1. Assessing the 2010 QDR: essential questions Project on Defense Alternatives January 2010 Briefing Memo 45

2. 9/21/2015for more on the QDR visit www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr 2 Presentation of Argument in the QDR In the 2010 QDR do the decisions taken clearly follow from the character of the security environment and threats, the defense strategy, and the stated required force structure and capabilities? Is the logical connection between these various elements convincingly presented? How transparent are the assumptions that underlie the statements in the QDR? Does the document allow for diligent interrogation of the assumptions it is built on?

3. 9/21/2015for more on the QDR visit www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr 3 Presentation of Argument in the QDR Setting priorities is the essential core task in the art of strategy. Does the QDR discuss the choices and priorities behind the decisions announced? Does it make a convincing case for the priorities chosen? (Keep in mind that making no change is a choice.)

4. 9/21/2015for more on the QDR visit www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr 4 Force Sizing and Structuring Does threat analysis in the QDR closely track to critical national interests? Or, to the contrary, does it remain at a level of generality which doesn’t allow clear distinctions to be made between what is a vital and what is a lesser, if nonetheless troublesome, security issue?

5. 9/21/2015for more on the QDR visit www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr 5 Force Sizing and Structuring Does the discussion of threats in the QDR calibrate their magnitude and probabilities in a way that would allow reasonable people to agree on a reasonable response in terms of defense preparations? Or is the calibration of threats imprecise and minimally articulated? Does the discussion of threats present empirical evidence of their relative severity or rely essentially on anecdotes?

6. 9/21/2015for more on the QDR visit www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr 6 Force Sizing and Structuring Are threats prioritized and are those priorities systematically applied to arrive at the structure of the forces and their capabilities? Is force structure presented in relation to real world dynamics… including assessment of the likelihood of multiple overlapping deployments, surge capacities, sustainment of forces, and regeneration of power after deployment and use of force?

7. 9/21/2015for more on the QDR visit www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr 7 Modernization and Procurement Is modernization and procurement geared to an assessment of actual and emerging threat capabilities? Are emerging threats carefully defined and described and is the argument around preparing now for prospective or emerging threats clearly stated and convincing? Do modernization plans take full advantage of the opportunity to hedge against uncertainty through technological development that stops short of procurement of new systems until intelligence informs that a relevant threat is emergent?

8. 9/21/2015for more on the QDR visit www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr 8 Modernization and Procurement To what degree does the QDR provide evidence of the overall coherence of modernization planning? Or does the QDR, for the most part, put a good face on what amounts to a brokered political compromise of the differing development perspectives and interests of the several services?

9. 9/21/2015for more on the QDR visit www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr 9 Balancing Scarce Resource Investment and Security Risk Does the QDR provide convincing evidence that the correct calculation has been made and the correct balance found between security risks and scarce resources? Does it make the case for when redundancy and over-matching foes is prudent and when it represents wasted investment of national wealth?

10. 9/21/2015for more on the QDR visit www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr 10 Balancing Scarce Resource Investment and Security Risk If economic and political conditions necessitate effective limits to defense spending, the scale and complexity of the force structure will trade against timely modernization, sizing, provisioning and training of the force. Is the QDR persuasive that the correct balance between the scale and complexity of the posture and economy of resources has been chosen?

11. 9/21/2015for more on the QDR visit www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr 11 Balancing Scarce Resource Investment and Security Risk In the 2008 National Defense Strategy Secretary Gates addresses what he calls ‘Institutional Risk’: “DoD is already a complex organization. We must guard against increasing organizational complexity leading to redundancy, gaps, or overly bureaucratic decision-making processes.” What evidence does the QDR offer that these risks are being addressed?

12. 9/21/2015for more on the QDR visit www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr 12 Defense Reform “Defense reform” usually includes infrastructure reduction, changes in business practices/cost accounting, restructuring of forces and service roles, changes to personnel and training systems, and doctrinal innovation. Is there any evidence that this QDR adequately addresses the decades of failure to reform the institutional practices of DoD and the several services, often contributing to the waste of investments and to excessive redundancy? Or does it offer little more than lip-service for the desirability of reform?