1. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY Technical Committee Meeting of Technical Working Group on Nuclear Power Plant Control and Instrumentation 20 - 22 May 2009, Vienna, Austria REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE) Prof. Mikhail Yastrebenetsky Ukrainian State Scientific Technical Center on Nuclear and Radiation Safety

2. REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE) Mikhail Yastrebenetsky Contents 1.Common news 2.Modernization during 2007-2009 3.Operating experience 4.Regulatory activity 5.Recommendation to IAEA

3. REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE) Mikhail Yastrebenetsky RIVNE NPP ZAPORIZHA NPP KHMELNITSKY NPP WWR 2×1000 WWR 6×1000 WWR 2×1000 WWR 2×440 SOUTH-UKRAINE NPP WWR 3×1000

4. REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE) Mikhail Yastrebenetsky 1 Common news There are in Ukraine: -4 NPP’s; -13 units WWER-1000; -2 units WWER-440. The youngest units – Rovno 4 and Khmelnitskiy 2 – started in 2004. The age of the oldest units (Rovno 1, Rovno 2, South Ukraine 1) – 28-29 years. Design life of these units – 30 years. The set of actions (including I&C) for life extension are fulfilling now. Decreasing of electricity production during January-March 2009 compared with January-March 2008: -Common – 13,7% -NPP – 13,6%

5. REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE) Mikhail Yastrebenetsky 1 Common news According government plans, 2 units will be intended for commissioning to 2015. The site was determined - Khmelnitskiy 3 and 4. Type of units – WWER-1000, project B392B (analog – Balakovskaja NPP-5 – Russia). Manufacturer of reactor – Russia. Manufacturer of turbine and generator – Ukraine. Designers and manufacturers of I&C systems – Ukrainian companies. Main designer of I&C – KHIKA and “LvovOrgres”. The main problem – the assurance of unity of different systems because designers of different systems inside of Ukraine had different element base, difference of software, etc. Conception of I&C systems for these units will be ended in 2009.

6. REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE) Mikhail Yastrebenetsky 2 New systems for Ukrainian NPP  – 2007–2009 Name of systemDeveloper RNPPSUNPP Kh NPP ZNPP 123412312123456 Reactor protection system RADIY  Reactor power regulation and limitation system RADIY  KHARTRON- ARKOS  Control rod actuation system ŠKODA  IMPULS  Neutron flux monitoring system IMPULS  Engineering safety features actuation system RADIY  SPDS WESTINGHOUSE, WESTRON  Refueling machine control system GANZ, EWIG  DIAKONT, RADIY 

7. REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE) Mikhail Yastrebenetsky 2 Implementation of Ukrainian I&C systems for foreign NPP Ukrainian company Name of systemName of NPPCountry RadiyEngineering safety feature actuation system Kozloduy NPP 2008 – unit 6 system 2 2009- unit 5 system2, unit 6 systems1,3 2010-unit 5 systems 1,3 Bulgaria WestronSystem of diesel-generator control Armenian NPP Unit 2 Armenia Feedwater control system Kharkov Shevchenko plant Automatic turbine regulatorsBalakovo NPP-3, 4 Kalinin NPP-1, 2 Russia ASUT-240 Control systems for turbine (regulators, technological protection, monitoring and diagnostic) and generator Kaiga 3, 4India RAPP 5, 6

8. REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE) Mikhail Yastrebenetsky 3 Operating experience Operating reliability of I&C systems, designed by “Radiy” company Name of system Reactor protection systems Reactor power and limitation control systems Engineering safety features actuation systems systemssetschannelssystemschannelssystemschannels Number 102060618722 Operating time, h 318000492000147600012400037200085000236000 Number of failures 0090203 Estimation of failures intensity, Е ‑ 06 low confidence bound ––10,6–19,2–32,8 point 006,105,37012,7 high confidence bound ––3,17–1,08–3,45 There weren’t any failures of systems or sets as a whole. Comparison of all operating measures with design measures and requirements measures in specification was fulfilled for channels. Operating measures are close to design measures (e.g. design failure intensity for channel of reactor protection system is 11.6E-06, point estimation is 6.1E-06). All measures for systems satisfy the specification requirements.

9. REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE) Mikhail Yastrebenetsky 3 Operating experience Reliability of FPGA Different types of FPGA – manufacturer “Altera” (USA) Common number of FPGA in reactor protection systems, reactor power control systems and ESFAS is 11000 FPGA had not failures for operating time during the observation.

10. REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE) Mikhail Yastrebenetsky Analysis of violations due to I&C Level of violations according INES- 1, 0, out of scale Intensity of violation decreased in function of time ( for violations due to I&C and due to technological equipment too) Important reason of violations- events outside of I&C (ventilation system, EMC, etc) Measures how modernization improved safety Influence of SW

11. REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE) Mikhail Yastrebenetsky 3 Operating experience Reactor power control and limitation systems (designer – Radiy) Reactor protection systems (designer – Radiy) Control rod systems (designer – Skoda-Controls) Before moder- nization After moder- nization Before moder- nization After moder- nization Before moder- nization After moder- nization Operating time, years 140321353710567 Number of violations 2–4–165 Violations intensity, 1/year 0,01400,02900,150,074 Unit downtime, h0–55,39038,150 Underproduction of energy, 10 6 kWh 3,5–55,3047,90716 Influence of I&C systems modernization to NPP safety

12. REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE) Mikhail Yastrebenetsky 3. Analysis of operating data about NPP violations due to the I&C systems Comparison of software influence to NPP violations because digital systems Ukraine USA B.Geddes and R.Torok 2 out of 13 (1 st generation), 0 out of 20 (2 nd generation) 4 out of 49 (1E systems) Agreement with B.Geddes, R.Torok Protection against the software failures is already at a “reasonable assurance level”

13. REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE) Mikhail Yastrebenetsky 4 Regulatory activity Common Principles of NPP Safety Regulations of NPP Reactors Nuclear Safety Safety Requirements to NPP Digital I&C Systems (Revision 1) IEC IEC 61513 IEC 1226 IEC 62340 IEC 60880 IEC 62138 IEC 60987 IAEA NS-R-1 NS-G-1.3 NS-G-1.1 NP 306.5.02/ХХХ-2009 NP 306.2.141NP 306.2.145 Ukrainian Regulations Regulations with Requirements to NPP I&C

14. REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE) Mikhail Yastrebenetsky 4 Regulatory activity (2) Requirements on Nuclear and Radiation Safety to digital safety important Instrumentation and Control Systems NP 306.5.02/XXX-2009 1. Common positions 2. Main terms and definitions 3. Classification 4. Functional requirements -common positions -safety control systems -safety related systems -control rooms 5. Requirements to dependability of functions -protections after CCF -single failure criteria -redundancy -diversity -reliability measures -diagnostic -protection after unauthorized access -protection after personnel error

15. REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE) Mikhail Yastrebenetsky 4 Regulatory activity (3) 6. Requirements to resistance of functions -environment -mechanical influence -electrical supply -EMC 7. Requirements to quality of functions -accuracy -MMI -response speed 8. Requirements to independence of functions 9. Requirements to software and hardware 10. Requirements to design 11. Requirements to confirmation of compliance

16. REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE) Mikhail Yastrebenetsky 4 Regulatory activity (4) Methods of Assessment of NPP I&C Compliance with Safety Requirements Requirements of Order and State of the Actions for Safety Important NPP I&C Life Extension Methods of Expert Review of NPP I&C, based on FPGA (Revision 0) NP 306.2.141NP 306.5.02/2-068 Regulations with methods related to NPP I&C

17. REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE) Mikhail Yastrebenetsky Knowledge base for expert activity -International (IAEA, IEC,ISO) and Ukrainian standards Requirements to I&C (Comparison) Expert reviews Documentations of new systems Methodics Text (or list) of books and articles

18. REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE) Mikhail Yastrebenetsky 5 Recommendation to IAEA (1) I) TECDOC. Review (comparison and analysis) of WWER I&C systems (Russia, Ukraine, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, etc.) (similar IAEA Technical Report N387, part 5 “Modern I&C for NPP: Guidebook”) The base of this chapter from Ukrainian side may be the new book “NPP Safety: Reactor Control Systems” (in Russian – “SUZ”), Kiev, 2009 (in publisher house now)

19. REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE) Mikhail Yastrebenetsky 5 Recommendation to IAEA (2) The content of this book: 1.NPP with WWER 2.Common information about reactor control systems (RCS) 3.Type project and modernization of RCS 4.Standard base 5.Classification 6.Common requirements 7.Peripheral equipment 8.Neutron flux monitoring systems 9.Protection systems 10.Power control and limitation regulators 11.Control rod actuation systems 12.Some results of operation Attachments 1.Classified list of standards 2.FPGA

20. REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE) Mikhail Yastrebenetsky 5 Recommendation to IAEA (3) II) Updating of NS-G-1.3, NS-G-1.1 III) I&C Roadmap in Support of Reactors III+IV generations IV) Collection, summarizing and analysis of information about NPP safety violations because I&C failures (independent of COMPSIS, not only digital systems) - TECDOC or coordinated research program Y) Knowledge base related to I&C

21. REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE) Mikhail Yastrebenetsky Thanks for attention