1. MCDA Guidelines and Country-specific Civil-Military Guidelines
Tempest Express -25
June 2014
MCDA Guidelines and Country-specific Civil-Military Guidelines
Viviana De Annuntiis
OCHA Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific

2. Learning Outcomes OCHA At the end of the session participants will….
DEFINE THE PURPOSE OF THE GLOBAL
UN-CMCOORD GUIDELINES
IN COMPLEX EMERGENCIES
EXPLAIN THE APPLICABILITY
OF THE MCDA GUIDELINES
At the end of the session
participants will….
HIGHLIGHT
THE KEY MESSAGES
OF THE IASC NON BINDING GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF ARMED ESCORTS
COMPARE THE MCDA GUIDELINES WITH THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC
GUIDANCE IN DRC
AND CAR
OCHA

3. Overview OCHA MCDA Guidelines IASC
GLOBAL
CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION GUIDELINES
COMPLEX EMERGENCIY
DIFFERENCES IN GLOBAL
CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION GUIDELINES
COUNTRY SPECIFIC
CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION GUIDELINES
MCDA Guidelines
IASC
Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys (2013)
Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies
Guidelines on the use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines)
Country –Specific Guidelines (Process and Challenges) Guidelines for interaction between
MONUC military
and humanitarian organizations (2006) Position of the HCT on the Interaction of the Humanitarian Community and the Armed Forces present in CAR
OCHA

4. Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies
Part I – Global Civil-Military Coordination Guidelines
Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies

5. Complex Emergencies Complex Emergencies
Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies
MCDA Guidelines: The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (Rev. 1, January 2006)
IASC Reference Paper on Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies (June 2004)

6. Scope: Use Of Military And Civil Defence Assets In Complex Emergencies

7. COMPLEX EMERGENCY
“A humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the on-going UN country programme” (IASC)
The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) definition of a complex emergency es a ‘complex emergency’ as:

8. MCDA Guidelines- Historical Background
Late 90s: Humanitarian emergencies (Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Ethiopia/Eritrea); need for the development of new guidelines focusing on the complex emergency environment
March 2003: First version released
26 June 2003: Launched in Brussels
January 2006: Updated version (Revision 1)

9. Part 1: Principles and Concepts Part 2: Tasks and Responsibilities
The MCDA Guidelines - outline
Part 1: Principles and Concepts
Core Principles
Key concepts for Use of MCDA resources
Avoiding Reliance on Military Resources
When to use Military and Civil Defence Resources to Support Humanitarian Activities;
Operational Standards for the Use of UN- MCDA
Operational Standards for the Use of Other Deployed Forces
UN-CMCoord in Complex Emergencies
Part 2: Tasks and Responsibilities
Affected State and Transit States
HC/RC
UN Humanitarian Agencies
OCHA
Assisting State and Foreign Military or Civil Defence Commanders.
UN-CMCoord Cell, Mali, 2013 – Credit: Sophie Solomon
Central African Republic, 2013 – Credit: Sergio Da Silva

10. Key principles:
Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.
The United Nations seeks to provide humanitarian assistance with full respect for the sovereignty of States.
As a matter of principle, the military and civil defence assets of belligerent forces or of units that find themselves actively engaged in combat shall not be used to support humanitarian activities.

11. Humanitarian operation retains its civilian nature and character
Credit: WFP/Simon Crittle
KEY PRINCIPLES
Last Resort
Humanitarian operation retains its civilian nature and character
Use of MCDA should focus on indirect assistance and infrastructure support missions
Use of MCDA limited in time and scale
Avoid becoming dependent on military resources
FP/Simon Crittle

12. Decision-makers must weigh the risk to relief workers and their ability to operate effectively at the moment, and in the future, against the immediacy of the needs of the affected population and the need for the use of military and civil defence assets.

13. Key questions to help guide the decision to use MCDA:
Box 1.
Key principles of the Oslo Guidelines5. Last resort: foreign military and civil defence assets should be requestedonly where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military or civil defence assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. Themilitary or civil defence asset must therefore be unique in capability andavailability. 22
24. Military and civil defence assets should be seen as a tool complementingexisting relief mechanisms in order to provide specific support to specificrequirements, in response to the acknowledged ‘humanitarian gap’ betweenthe disaster needs that the25. MCDA can be mobilized and deployed bilaterally or under regional or al-liance agreements as ‘other deployed forces’ or as part of a United Nationsoperation as ‘UN MCDA’. All disaster relief should be provided at therequest or with the consent of the Affected State and, in principle, on thebasis of an appeal for international assistance.26. All relief actions remain the overall responsibility of the Affected Stateand are complemented by foreign MCDA operating bilaterally or within aninternational relief effort.27. Foreign MCDA assistance should be provided at no cost to the AffectedState, unless otherwise agreed between concerned States or regulated byinternational agreements.28. An Assisting State deciding to employ its MCDA should bear in mind thecost/benefit ratio of such operations as compared to other alternatives, if available. In principle, the costs involved in using MCDA on disaster relief missions abroad should be covered by funds other than those available forinternational development activities as a general principle, UN humanitarian agencies must avoidbecoming dependent on military resources and Member States areencouraged to invest in increased civilian capacity instead of the ad hoc useof military forces to support humanitarian actors.
Source: 
Oslo Guidelines, Nov update.
For the most recent revision of the text on ‘last resort’, which was made in Nov. 2007, see chapter 6.
A changing landscape for disaster relief assistance 11
                                                                                                      
Summary
Key questions to help guide the decision to use MCDA:
Are they the option of last resort, indispensable and appropriate?
Are the countries offering MCDA also parties to the conflict?
Based on the need, is a military or civil defence unit capable of the task?
How long will they be needed?
Can they be deployed without weapons or additional security forces?
How will this association impact the security of UN personnel and other humanitarian workers?
How will this impact the perceptions of UN neutrality and/or impartiality?
What control and coordination arrangements are necessary?
How and when will transition back to civilian responsibility be achieved?
What are the consequences for the beneficiaries, other humanitarian actors, and humanitarian operations in the mid to long term?
Scope of Use:
Complex Emergencies
2010 Haiti, Cholera outbreak – Credit: UNICEF, M. Dormino

14. Part II – Global Civil-Military Coordination Guidelines
Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies vs Guidelines on the use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) in Disaster Relief

15. Key UN-CMCoord Guidelines
Guidelines on the use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) in Disaster Relief
(The Oslo Guidelines)
Guidelines on the Use of MCDA to support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines)
Scope of use:
- Natural, technological and environmental disaster (peacetime)
Scope of use:
- Complex emergencies
Key concepts:
- Last resort (complementarity)
- At no cost
- Consent of the Affected State
- Avoid dependence on MCDA
- Perception
- Critical areas for coordination
Key concepts:
- Last resort - At no cost
- Consent of the Affected State
- Avoid dependence on MCDA
- Perception - Time-limited - Smooth transition
- Parties to conflict: no involvement
- Hierarchy of tasks
- Minimum amount of liaison required
- Requirement for the sharing of information
Key principles (common to both sets of guidelines):
- Humanitarian principles / Humanitarian imperative

16. Hierarchy of Humanitarian Tasks Performed
Direct Assistance:
Face-to face distribution of goods and services - handing out relief goods, providing first aid, transporting people, interviewing refugees, locating families etc.
Indirect Assistance:
At least one step removed from the population - transporting relief goods, building camps and shelters, providing water sources, clearing mines and ordinance, etc.
Infrastructure Support:
General services that facilitate relief, but are not necessarily visible to, or solely for, the benefit of the affected population - repairing infrastructure, operating airfields, providing weather info, ensuring access to communications networks, etc.
To simplify this:
Direct Assistance is the “cookie” that is handed out directly to the beneficiary
Indirect assistance is the “truck” that carries the “cookie” for it to reach the beneficiary
Infrastructure Support is the “bridge” that was repaired and allowed the “truck” to pass and made the “cookie” reach the beneficiary
Our position is that, military forces’ capability can best add value to the process by focusing on Indirect Assistance and Infrastructure Support; direct assistance is best undertaken by humanitarian actors.
However, in the event that there are NO humanitarian actors on the ground during the critical life-saving period, and failure to deliver urgently needed good and services could result to unacceptable loss of lives, suffering and injuries, then the military, as a last resort, may be tapped to fill that gap.

17. Peace & Security Activities Infrastructure Support
Appropriate Relief Tasks of Military Actors
- based on missions
Availability and impartiality of forces decreases
Mission of Military
Peaceful
Peace & Security Activities
Combat
Peacekeeping
Peace
Enforcement
Humanitarian Tasks
Direct
Maybe
Maybe No No
Indirect
Yes
Maybe
Maybe No
The existing UN-CMCoord Guidelines identify situations where MCDA could be used to support humanitarian operations. The gray areas indicate situations where judgment call has to be made by actors on the ground, looking at the need, the life-saving aspect of the specific activity, and the implications for such activity.
Infrastructure Support
Yes
Yes
Maybe
Maybe
Visibility of task decreases

18. UN-CMCOORD SPECTRUM OF STRATEGIES
Coordination
Cooperation
Planning
Task Division
Information Sharing
Co-existence
Information Sharing
Task Division
Planning

19. Questions?

20. Updated Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys IASC Non-Binding Guidelines (2013)

21. Humanitarian Convoys will not use armed escorts
GENERAL RULE
Humanitarian Convoys will not use armed escorts

22. CONSEQUENCES OF USING ARMED ESCORTS
Undermine position of neutrality, impartiality and independence
Armed escort may become a target
Armed escort capacity to respond
Pressure others to use armed escorts
Create dependence
Cooperation with one armed actor could reduce Humanitarian space
The use or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys can have significant short or long term counter-productive implications for humanitarian actors, their respective organisations and associates.
Cooperation with an armed actor – to include a UN-mandated forces – can lead local, national and international actors and the population to associate humanitarian organisation and beneficiaries of aid with the political and/or military objectives of the armed actor, thereby undermining the actual and perceived neutrality, impartiality and independence of the humanitarian organisation and humanitarian community as a whole.
The armed actor providing the escort may be targeted for attack by apposing force, thus putting humanitarian personnel, supplies and beneficiaries at risk.
Cooperation with providers of armed escorts that do not have the capacity to respond appropriately if attacked can make a convey more vulnerable and create additional risk for humanitarian workers.
The use of armed escorts by one humanitarian actor can negatively affect the perceptions and therefore, the security of others that do not use them. Those that do not use armed escorts may come under pressure to do so, particularly if there are economic benefits involved.
Dependence on support from an armed actor can be extremely difficulty or impossible to operate without such force in the future, undermining the sustainability of humanitarian operations. The provider of armed escort may develop a financial interest in maintaining the service. In addition, the sudden cessation of armed escorts can expose a humanitarian organisation as soft target.
Cooperating with one armed actor can make it impossible or unsafe to operate in territory controlled by other armed groups.

23. ALTERNATIVES TO THE USE OF ARMED ESCORTS
Cultivate greater acceptance
Humanitarian negotiations (incl. access arrangements)
Remote management/programming
Low profile approach
Area security
Innovative program design and monitoring
Suspend or cease operationsn

24. CRITERIA FOR THE EXCEPTIONAL USE OF ARMED ESCORTS
As a last resort, in exceptional circumstances and when key criteria are fulfilled, the United Nations Designated Official for Security will decide on the use of armed escorts for humanitarian convoys
Humanitarian Need & Programme Criticality
Responsible Authorities
Safety & Security
Sustainability
Therefore as a general rule if we do use them is should on be “As a last resort, in exceptional circumstances and when key criteria are fulfilled, the United Nations Designated Official for Security will decide on the use of armed escorts for humanitarian convoys”
Humanitarian Need & Programme Criticality – lack of humanitarian action would lead to unacceptable human suffering
Responsible Authorities – unable/unwilling to permit movement without the use of armed escort
Safety & Security – armed escort is a deterrent to enhance safety; does not compromise security of humanitarian personnel or beneficiaries
Sustainability – use of armed escort will not compromise future humanitarian operations

25. Guiding Principles Primacy of humanitarian criteria
Humanitarian Identity
Primacy of humanitarian organisation in humanitarian work
Primacy of humanitarian criteria – decision to request/accept the use of armed escort must be made by humanitarian organisation based on humanitarian criteria.
Humanitarian Identity – humanitarian convoys must retain their civilian nature & character at all times.
Primacy of humanitarian organisation in humanitarian work - military organisation can support humanitarian work by creating a secure environment and by providing logistical support when requested

26. Part III
Country Specific Civil-Military Coordination Guidelines: Process and Challenges
Also see IASC Reference Paper, Practical Considerations B> Information Sharing

27. Why UN-CMCoord HCT Position Papers & Country-Specific Guidance?
Lack of common position and country-specific guidance prior to an emergency may delayed decisions on use of MCDA.
Existing country-specific guidance contributes to successful civil-military interface and decision-making by HCT.

28. Do’s – Best Practices
Plan sufficient time to consult with all key stakeholders, both through a task force and in bilateral meetings with actors that may not (want or be able to) be part of the task force.
Ensure engagement and buy-in from the DSRSG/RC/HC and HCT from the start of the process and enlist HCT members or their representatives in the guidelines’ drafting task force.
Endorsement of the guidelines following an engaging and participatory process will facilitate acceptance of and adherence to the non-binding guidelines.
Ensure that there will be dedicated commitment and sustained involvement of the task force members throughout the process.
Best practices:
Unified HCT position…
In terms of coordination between humanitarian and military actors, the Pakistani authorities demonstrated a high degree of both competence and commitment in their approach.
Following some early challenges with regard to the tasking of military helicopters, the logistics cluster suggested the creation of a Joint Aviation Coordination Cell, where all relevant actors came together at Islamabad level to plan and agree on the use of military assets. The JACC provided humanitarian actors with a forum to clearly articulate the response priorities and link up with military actors who could support the implementation of these activities. The fact that some key military counterparts at the federal level were embedded directly within NDMA greatly facilitated this exercise, as did the remarkable flexibility and trust that military officials showed to us at field level (ie Jacobabab C-130, Dadu hovercraft, UNHAS engineer)
Challenges:
Misunderstanding of HCT agreed position, confusion about timeliness and cost.
Where confusions were resolved, some donors adjusted admirably (ie Sweden) while other actors (NATO, UK, US) questioned the principle itself.

29. Challenges
Definition of the operating environment.
Definition of Last Resort.
Use of Armed and Military Escorts.
Developing guidelines with humanitarians, mission personnel, military and police forces  common ground vis-à-vis differences.
DSRSG/RC/HC in Integrated Missions.
Blurring of lines.

30. Guidelines for interaction between MONUC military and humanitarian organizations (2006)

31. Aim of the Guidelines
Aim: Improving the interaction between the MONUC peacekeeping force (MONUC military) and the humanitarian organizations.
Developed by the MONUC CIMIC Unit, OCHA and MONUC HAS, with the contribution of the UN Country team in the DRC, other civil components of MONUC, in-country humanitarian donors and INGOs

32. Part A
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND DEFINITIONS
Part B
OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

33. Guidelines - outline Part A: General Principles and Definitions
MONUC military and humanitarian actor’s mandates
Principle of cooperation
Principle of distinction
Definition of key terms
Principles of humanitarian action
Principles of CIMIC operations
Roles of OCHA, MONUC HAS and MONUC CIMIC
Part B: Tasks and Responsibilities
Liaison arrangements, lines of communication
Coordination
Type of information to be exchanged
Security of humanitarian personnel
Use by humanitarians of military assets
Use by humanitarians and MONUC military of MONUC civilian asset
Humanitarian operations carried out by MONUC military
Training
DDR process and reintegration programs for former combatants
Implementation of the Guidelines

34. PRINCIPLE OF COOPERATION protection and assistance activities
Cooperation between MONUC military and humanitarian actors is made necessary by the close inter-relation of the respective actors’ role in
protection and assistance activities
in protecting and assisting the civilian population, military and humanitarian actors represent different facets of the overall endeavor

35. PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION
There should always be a clear distinction
between peacekeeping military and humanitarian actors.
The principle of cooperation between MONUC military and humanitarian actors must therefore be limited by
the principle of distinction.

36. OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES
Liaison arrangements

37. Exchange (secondment)
Range of Interfaces for Humanitarian-Military Liaison
Range/Continuum of Strategies of Approaches
Cooperation
Co-existence
The UN-CMCoord function facilitates the establishment and maintenance of all possible interfaces
Liaison
Exchange (secondment)
Liaison visits
Limited Liaison
Co-location
Conduit or interlocutor
Hum
Hum
Hum
Hum
Hum
Liaison Officer
Liaison Officer
Mil
Liaison Officer
Liaison Officer
Hum
Depending on the UN-CMCoord Strategy, different interfaces can be used between humanitarian and military actors.
Co-location is the default interface under a cooperation strategy in a purely natural disaster situations. There is less concern about being seen or perceived as working with the military.
Liaison Arrangements allow varying approaches to liaison activities depending on what is appropriate, doable and acceptable. This can be in the form of liaison exchange where liaison officers are “seconded” to the other party; this could also be liaison visits where liaison officers do regular visits to the other party for information sharing; or limited liaison where liaison officers meet each other in a neutral place – this may be resorted to when the room for coordination becomes smaller.
In a complex emergency situation under the co-existence strategy, the default interface is conduit. This is where a liaison officer from the humanitarian organisation/community (usually a UN-CMCoord Officer or a staff performing the UN-CMCoord function) becomes the “go-between” of the humanitarian and military communities. This drastically reduces the chance of humanitarians being seen (thence perceived) as working with the military.
Liaison Officer
Liaison Officer
Mil
Mil
Mil
Mil

38. Information Sharing
Humanitarian locations: coordinates of humanitarian facilities, especially if they are included in a possible military operating theatre.
Humanitarian activities: plans of action, routes and timing of humanitarian convoys and airlifts, in order to coordinate planned operations and avoid accidental strikes on humanitarian convoys
Mine-action activities
Security information
Population movements
Post-strike information
Customs and airport clearances
information relevant to the security situation in the area, both for RDC’s population and for humanitarian agencies/organizations

39. Information Sharing
MONUC military might not share some confidential information relating to certain military operations.
Humanitarian agencies and organizations might not share:
Information of a nature to compromise their independence, neutrality, impartiality or their security in the field;
Information relating to some victims or individuals assisted or protected, when they deem that transmitting such information might be detrimental to the security of these victims.

40. SECURITY OF HUMANITARIAN PERSONNEL
The use of military/armed protection for humanitarian premises or personnel is an extreme precautionary measure that should be taken only in exceptional circumstances, on a case-by-case basis and on request of the agency/organization.
This should be a last resort option when other staff security mechanisms are unavailable, inadequate or inappropriate.
Do we have these guidelines?
Do we need them?

41. USE BY HUMANITARIANS OF MILITARY ASSETS
Military assets must be used in accordance with the guidelines on “The Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets to Support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” issued in March (MCDA Guidelines)

42. Hierarchy of Humanitarian Tasks Performed
Direct Assistance:
Face-to face distribution of goods and services - handing out relief goods, providing first aid, transporting people, interviewing refugees, locating families etc.
Indirect Assistance:
At least one step removed from the population - transporting relief goods, building camps and shelters, providing water sources, clearing mines and ordinance, etc.
Infrastructure Support:
General services that facilitate relief, but are not necessarily visible to, or solely for, the benefit of the affected population - repairing infrastructure, operating airfields, providing weather info, ensuring access to communications networks, etc.
To simplify this:
Direct Assistance is the “cookie” that is handed out directly to the beneficiary
Indirect assistance is the “truck” that carries the “cookie” for it to reach the beneficiary
Infrastructure Support is the “bridge” that was repaired and allowed the “truck” to pass and made the “cookie” reach the beneficiary
Our position is that, military forces’ capability can best add value to the process by focusing on Indirect Assistance and Infrastructure Support; direct assistance is best undertaken by humanitarian actors.
However, in the event that there are NO humanitarian actors on the ground during the critical life-saving period, and failure to deliver urgently needed good and services could result to unacceptable loss of lives, suffering and injuries, then the military, as a last resort, may be tapped to fill that gap.

43. HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS
BY MONUC MILITARY
WHAM
They should in principle not be activities of direct relief or assistance, but rather be activities of indirect relief such as rehabilitation of infrastructure;
They should not be undertaken in situations where there are ongoing hostilities with one or more factions;
When planning and implementing WHAMS, it is recommended that these activities be coordinated by the MONUC military with the humanitarian organizations present in the area.
Best practices:
Unified HCT position…
In terms of coordination between humanitarian and military actors, the Pakistani authorities demonstrated a high degree of both competence and commitment in their approach.
Following some early challenges with regard to the tasking of military helicopters, the logistics cluster suggested the creation of a Joint Aviation Coordination Cell, where all relevant actors came together at Islamabad level to plan and agree on the use of military assets. The JACC provided humanitarian actors with a forum to clearly articulate the response priorities and link up with military actors who could support the implementation of these activities. The fact that some key military counterparts at the federal level were embedded directly within NDMA greatly facilitated this exercise, as did the remarkable flexibility and trust that military officials showed to us at field level (ie Jacobabab C-130, Dadu hovercraft, UNHAS engineer)
Challenges:
Misunderstanding of HCT agreed position, confusion about timeliness and cost.
Where confusions were resolved, some donors adjusted admirably (ie Sweden) while other actors (NATO, UK, US) questioned the principle itself.

44. HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS BY MONUC MILITARY - Direct Assistance
Only in exceptional circumstances and as a last resort measure;
No comparable civilian alternative to the military activities (MONUC military are the only actors on the ground or the humanitarians lack the capacity and/or resources to respond to critical and life threatening needs of the civilian population);
Operations necessary to meet urgent and critical needs of the civilian population;
The planning and implementation of these operations should take place in close coordination with OCHA and HAS.
Best practices:
Unified HCT position…
In terms of coordination between humanitarian and military actors, the Pakistani authorities demonstrated a high degree of both competence and commitment in their approach.
Following some early challenges with regard to the tasking of military helicopters, the logistics cluster suggested the creation of a Joint Aviation Coordination Cell, where all relevant actors came together at Islamabad level to plan and agree on the use of military assets. The JACC provided humanitarian actors with a forum to clearly articulate the response priorities and link up with military actors who could support the implementation of these activities. The fact that some key military counterparts at the federal level were embedded directly within NDMA greatly facilitated this exercise, as did the remarkable flexibility and trust that military officials showed to us at field level (ie Jacobabab C-130, Dadu hovercraft, UNHAS engineer)
Challenges:
Misunderstanding of HCT agreed position, confusion about timeliness and cost.
Where confusions were resolved, some donors adjusted admirably (ie Sweden) while other actors (NATO, UK, US) questioned the principle itself.

45. PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS
Special coordination mechanisms established
Provincial protection clusters (PPCs) - provincial level
National protection cluster (NPC) - Kinshasa level
MONUC military is fully a member of the groups which are chaired by UNHCR and co-chaired by MONUC civilians.

46. Position of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) on the Interaction of the Humanitarian Community and the Armed Forces present in the Central African Republic

47. HCT Position Paper
Strategy of cooperation in the areas of security and protection of civilians (common objectives but different approaches and means).
Military involvement in humanitarian forums/ clusters is not desirable to maintain a clear distinction between humanitarian actors and military activities.
Civil-Military Coordination framework in place to facilitate dialogue and interaction necessary to promote humanitarian principles and discuss key issues related to access and protection of civilians.

48. HCT Position Paper
Distinction between military and humanitarian actors and activities is essential and necessary.
Humanitarian teams cannot carry equipment/ military personnel and this cannot be imposed by the armed forces.
Humanitarian workers must never present themselves or present their work as part of a military operation; military should refrain from presenting themselves as aid workers or claim to provide humanitarian assistance.

49. HCT Position Paper
The use of armed or military escorts for humanitarian actors is to be discussed on a case by case basis for each area;
Alternative strategies in place to ensure the safety and security of humanitarian convoys must be preferred;
The use of armed escorts by one humanitarian actor could affect the perception of neutrality of all humanitarian actors and compromise the independence of humanitarian operations while endangering aid workers and affected populations.

50. HCT Position Paper
Evacuation of civilians under direct threat might require armed escorts; this should be coordinated within the HCT and approved by the Humanitarian Coordinator.
The decision to request/accept the use of military or armed escorts cannot be imposed by the military and/or political authorities.
The use of armed escorts cannot be taken unilaterally; it must be the result of a transparent decision-making and collaborative process within the HCT.
Humanitarian agencies conduct independent humanitarian assessments to determine the nature and extent of needs and must be able to access all vulnerable populations in all regions affected by the emergency.
MISCA and Sangaris are mandated to contribute to the PoC and the creation of an enabling environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to people in need (SCR 2177).

51. Learning Outcomes OCHA At the end of the session participants will….
DEFINE THE PURPOSE OF THE GLOBAL
UN-CMCOORD GUIDELINES
IN COMPLEX EMERGENCIES
EXPLAIN THE APPLICABILITY
OF THE MCDA GUIDELINES
At the end of the session
participants will….
HIGHLIGHT
THE KEY MESSAGES
OF THE IASC NON BINDING GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF ARMED ESCORTS
COMPARE THE MCDA GUIDELINES WITH COUNTRY-SPECIFIC
GUIDANCE IN DRC
AND CAR
OCHA