1.  Have to consider individual and organizational dimensions  Definition: Intentionally killing oneself for the purpose of killing others, in the service of a political or ideological goal To be distinguished from:  High-risk missions  Fooled couriers  Suicide – without homicide – for a political cause

2. Trends: Most deadly form of terrorism (so far)  Sri Lanka, Tamil Tigers (pioneers & innovators)  Israel: 0.5% of attacks, 56% of fatalities.  U.S.: 9/11 – 10 times more deadly than any previous terrorist attack in history. Starts with Hezbollah in Lebanon –1981 -- attack on Iraqi Embassy -- Beirut –1983 -- killed 384 in six attacks US Embassy -- Feb 241 Marines at Beirut Airport -- Oct –Simultaneous attack on French Cars, grenades and explosive belts Starts with Hezbollah in Lebanon –1981 -- attack on Iraqi Embassy -- Beirut –1983 -- killed 384 in six attacks US Embassy -- Feb 241 Marines at Beirut Airport -- Oct –Simultaneous attack on French Cars, grenades and explosive belts

3. Exponential growth over the last two decades - more global, more frequent, more lethal Suicide attacks account for < 5 percent of terrorist events, but  50 percent of casualties due to suicide attacks. Gaining in strategic importance with disruptive effects that cascade upon the political, economic and social routines of national life and international relations Also gets more media coverage than most other forms of attack Trends: 1980s-2012

4. How  Suicide bombs can be delivered by multiple means, complicating security measures Vehicle bombs: USMC barracks in Beirut, 1983; Embassy attacks in Africa, 1998; Bali and Jakarta bombs; Attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. Boat bombs: Sri Lanka, 1990s; USS Cole, 2000; the MV Limburg, 2002 Airborne: 9/11, Marseille plot, 1994 Individual-borne bombs: the primary method of attack in Israel since 2000; Attacks in London, 2005

5.  Mostly civilian targets (shopping malls, buses, restaurants).  Approx. 85% civilian fatalities, 15% security forces  Military bases are on the “A-List” for targeting by terrorists, but difficult to penetrate Targets

6. Who Al Aqsa Martyr Brigades Palestinian Islamic Jihad Hamas Al Qaida PKK/Kongra Gel Ansar al Islam Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Lashkar-e-Taiba... and a few others...

7. Why: Group Rationales  Personal attributes are not the key. The critical factor is the group. Suicide terrorism is a group phenomenon.  All suicide attacks have been carried out by groups. None by individuals on their own whim.  Main goal is to inflict as many casualties as possible  Objectives include:  Causing widespread fear and panic  Demonstrating the targeted government’s “weakness”

8. Why Suicide Terror?  Perception -- seemingly irrational act  From the perspective of a terrorist organization it’s a strategy that is:  Well planned  Logical  Designed to achieve specific political objectives  Suicide attacks have increased over the past two decades; Why?  Perception -- seemingly irrational act  From the perspective of a terrorist organization it’s a strategy that is:  Well planned  Logical  Designed to achieve specific political objectives  Suicide attacks have increased over the past two decades; Why?

9. Strategic Advantages  Traditional concepts of security are based on deterring terrorist attacks  Assumes the terrorist fears death or capture  But, suicide attacks depend on the death of the terrorist  The suicide bomber doesn’t care about his/her death, imprisonment or torture at the time of the attack  No need for an escape plan, traditionally the most difficult part of a terrorist operation  The terrorist group wants to succeed  The suicide bomber does not want to die for nothing  If a target is too tough, they will choose another = Ultimate smart bomb

10. Suicide Terrorism as an Organizational Strategy  Suicide terrorism is always part of a larger terrorist campaign  Sacrificing its “best and the brightest” signals the organization’s costly commitment to the community, whether transnational (Al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah) or national (Hamas, Hizbollah).  This underpins trust in the organization, thus increasing the organization’s political “market share” in the community. (M. Bloom, Dying to Kill, 2005)  Influence on terrorist group’s decisions  Influence on the number of volunteers for terrorist activity in general and suicide attacks in particular  Often, competing claims for particular suicide attacks

11. Are Suicide Attacks Effective?  PAPE: In 6 of the 11 campaigns that ended terrorists achieved at least partial political gains  Represents 55% success rate  Target states  Fully or partially withdrew from territory  Began negotiations  Released a terrorist leader  Suicide campaigns have been successful against a variety of democratic governments -- even hawkish ones  Reagan Administration  Netanyahu Succeeded despite military raids to kill or arrest terrorist leaders

12. Why Are Suicide Attacks Considered Effective?  With standard military coercion stronger states pressure weaker states  Suicide attacks work because they have a different structure  With suicide terrorism model the weaker acts as coercer and the stronger actor is the target  Target of suicide campaign cannot easily adjust to minimize future damage

13. However: Suicide Terrorists’ Gains Are Limited  Suicide attacks do not achieve goals central to security or wealth  Even with a complete gain – US withdrawal from Lebanon – US had only humanitarian interest at stake  Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 1985, but troops remained in security buffer  1994 – 1995 Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and West Bank  Settlements increased  IDF have no trouble going back when they believe necessary

14. Summary  Unique phenomenon in the world of political violence  Driven by group strategies, decisions, and relies on public support  Traditional concepts of deterrence and security are ineffective  Requires combination of intelligence, counterideology and diminished public support to defeat

15. Individual Suicide Bombers: Common Explanations  Religious fanaticism  Poverty  Ignorance  Revenge for personal suffering  Brainwashing  Psychopathology None of these explanations are supported by significant data

16. Sources of Empirical Data  Media accounts  Interviews with captured would-be suicide bombers  Interviews with trainers/launchers  “Psychological autopsy” of dozens of Palestinian, Tamil and other suicide bombers (interviews with families)  Jerrold Post  Ehud Sprinzak  Mia Bloom  Scott Atran  et al.

17. Demographic Details  Age  Marital status  Gender  Socio-economic level  Education Hanadi Jaradat No real profile – Most are male and single. BUT: – Can be any race, color, sex – Can be older, married people – Bombers often alter their appearance to “blend in” - Terrorist groups will employ bombers and disguises most likely to defeat security measures…or profiling Wafa Idris Sri Lankan suicide bomber “Dhanu,” moments before killing former Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi, herself, and 17 others

18. Religious fanaticism Religious fanaticism is neither a necessary nor a sufficient factor  Most of the suicide attacks in Lebanon were carried out by secular groups.  The LTTE and Fatah are not religious groups.  The PKK and the PFLP are pseudo-Marxist groups.  Most Hamas & PIJ members do not mention religion as main cause.

19. Psychological Profiling?  The most common result of research indicates a pattern of “normalcy”— the absence of any unique attribute or identifier that would distinguish one individual from another  “...rarely mad, and very few suffer from personality disorders” (Andrew Silke)  “Many of the personal traits or characteristics... are neither specific to the terrorist nor serve to distinguish one type of terrorist from another.” (John Horgan)  “30 years of research has found little evidence that terrorists are suffering from psychopathology” (Clark McCauley)

20. Conclusion  Media accounts of suicide terrorists should be read/viewed with caution; too often they rely on assumptions than on empirical data and scholarly research  The majority of suicide terrorist are no more “abnormal” than you or me  Combating suicide terrorism requires strategic communications and counterideology narratives that discredit and deligitimize this tactic  Until families are embarrassed, not honored, to have a martyr, the problem will not go away  Messenger matters – the effort to eradicate this tactic must involve community, religious leaders (more than government officials)