global alert Mongolia (9) Russian Fed. (1)

11. Probable cases of SARS by date of onset, Hanoi: n = 62 1 February – 12 June 2003 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 Feb.11 Feb.21 Feb.3 March13 March23 March2 April12 April22 April2 May12 June Number of cases

12. Probable cases of SARS by date of onset, Singapore: n = 206 1 February – 12 June 2003 Source: Ministry of Health, Singapore, WHO 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 1 Feb.13 Feb.25 Feb.9 Mar.21 Mar.2 Apr.14 Apr.26 Apr.8 May20 May29 May Number of cases 12 Jun.

13. Probable cases of SARS by date of onset, Canada: n = 227* 1 February – 12 June 2003 Number of cases 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 Feb.13 Feb.25 Feb.9 Mar.21 -Mar.2 Apr.14 Apr.26 Apr.8 May20 May1 Jun.12 Jun. * As of 12 June 2003, 11 additional probable cases of SARS have been reported from Canada for whom no dates of onset are available. Source: Health Canada

14. Probable cases of SARS by date of onset, Taiwan: n = 688 1 February – 12 June 2003 Number of cases 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 1 Feb.13 Feb.25 Feb.9 Mar.21 Mar.2 Apr.14 Apr.26 Apr.8 May20 May1 Jun.12 Jun.

15. Probable cases of SARS by date of onset, Beijing: n = 2,522 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 30-Mar-0313-Apr-0327-Apr-0311-May-0325-May-038-Jun-03 date of report number of cases

16. 156 close contacts of HCW and patients Index case from Guangdong Index case from Guangdong Hospital 2 Hong Kong 4 HCW + 2 Hospital 2 Hong Kong 4 HCW + 2 Hospital 3 Hong Kong 3 HCW Hospital 3 Hong Kong 3 HCW Hospital 1 Hong Kong 99 HCW Hospital 1 Hong Kong 99 HCW Canada 12 HCW + 4 Canada 12 HCW + 4 Hotel M Hong Kong Ireland USA New York Singapore 34 HCW + 37 Singapore 34 HCW + 37 Viet Nam 37 HCW + ? Viet Nam 37 HCW + ? Bangkok HCW Bangkok HCW 4 other Hong Kong hospitals 28 HCW 4 other Hong Kong hospitals 28 HCW Hospital 4 Hong Kong Hospital 4 Hong Kong B I K F G E D C J H A SARS: chain of transmission among guests at Hotel Metropole, Hong Kong, 21 February Germany HCW + 2 Germany HCW + 2 As of 26 March, 249 cases have been traced to the A case Source: WHO/CDC

17. Airport screening and health information, Hong Kong, SARS, 2003

18. Probable cases of SARS by date of onset, Hong Kong: n = 1 753, as of 9 June 2003 Number of cases 0 1 Feb.13 Feb.25 Feb.9 Mar.21 Mar.2 Apr.14 Apr.26 Apr.8 May20 May1 Jun.9 Jun. 0 20 40 60 80 100 120

19. SARS and the economy: impact on global travel, Hong Kong

20. SARS and the economy: impact on global travel, Singapore

21. Virus

23. Phage Virus – Lytic & Lysogenic cycle

24. dsDNA, ssDNA virus 의 복제

27. ssRNA – 자신의 RNA 를 mRNA 의 주형으로 사용하 는 경우

28. ssRNA – 자신의 RNA 를 DNA 의 주형으로 사용하는 경우

29. Structure and Composition Enveloped – Spike proteins resemble solar corona or crown 120-160 nm Positive-strand RNA (27-32 kb) Cytoplasmic replication Budding into ER and Golgi Notoriously difficult to propagate in culture High frequency of recombination Cause colds and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)

30. Coronavirus Infections Pathogenesis – Limited knowledge – Highly species-specific – Typically mild upper respiratory infections (“colds”) that remain localized Exception: SARS – Immunity is not durable Many people become resusceptible after a few years Laboratory Diagnosis – ELISA - may not discriminate past infections – HA – PCR – Virus isolation is difficult (often impossible) and requires great expertise

31. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Initial outbreak in SE Asia – Hong Kong and Singapore first reported – Disease originated in China – Originally thought to be from wild game markets Palm civet cat (which isn’t a cat) - Paradoxurus hermaphroditus Raccoon dog (which isn’t a dog) - Nyctereutes procyonoides – It is a bat virus Chinese horseshoe bats (Rhinolophus sinicus) No virus isolation – Amplification of coronavirus RNA from anal swabs – Serology – It is highly-similar, but not identical to SARS-CoV » Mutations have most likely occurred in transmission from bats to civets to humans » Reverse genetics of SARS-CoV and some bat viruses has been done – No animal pathogenesis model

32. SARS CoV

33. Coronavirus Phylogeny Chymotrypsin-like protease (3CL pro ), RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (Pol), spike (S), and nucleocapsid (N)

34. SARS Pathogenesis Virus is transmitted by respiratory and fecal routes Infection is mediated by human angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (hACE2) receptor – High expression Lung alveolar epithelial cells Intestinal enterocytes – Low expression Blood vessels (virtually all organs) Pneumonia – Cause of death is lung failure

35. SARS: what more we know 3 months later 1)Atypical pneumonia with rapid progression to respiratory failure: – Case fatality rate by age group: – 85% full recovery – Incubation period: 3–10 days 2)Health workers appeared to be at greatest risk – Health workers remain primary risk group in second generation – Others at risk include family members of index cases and health workers, and their contacts – Majority of transmission has been close personal contact; in Hong Kong environmental factors caused localized transmission < 1%< 24 years old 6%25–44 years old 15%45–64 years old > 50%> 65 years old

36. SARS: what more we know 3 months later 3)Unidentified cause, presumed to be an infectious agents – Aetiological agent: Coronavirus, hypothesized to be of animal origin – PCR and various antibody tests developed and being used in epidemiological studies, but PCR lacks sufficient sensitivity as diagnostic tool 4)Antibiotics and antivirals did not appear effective – Studies under way to definitively provide information on effectiveness of antivirals alone or in combination with steroids, and on use of hyperimmune serum in persons with severe disease – Case detection, isolation, infection control and contact tracing are effective means of containing outbreaks – Meeting 30 April at NIH to examine priorities in drugs and vaccine developments

37. SARS: what we are learning In the world today an infectious disease in one country is a threat to all: infectious diseases do not respect international borders Information and travel guidance can contain the international spread of an infectious disease Experts in laboratory, epidemiology and patient care can work together for the public health good despite heavy pressure to publish academically Emerging infectious disease outbreaks often have an unnecessary negative economic impact on tourism, travel and trade Infectious disease outbreaks reveal weaknesses in public health infrastructure Emerging infections can be contained with high level government commitment and international collaboration if necessary

38. PCR – Polymerase Chain Reaction

40. Transformation, Transduction, Conjugation 1. Transformation

41. Transformation, Transduction, Conjugation 1. Transformation

42. Transformation, Transduction, Conjugation 2. Transduction

43. Transformation, Transduction, Conjugation 3. Conjugation

44. Transformation, Transduction, Conjugation 3. Conjugation