1. Presented April 2009 By Carolyn Stewart, COL (ret) US Army Consultant Stewartconsult_1@msn.com Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart

2. The “MULTI” Aspect is Reality Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart Multinational military and agency is the norm but it seems new for every mission Most of us find out who we need to work with during the missions – on the job training Military and non-military need to build a team and partnership relationship to accomplish the multi-functional missions If I could travel back through time, I’d ensure my intelligence organizations had dedicated persons or a group to coordinate regularly with non-military mission partners –NOT SPORADICLY

3. The ISSUES – Yes to What Everyone Said so Far Let’s talk about some “Multi Solutions” Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart

4. Stewart THEOREM 1: Success in the Environment Requires a Team/Partner Sharing Relationship Using Operational Reasoning Among Mission Members Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart Ethnic groups Tribes SubTribes Clans Smugglers Org.Crime Businesses NGOs International Diplomats International Organizations Refugees Coalition agencies National government Media Tribal fighters Insurgent Groups Criminals Ethnic militia Judicial National Military Private Contractors Illegal border crossers Coalition Forces Terrorist Cells Police Local Govts Religious groups Financial system transport system Infra- structure History

5. Stewart’s Definition of Multi-Dimensional OPERATIONAL REASONING Knowledge and understanding of the variables and inter-relationships in the operational environment is applied to develop shared situational understanding and coordinated actions Actions and non-actions, options, and reactions are “gamed” and assessed to estimate causal effects Learn what is already in existence See what has changed Know what and how things can change View from all players and actors who influence outcomes, actions and reactions Multifunctional, interagency effort – not done in isolation Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart Knowledge shared situational understanding coordination, planning and decisions Desired Causal effects

6. Intelligence and Operational Reasoning Application in the Multifunctional Environment Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart Intel and Info – analysis And synthesis Knowledge products More collection, Info, synthesis analysis ID gaps, needs, Changes in variables

7. FIRST -- Dispel Some MYTHS Leaders and Intel know everything about all the actors or can learn everything with pure intelligence collection and reporting means Everybody looking at the problem set understands the complexity The expertise to understand all the associated factors (such as how financial systems work) resides in the intelligence community NGOs, diplomatic efforts, reconstruction agencies, and internal security forces all have independent, full situational understanding within their own organizations Anyone making an assessment or providing information is open- minded and views issues from all perspectives Information from days, weeks and months ago is always still valid Intel guys just sit around base camps drinking coffee and reading Military or interagency personnel arrive in theater trained and ready Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart

8. Experience Tells Us Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart The entire picture is not in one place or one mind Plenty of good people are trying to do good things – they are ALL learning and improvising Perspectives are based on time, location, mission, goals, experience, and what you see, hear and read Veracity of data, and cognitive errors/biases impact perspectives Intel is art and science that requires sharing One brain can’t do it all Attitude does matter

9. Knowledge and Understanding – Challenges You Can’t Ignore A lot of data but who are subject matter experts to help validate information and put it into context? Data is not necessarily organized or accessible to everyone; are assessments based on cherry-picked items? Who checks? Are we applying cognitive reasoning and knowledge in such a way that we overcome biases? Are any of us tainting the assessments? Are we collecting the right information from all the right places? Are we operating like the media on snapshots and sound bytes or have we truly developed situational understanding? Do we know what is important to the actors, their interests, their motivations, and who/what influences them? Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart

10. Stewart Theorem 1 Axiom: Intelligence Reasoning Drives Operational Reasoning LOGIC, DIALOGUE, SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING AND REASON ARE THE PREEMINENT FACTORS for analysis and synthesis - Talent in day job tasks not an indicator of ability to reason amidst complexity Intel reasoning provides the proactive thought, synthesis and examination of actions and effects from the perspective of all actors/variables that informs the entire operational reasoning process Analyst training is deficient – doesn’t matter how much technology you do or don’t have – FIX the thinking Postulate 1: There is no reason every “multi” organization can’t all come together to reach common standards in thinking for analysis Postulate 2: The majority of friction in the “multi” mission can be smoothed out by teaching analytic thought to a high standard Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart

11. Intelligence and Interagency- What We know Intelligence should provide knowledge products and energize shared situational understanding across the contingent so commanders, leaders, agencies and people make the right decisions and take the right actions at the right times A coordinated civilian interagency effort is the main effort leading to success in peace support operations Requires situational understanding across the economic, political, social, cultural, informational, infrastructure and military domains of the environment Neither the military or civilian components have a complete, unbiased, knowledge-based picture on their own When communications are not continuous, units and agencies step on each other Iraq, De-Ba’athification, disbanded the Iraqi mil – no coordination ahead of time by CPA with mil and its plan – Model of how to create an insurgency thru ignorance Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart

12. Multifunctional Thinking – Not Your Traditional Military Intel: These Guys Multi-Task! Social and cultural analysis (population, tribes, clans, religious, sites, events, dates, leaders, education, ethnic dynamics, discrimination, local customs, family and social relationships, values, competitors…) Informational analysis, Perceptions among actors; influential people What inaccuracies are growing; what good events influenced populace Geo-political assessments at the tactical level: impact on mission, who is who, and relationships Stability Intel: threats to the mission, objectives, populace, or borders Organized crime, drugs, arms smuggling, political violence, intimidation, religious violence, radicalization, disease…. Economic and infrastructure assessments and impacts Force Protection: threats to forces Indigenous military and security force assessments (compliance, disarmament, training, readiness, etc.) Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart INTERAGENCY Players and NGOS ARE STAKEHOLDERS AND RECIPIENTS OF THE PRODUCTS AND RESULTING ACTIONS

13. All Must View the Environment: Culture, Ideals, and Social norms Everyone has motivations, interests and values – different from yours Applying judgmental views will distort decisions Define actions appropriate to the culture and in proportion to the issue Consent for the mission can become opposition, resistance and insurgency Know the reality of social and cultural norms versus own ideals “We are not going to recognize tribes in the new Iraq” Dec ’03, prior to Anbar meltdown, a CPA deputy and CJTF POLAD when presented with detailed Red Team COA to empower 19 tribes to counter growing insurgency and AQ terrorism in Anbar province “The Afghan Arabs/Mujahidin are not a threat to SFOR or anyone in/outside Bosnia” DEC 1998, US agency position in response to MI BN and Danish reporting of growing hostility and threatening behavior “They are just like the Amish” MND-N Polad “The Iraqis will greet us as liberators” former US SECDEF, 2002 “There is no nationalism in Iraq” Intel general, AUG 2003 Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart

14. What Intel Should Expertly Do For the Mission Provide usable current and long term reports, assessments, and anticipatory estimates on threats, vulnerabilities, and opportunities Work the Multi perspective view – threat, neutral, friendlies, non- combatants – for planning, ops, and decisions Include social, economic, political, informational dynamics Assess possible causal effects Continue filling gaps and updating – build enhanced knowledge Work with international and interagency Establish and maintain an architecture for collection, analysis, production and dissemination of information and intelligence OTHER: Supply Terrain/geospatial imagery and mapping support Use all sources and define detailed requirements for each Support Planning and course of action development Provide Counterintelligence and security support Ensure Data base management (file preservation too) Provide DOCEX/DOMEX and translation support Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart Know self and threats…overcome tendency to rely on tech intel means…mass information resources at the right time for results

15. Anticipate thru Imbedded Multi Look in Multi Dimensions – Must Do! This is not doctrine – this is the world according to Stewart Create a “gaming” cell to objectively and independently think and assess the future all multi players are creating Know what galaxy you are heading toward Not everyone is suited to doing this – must be hand picked Creative, imaginative, perceptive, think with reason, non-judgmental, empathy Must think like and represent red, blue, green and neutrals If it’s possible and within capabilities of the actor in the circumstances, then address the issues Hope and wishful thinking don’t work POSTULATE #3: Implementation of a “multi staffed gaming cell” will reduce surprise and unintended effects Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart

16. Data, Information, Knowledge And Situational Understanding For Intelligence ART Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart

17. More and better knowledge requires hard, detailed work…continuous analysis and synthesis…requires information from all sources…many non-military NOT ALWAYS TIED TO DECISION – NEEDED TO ANTICIPATE Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart Need collection and analysis married to reach top ring Need collection and analysis married to ID requirements

18. What Intel Needs, Topic By Topic, to Analyze, Synthesize, Estimate and Assess Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart The ART IS Not Limited to a Decision Point or ONE Time Understanding Knowledge INFO Data Understanding Knowledge INFO Data Knowledge Understanding Knowledge INFO Data

19. Viewing PLATO/SOCRATES’ Discussion of Knowledge in “The Republic” (US Army Field Manuals - FM 3 and 6) Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart Limited information leads to the wrong view from the shadows of the cave – Distorted from reality at the top; ABILITY TO REASON DEPENDS ON UNDERSTANDING Situational Understanding Is related to wisdom

20. “Multi” Coordination --Thought and Effort Understanding root causes of issues and possible results from actions Subject matter experts, all sources, and continuous coordination Shared or communicated goals Follow through on details versus the hand wave Clear vision, all expectations and stated requirements for intel and info Pre-deployment coordination to establish relationships Operational procedures and policies Designated lead to bring analysts, experts, and interagency together Common portal for information sharing and knowledge Coordinated assessments and efforts – don’t step on each other Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart

21. What is a PIR? Why We are Short-Sighting Ourselves with the Definition and Application “Commanders limit CCIR (PIR) to focus efforts of limited collection assets” Limit by topic and time – directly linked to decision and operation by Army doctrine --OK then, how do you gain this thing called understanding?

22. Time and platforms Drive CCIR and ISR processes– not the Quest for knowledge and understanding Much knowledge and most detail does not come from platforms “Mission Command” desires initiative and agility, then why self-impose restrictions on what we can or should know by viewing platforms as the dominant collector? Chicken or egg argument – process assumes you have knowledge and know the most important gaps – how do you get the initial details? “Mission Command” desires initiative and agility, then why self-impose restrictions on what we can or should know by viewing platforms as the dominant collector? Chicken or egg argument – process assumes you have knowledge and know the most important gaps – how do you get the initial details? Platform and Time Centric View Dominates Collection And Development of Knowledge

23. Viewed in 2 dimensions for operations: TIME and PLATFORM/ASSET centric Self-Imposed limits on intel capacity ; collection limits analysis ISR synchronization does NOT encompass analysis – parallel process that becomes current ops focused versus longer term understanding Wastes capability and capacity of “non-platform” resources; knowledge from people across the globe is not a platform in the system No knowledge network or supported means to use one How does an analytic team get access to experts and people with knowledge – the RFI process doesn’t do this Current term focus and operations decision –based ignores knowledge required for routine interaction that cause effects over time Triage precludes knowledge and synthesis needed for anticipation; causes reactive mode and being behind power curve No mention of use of reason and logic over time Focus on process charts and words without teeth to support in complex operations Upfront Issues – ISR and Intel Process’ Depiction Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart

24. Is this a focused, driven effort to gain understanding, or hope that absorption and luck over time in the mission area will make people smart? What “strategies” compensate for PIR /CCIR?

25. The Intel World According to Stewart: The Theory of Relativity for Intel Over Time, Space, and Action-Reaction Variables Applies Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart

26. 3 dimensions time: past, present and future. No boundary in space and time for intel. Knowledge level in past led to actions that resulted in the present situation. Past still impacts (actions, relationships, what you developed for knowledge). Understanding in the present dimension of time of all the variables will effect decisions and actions that cause future state/situation, where today’s present is the past…. Actions, Collection, and Knowledge flow into the future based on Past and Present Casual Effects that are your “Present” situation can require actions to clean up the past Knowledge, Reason and Situational Understanding form the basis for current decisions that shape the future – different futures are possible based on actions Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart

27. Stewart’s World: Intel and Collection Cycles Should Work in Many Dimensions Considering Many Variables – the “X, Y, and Z” axes’ intersection not a common starting point for variables New data and info cause loop back to new collection and then move into different knowledge/variable area - lead to other analysis and requirements for information – the variables are not constant or static; data and assessment points change

28. Recurring Issues –Get Over These Hurdles Normal unit architectures not organized for these complex missions A standing mil architecture that is ready and suitable with orgfanic expertise for every possible contingency is fiscally untenable Intelligence expertise in economic, social, cultural, political, and military affairs rarely inherent “On the job” training and knowledge build occur during missions Shortfalls in Coalition military to military interoperability Military information system closed to most civilian agencies - firewalled Normal unit operating procedures and training do not include a structured interface with interagency AND – NEITHER IS GOING TO OPEN DATA BASES Shortly after the military contingent “gets it” and has established relationships and knowledge, they rotate Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart Unit turnover often results in setbacks in relationships with interagency and the populace, loss of area expertise, loss of data and records— Preventing these Issues Requires Dedicated Efforts

29. Counterproductive Issues Intelligence collectors considered radioactive or Intel left off mission reports Civil Affairs and Public Affairs want separation Debriefs and operation reports don’t include all information Intel does not give specific information requirements and collection details to ALL sensors (engineers, patrols, etc) Intelligence focuses on negative activity and threats; often excludes positive conditions, progress, slight changes, lack of threat, etc. Majority of Intel prepares the daily brief, focused on what happened “yesterday” Unreliable or too small comms pipes for the data to be shared easily No common server-based warehouse for all data and access by all Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart These are easy training and technology fixes if the effort is applied

30. Naysayers and Limited Vision – Words from Senior MIL Leaders If the information does not come from a traditional intel system, then it is not credible and should not be used Open source and subject matter expertise is unreliable because we cannot vet the sources as we can “HUMINT” sources “If the intelligence assets and people do not belong to me and are not deployed with me, then they will not support me adequately” Other agencies’ information is always suspect because “they” have an agenda Social, political, economic, cultural, military experts must grow inside our intel system Software used must provide a digital map icon picture Assessments must document everything - the data and intel used “Work with ‘uncleared ‘ Subject Matter Experts will compromise our plans/ops” Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart

31. Real Concerns You have to Work Through Regarding Criminal Activity and Insurgency Requirements for national approval for certain missions, regardless of how compelling the intelligence might be…. What legal standards apply and can everyone meet those standards? Important when military assists with criminal detention of people and handling evidence; Military not trained to legal standards Intel association with evidence may result in inadmissible view Are the laws in place for police to use technical surveillance? Do not require military intel as evidence – either the people or technical intel Unless military intel transitions to police investigation, you can collect for years and be limited in achieving discernible results Appears extrajudicial if all based on mil detention and intel Detainees released and seek retribution on “collaborators” If judges, investigators, and police have no clearances, and there is no assurance of their trustworthiness, it is very difficult for military intelligence to share much Multiple clearance and security levels (NATO, KFOR, none?) The originator of the intel retains the authority to lower or change the classification What do you really know and not know about insurgent groups and their support? Does AQ really have a global network? That’s what the slides show… Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart

32. Some Examples of What Worked Single NATO data base – get mil to use it and update it More REL NATO and REL KFOR reporting rather than SECRET NOFORN Enlisted the assistance of deployed National Intel Centers (NICs) Each took on production topics as a responsibility-- reach back home UNMIK police chief, regional police chiefs, CIU, ORG Crime Bureau, some prosecutors and investigators – NATO clearances Could brief them on what we knew; end the cycle of intel for intel’s sake They could start/direct evidentiary investigations Multiple intel conferences to bring in all intel views on specific topics POLAD supported introductions to topic “experts” in the country Declassified reports to max extent possible to share with neighboring country security forces about threat coming thru Kosovo; NATO policy only in regard to REL KFOR intel Conducted board with intel and cleared police agency leaders to lay out what each was investigating/targeting and where to prioritize or deconflict efforts Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart

33. More Examples of What Worked Intel and KFOR support to elections – areas with threats – met regularly with police, OSCE, UN elections monitoring, etc. Intel and declassification to support Hague War Crimes investigations KFOR Command meeting with SRSG to present the intel, the threat, risks and plan for operations that had significant potential causal effects Discussion with OSCE prior to detention of criminals/individuals leading insurgency efforts in southern Serbia and Macedonia Open meeting followed with OSCE, intel, police Requests to national police investigative service (FBI equivalents) in Kosovo for info on detainees or wanted personnel from their nation (significant criminal or terrorist affiliation) NIC support to stand up DOCEX; home country research support Analytic teams and comms in direct support of BDEs in Bosnia to share info laterally across unit boundaries – research support to HUMINT and S2s Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart

34. Additional Points Related to Previous Identify who will manage coordination and sharing across units and agencies. ID who manages specific problem sets and then bring the team together to answer requirements and build knowledge Apply complex reasoning, dig into details while looking at the big picture and keep learning every day; do not focus only on the short term or recent past Determine how you vet and fuse information – ID accountability and method Do you require all analysis forward, or can you stand up teams of experts and researchers on demand and connected virtually? Develop a structure that can pursue all info requirements and get answers. Do not let requirements and questions just fall on the floor Trust people – give intel analysts challenging work and let them do it! You don’t need 90% of analysts doing CNN type work…you don’t need everyone just reading messages without purpose Provide commanders, units, and interagency elements with the right analytical support before, during and after actions

35. Don’t limit analysis and intel thru CCIR and asset centric view Collection and analysis in the past and present impact the future – do the hard detailed work always Build a real knowledge network and system Add “architecture management” Recommendations Copyright March 2009 Property of C Stewart