1. Why Oh Y ? HS2 -- grand projet, great delusion or national network ? Jonathan Tyler Passenger Transport Networks, YORK Cambridge University Railway Club 17 February 2012

2. How have we got here ? growth in rail traffic -- distinct change in trends, with multiple causation -- corporate assumptions of trends continuing -- limited interest in alternative scenarios -- ‘green’ message imperfectly understood hence momentum for increased capacity politics -- Conservative commitment lieu Heathrow runway -- enthusiasm of Labour Transport Secretary -- longstanding LibDem support for public transport

3. how have we got here ? continued engineering opportunity seized by -- people frustrated by more modest projects -- the construction industry economic opportunity seized by -- believers in infrastructure as economic driver -- northern cities desperate for regeneration other factors -- keeping up with other countries -- railway enthusiasts dreaming of an HSR in Britain -- a polarised debate [more later]

5. My position long career dedicated to quality passenger services (first to quantify link between speed and demand) -- therefore a surprising sceptic about HSR reasons: -- this University taught me objective appraisal -- doubts grew as I studied documents, specifically - the ‘network’ concept - the technical optimism - the environmental arguments - the mega-project phenomenon

7. A flawed process Government need for grand projet HS2 Ltd too close to Department for Transport HS2 did not emerge from a national strategy planning presupposed standards + geography concern for property rights > secrecy consultation confused strategy, route-planning and local considerations – largely ignored anyway polarisation : ‘true believers’ versus ‘nimbys’ little independent debate: silence of the industry / treason of the consultants

8. So, what are the issues ? need for a national network strategy demand forecasts scale, timescale, costs, economic benefits routes (Chilterns, M corridors, Heathrow, HS1) technical specification and operating capacity location-specific environmental issues not addressed (ecological, socio-cultural, personal loss only legitimate if overwhelming justification for a project : establish that first without compromised assessment procedure)

9. A national network strategy what is railway for ? -- context : continuous growth … ecological limits -- public service or travel supermarket ** -- marginal social cost pricing (all modes), or subsidy -- mode of first choice for all appropriate journeys ? principles : -- national standards of service, eg. frequency, speed -- comprehensive connectivity (including other modes) -- fares system matched to objectives (not so now !) nb. responsibility for delivery is secondary matter

10. “Whatever your destination this autumn, you can bag a bargain, giving you more money to spend on nights out or your Christmas shopping. But hurry, this offer ends on Sunday and the numbers of tickets are limited, …”

11. a national network strategy continued huge improvements but still uneven quality no systematic plan to address weaknesses -- eg. London / non-London variation, mixed- purpose services, missing links, ends of suburban lines, historic anomalies, off-rail places -- not helped by poor data model demand with various scenarios, mode splits then envision an ideal network (compare Swiss) possible outcomes : a case for extensive HSR / limited HSR / new non-HSR sections / projects directed at specific timetable improvements

12. modal-split targets national standards of service-quality and connectivity modelling route-specific demand organisations, budgets timetabling, operations planning infrastructure plan toward an excellent system of public transport data, scenarios

13. Demand forecasts questionable presumption of continuing growth changes in composition of traffic, public expectations surprising acceptance of ‘predict and provide’ no analysis of potential gains elsewhere on network (lower mode-shares > greater social benefit ?) reluctance to question value by journey-purpose myth of business people doing vital deals doubts about Virgin’s business model crowding distorted by fares policy should we be encouraging long-distance commuting ?

14. Scale, timescale, costs, benefits bold vision – or hubris ? Birmingham … London not until 2026, full ‘Y’ not until 2032 : a long time to wait in an uncertain world risk of cost-escalation or changed circumstances leaving unfinished project, lost opportunities high cost of British civil engineering compounded by large projects (Euston), tunnelling economic benefits subject of fierce debate (weak evidence on regional regeneration, absence of strong regional government, arcane value-of-time figures) may widen, not narrow, North / South division as planned will favour select cities, not whole regions

15. The routeing arguments HS2 ‘perfect railway’ : straight, 400 km/h, few stops the ‘Y’ is London-centric, serves few cities not a network, places omitted (Stoke, Coventry) ambiguity on city-centre or ‘parkway’ stations Chiltern route (note pull of Heathrow) most environmentally and politically damaging routes along Motorway corridors : less damaging – and would the engineering be that difficult ? muddled thinking about Heathrow even more muddled thinking about HS1 link

16. Specification + operating capacity maximum speed driven by technical ambition -- undervalues energy and carbon costs -- prejudices route choices -- marginalises all but largest cities assumption of European gauge -- required by EU law (challengeable ?), BUT -- adds engineering cost -- predicates 2 train-types (‘captive’, ‘classic compatible’) -- complicates station design -- may introduce operational inflexibility

17. specification + operating capacity continued HS2 Ltd believes 18 trains / hour feasible, based on advanced control technology (= >20, with margin) compare with present maximum anywhere of 15 18 t/h an act of faith too far ? -- effect of intermediate stops, diverge/merge moves -- inevitable perturbations, esp. from classic lines -- matters because expectations exceed even 18 poor integration with existing network system designed for 400 m trains, but ‘classic compatibles’ limited to 200 m – unless portion- working introduced (could help capacity)

18. The convergence problem Trains 1 and 3 non-stop, train 2 starts on ‘slow’ line and converges at c. 2.5 km from station.

19. The timetable plan for a £32billion project

20. The implications of constrained capacity Column 1 : HS2 latest plans * HS1 services omitted * Birmingham reduced to 3 * commitment to North East Col. 2 : aspirations Col. 3 : what could be offered without the Heathrow and HS1 links Col. 4 : the potential benefits of portion-working (actual frequencies = 2 x trains) NB. ‘open access’ ignored !

21. What are the alternative strategies ? a flexible, incremental approach for example, for the West Coast Main Line : -- Pendolino lengthening, more Standard seats -- better operating discipline in peaks -- reform of ticket-pricing policy -- selective infrastructure schemes but do in context of a national public transport plan new alignments may be justified (not necessarily in WCML corridor) but make socio-economic case first and weigh environmental factors honestly

22. What now ? Government has decided to build despite the spin the project is not certain complex Hybrid Bill procedure opponents will fight bloody battle through Judicial Review and then Parliament will distract the rail industry’s attention dangers of mega-projects with own momentum compare APT and HST case for a pause, a national debate, a fresh start ? I would rather that than a negative ‘stop’ campaign

23. Jonathan Tyler Passenger Transport Networks, YORK 01904 611187 ptn@btconnect.com