The Expeditionary Warfare Integrated Project

The Expeditionary Warfare Integrated Project
Wayne Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering Naval Postgraduate School 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

ExWar Project Final Briefing
Introduction CDR Bill Erhardt, USN Good Morning, my name is Bill Erhardt and I am, along with Ltc Loh of the Singapore Air Force, am the Project Student Co-Leader for the Meyer Institute Expeditionary Warfare Integrated Project. Over the last year, we’ve worked with over 70 students and 18 faculty members on a project that brought together 6 different curricula to work on tasking from N7 to examine Expeditionary Warfare using a top-down system of systems approach. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

The Intent Of This Morning’s Briefing
To share our most important results with you To show you the methodology we used to obtain our results To interest you in the details of how we performed the study This briefing is the first in a series of briefings today designed to show you the various studies and designs we’ve used to address the N7 tasking. Between now and 1030, the Systems Engineering and Integration curriculum is going to show you how we met that tasking by sharing our most important results and how we attained them. Our goal is to interest you in the details of how we conducted our study, so you’ll come talk to us later this afternoon as well as downloading a copy of our Final report when its available on our website next month. A copy of our Final Report will be available in January at 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

What Will I See That Is Transformational?
The Navy Marine Corps Team has already transformed its thinking with the Sea Basing and Ship to Objective Maneuver Operational Concepts We tried to tie this transformational thinking to a future system of systems capable of fully implementing these doctrines In keeping with DOD guidance, this study attempted to take the role of transformation into account. The real transformation in this study comes from the doctrine and operational concepts we were asked to use in building our study: Ship to Objective Maneuver and Sea Basing We tried to create a future system of systems capable of of fully implementing these concepts 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

What Were We Trying To Do?
Take a big picture, overarching look at how future operational concepts might work Examine the system implications of these operational concepts Create conceptual designs to fill some of the possible capabilities gaps discovered during the analysis Lay a foundation of tools and methodologies for a more detailed system study of specific emerging operational concepts In order to create this system of systems, we took an overarching look at how these future operational concepts might work. Once we had examined these concepts and their interactions, we wanted to define the implications for our system of systems, and create requirements for conceptual design candidates to fill some of the capability gaps we identified Finally, we wanted our tools and methodologies could provide a jumping off point for more detailed analysis of specific operational concepts or areas we did not have sufficient time to address in our work. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

What Did We Find Out? STOM is a viable operational concept, given a suitable force architecture The Sea Base concept is capable of achieving the throughput required to sustain a brigade size force ashore, given a suitable force architecture While the programs of record provide a level of STOM capability, it could be further enhanced by the addition of specifically designed air and surface craft These results were attained through application of system engineering methodology and the use of large scale, high resolution dynamic modeling and simulation Before we start to delve to deeply into the details, I’d like to review our high level conclusions: I’m sure many of you have heard these assertions before and might be wondering what makes our study unique? The use of systems engineering methodology and large scale high resolution modeling. As you’ll hear later, for example, our model captured the flow of troops and materials from CONUS through the Sea Base and on to the Objective down to the individual vehicle and Marine level. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Conceptual Architecture Generation
CDR Erhardt, USN Lt Steeno, USN Now that we’ve talked at a high level about what we were trying to accomplish and what we discovered, LT Matt Steeno and I would like to start examining the process we used to generate the conceptual architecture, our future system of systems, and the conceptual designs it includes. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

How Did We Try To Do It? Top Down Analysis (Integral of Capabilities
Required) Functional Flow Analysis Integrated Future CONOPS Joint Campaign Analysis Integration (Identification of “gaps” and opportunities) Conceptual Architecture Dynamic System Model Analytical Studies The cornerstone of our architectural analysis was the top down and bottom up approach shown here. Beginning with the top down approach, we performed a functional flow analysis of the expeditionary warfare mission by creating a functional flow block diagram describing all facets of expeditionary warfare. This functional flow, along with an integrated CONOPS combining the latest in USN and USMC doctrine, served to define the capabilities required to conduct a STOM operation from a Sea Base. The Bottom Up Analysis examined the current and planned architectures to define the capabilities that would be available to perform future expeditionary missions. This integral of capabilities available was then compared against the Top Down Analysis’ integral of capabilities required in order to identify capability gaps, or areas where the programs of record did not have the capability to fully perform STOM operations from a Sea Base Bottom Up Analysis (Integral of Capabilities Available) Current and Planned Architectures Current and Planned CONOPS

Addressed in Conceptual Architecture
Significant Capability Gaps Identified For Resolution In The Conceptual Architecture Capability Gap Addressed in Conceptual Architecture Surface Platforms Capable of Forming and Sustaining a Sea Base YES Shipboard Aircraft Capable of Transporting Large Loads Over Long Distances Ability to Rapidly Deliver Combat Force to Theater Highly Survivable Air Transport Platforms To Sustain STOM Operations Organic Capability to Collect ISR Data Throughout Area of Operations The Ability to Support Marines Ashore with Both Precision and Volume Fires From The Sea Base The Ability To Provide Sufficient C4 Support To Fully Implement STOM Providing Force Protection For Surface Craft Transiting to Shore Robust Organic Mine Countermeasures Capability This Top Down and Bottom Up process identified the following 9 major capability gaps, 5 of which were directly addressed in our conceptual architecture. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Who Else Was Involved? TSSE Design Team: Ship Design Aero Design Team: Aircraft Design SEI Team: Capability Gaps, Requirements, Architectural Analysis Space Operations: Satellite Design Operations Research: Joint Campaign Analysis Once these capability gaps were identified and allocated to platform solutions, we generated a set of conceptual requirements and worked with the design teams shown here to produce a conceptual design or detailed analysis product that allowed us to create a detailed conceptual architecture for subsequent analysis. C4I Team: C2 For STOM 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

How Did We Try To Do It? Mix of Conceptual Planned and Conceptual
Architecture Mix of Planned and Conceptual Systems High Fidelity Extend Model Along with additional analytical studies Comparison against Current and Planned Architectures Impact Of Excursions On Architecture Once we had a detailed conceptual architecture, we input it into a large scale, high resolution model, created using Extend, in order to compare the conceptual architecture against the current and planned architectures in terms of their ability to project combat power ashore. Maj Poh and and Cpt Lau will describe this process in detail later in this presentation In the other major analysis effort, the results from the Extend model were combined with results from other analytical studies to ascertain the impact of several excursions contained in the N7 tasking. The main excursions were: Capability to Project Combat Power Ashore Speed, Reduced Footprint, Sea Basing 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

What We Were Not Trying To Do:
We were not trying to generate operational requirements all requirements documents for in-house design use only We were not trying to write doctrine Our CONOPS combines existing USN/USMC doctrine concepts and is intended for in-house use only We were not trying to generate specifications for building actual systems 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

What We Didn’t Have Time To Do:
Analysis of the costs and benefits as well as the design of systems to provide precision and volume fire support from the Sea Base A detailed examination of C4ISR systems and requirements to support OMFTS Analysis of more detailed operational concepts such as “Sense and Respond Logistics” and “Enhanced Networked Sea Basing” 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

So What Did We End Up With?
A system of systems, some Planned and some Conceptual, to place the Ground Combat Element of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade and its pre-positioned equipment ashore in a forcible entry environment, provide them with the ISR information they need to fight and win, while sustaining the operation through the Sea Base Based on certain assumptions So by this point in the analysis, we had a conceptual architecture: 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

ExWar Project Key Assumptions
System to execute a MEB size forcible entry operation in the timeframe. MEB and Sea Base operations are conducted up to 200 nm inland from a Sea Base nm offshore. Assaults are launched from up to 75 nm offshore. Projected legacy force structure does not change MEB Ground Combat Element (GCE) composition and sustainment requirements remain the same 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

ExWar Project Key Assumptions
A MEB sized expeditionary forcible entry operation will not take place without the support of at least one Carrier Strike Group (CSG). The Sea Base will form by merging a minimum of two Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) sized Naval Expeditionary Strike Groups (NESG), their logistics and prepositioned equipment support ships, and the associated CSG. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Joint Campaign Analysis
Does a MEB provide the capability to conduct tactically significant forcible entry operations through a Sea Base? JCA results were used to quantify the viability of a MEB in realistic combat operations in order to validate our conceptual Sea Base sized to project and sustain a MEB in combat operations Good Morning Joint Campaign Analysis was conducted in order to determine whether the MEB size force selected by our team as the basis of our architecture was a tactically viable and relevant force. The results of the Joint Campaign Analysis were used to validate this architectural design parameter. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Burma Scenario Allied Forces: 2 MEU Prepositioned Equipment 6,840 rebel troops Burmese Forces: 3.5 Infantry Div 1 Armored Div (42,000 troops + 80 Tanks) USA AO Burmese Forces NESG AO The scenario involved an Allied force consisting of two Marine Expeditionary Units and rebel forces who were attempting to block a superior force of regular Burmese Infantry and Armor units from breaking through to suppress US supported revolutionary activities in the southern Burmese city of Tavoy. Blocking Forces 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Burma Scenario Results
- From a Lanchester Exchange Model built in Excel - Parameters were derived from differing combat capabilities with “will to fight” considered - Combat capability represents the entire capability of the NESG and rebel forces Whether Burmese forces trickle down or attack en mass, 2 MEUs are the minimum force required for a reasonable chance for victory Robust sustainment would enhance combat capability in this scenario Breaking Points If Combat Continues Past Breaking Point Using a Lanchester Exchange Model that took a number of parameters into account, the Joint Campaign Analysis produced the two charts shown here. The charts depict days of combat on the x axis and combined force strength on the y axis. This represents the entire force strength of the NESG, not just the Marine Ground Combat Element ashore. The analysis demonstrates that, regardless of whether Burmese forces conduct a “trickle down” or massed attack, a minimum of 2 MEUs are required to provide a reasonable potential to drive the Burmese to their breaking point. It is also worth noting that the Joint Campaign Analysis did not make any provision for resupply of troops and equipment, so a Sea Base capable of providing sustainment directly to the contact area should increase the allies combat capability. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Joint Campaign Analysis Conclusions
Need capability to quickly deliver combat power to theater Must have at least 2 MEU and equipment in place 8 eight days after the start of enemy movement Need capability for highly survivable transport aircraft Need capability for wide area surveillance and targeting Need capability for enhanced self defense for expeditionary ships Need capability robust organic MCM capability Manned and unmanned The results of this study indicate that, in order to be successful, the ExWar force must be comprised of no less than 2 MEUs worth of combat capability in place within 8 days after a warning order from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Aviation assets must possess a high degree of survivability and enhanced ISR capabilities. Finally, the Sea Base must have enhanced self defense capability and an effective mine counter-measure capability. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Results of the Process to This Point
After the Top Down and Bottom Up analysis identified capability gaps and JCA validated the size of the GCE and Sea Base, We generated conceptual platform requirements to fill the highest priority gaps The Conceptual Architecture then evolved based on design team inputs, our analysis, and other recent NPS conceptual designs To recap, we uncovered gaps between the overarching requirements we identified in our Top Down analysis and our Bottom Up analysis of Current and Planned force structures. We passed on conceptual platform requirements to design teams here at NPS in order to further develop out our Conceptual architecture. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Capability Gaps With Platform Solutions
Ships capable of forming a Sea Base and supporting STOM Long Range, Heavy Lift Aircraft High speed transport escort aircraft ISR family of systems We filled holes the holes in our ability to conduct STOM and Sea Basing with ships, logistics and escort aircraft, and an ISR family of systems. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Ship Requirements System must deliver and sustain a MEB-sized force to the objective via the Sea Base Operate 25 to 250 NM offshore Solve throughput bottlenecks to achieve indefinite sustainment of operations Possess enough self-defense capability to defeat air “leakers,” destroy small boat threats, and conduct USW. Our Top Down and Bottom Up analysis revealed a platform gap in STOM and Sea Basing capabilities in surface shipping. We asked the TSSE design team to design a ship platform, or family of ship platforms, that could deliver, protect, and indefinitely sustain a Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The ship system had to be capable of conducting its operations within a window of 25 to 250 NM from the beach. Finally, the ships had to have enough organic self-defense capability to conduct independent operations, without the protection of Carrier Strike Group or Naval Expeditionary Strike Group force protection assets. Our definition of self-defense capability means to possess the ability to defeat small numbers of air threats, or air “leakers” when employed as part of the overall ExWar Force, the ability to thwart a small boat attack, and the ability to conduct USW. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

TSSE System Design Sea Base carries 17,000 troop-MEB, associated vehicles, and 30 days of supply 1,260,000 Sq ft of flight deck space to support STOM-enhanced ACE with a range of 250 NM Can operate as a six-ship Sea Base, an LHA(R) in a NESG, or as a prepositioned support ship Achieves indefinite sustainment by interfacing with CLF, MSC, and Commercial Shipping Self-defense provided by JSF, helicopters, RAM, FEL, UUVs, and robust C4ISR architecture What TSSE came up with was a system that met or exceeded all of the system level requirements we gave them. TSSE designed a six-ship Sea Base system that is capable of lifting a 17,000 troop Marine Expeditionary Brigade, its associated vehicles, and an initial 30 days of supply. Over 1.2 million square footage of flight deck space that can support a more logistically robust Aviation Combat Element capable of conduct STOM up to a range of 250 NM. The six ships can operate in a variety ways: (1) as a six-ship sea base; (2) as an LHA(R); or (3) as a logistic support ship which an be used in place of current Maritime Prepositioned Force and Large Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-off shipping. The Sea Base system solves the problem of indefinite sustainment through seamlessly interfacing with Combat Logistics Force, Military SeaLift Command, AND commercial shipping while operating at-sea as a Sea Base. Also, the logistics configured version of the TSSE design can resupply the Sea Base or move supplies directly to the objective. Finally, the TSSE design meets the requirement for a self-defense capability. The Sea Base system will carry aviation assets to provide an AAW and USW capability. Each ship will have the Rolling Air Frame Missile and the Free-Election Laser to neutralize air “leakers” and surface threats to the Sea Base and unmanned, underwater vehicles will provide a mine-countermeasure capability. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

The ExWar Ship DWL = 990 ft Well deck for 3 HLCACs Flight deck = 770’ x 300’ Max speed approx. 30 Kts Displacement = 86,000 LT Draft = 42’ We will now take a closer look at the individual ExWar Ship. All six ships have an identical hull form with a design waterline length of 990 ft., a draft of 42 ft, a displacement of 86,000 LT, and a max speed capability of 30 knots. The flight deck has dimensions of 770 ft by 300 ft for a total area of 230,000 square ft. The triple tram design and the absence of a superstructure, enables the system to conduct simultaneous fixed and rotary wing operations with sufficient throughput to insert, support and sustain a MEB-sized force ashore. The ship will be capable of conducting well-deck operations in order to enhance logistics throughput and the delivery of MEB assets ashore. Three future heavy-lift LCACs will operate out of and be carried in the ship’s well deck. This concludes my portion of the brief. For more details on the TSSE design, please attend the TSSE team brief at 1100 in this auditorium. CDR Erhardt will now talk about the heavy lift aircraft design. Thank you. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Long Range, Heavy Lift Aircraft
Key requirements: 300 nm radius of action Payload: 37,500 lb (18.75 ston) Desired speed in 200 – 250 kt range Capability to carry vehicles like LAV, MTVR, or HEMAT (internal or external) Capable of 15 minute cargo on load or off load using only aircrew Shipboard compatible 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Conceptual Aircraft Design Space
SEI Requirements Appear Attainable 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Payload Determination
Too Heavy For Transport By Shipboard Aircraft 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Desired Speed Determination
Increases in speed no longer produce corresponding decreases in the number of aircraft required 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Design Concepts Under Evaluation
The Quad Tilt Rotor The Compound Helicopter 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

ISR Family of Systems STOM operations place a premium on the timely acquisition and dissemination of ISR data The ISR family of systems is an organic means by which the force commander can collect ISR data tailored to their specific needs The first tier consists of short range tactical UAVs operating from ships or units ashore 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Sea Spectrum UAV Second of three tiered ISR system Shipboard compatible (LHA) Global Hawk class payload 12 hr endurance at 60K ft 300 nm from launch platform Limited weapon delivery capability 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

LEO Multi-spectral Imager
“Persistent Peepers” system High component of three tiered ISR family of systems Capable of conducting mapping, wide area surveillance, and specific target imaging missions 6 satellite constellation Multi-spectral pan-chromatic/RGB/Near IR images to 2.0 m resolution over 250x250 nm area with 48 hour revisit time Near real time crosslink/downlink to expeditionary force commander 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Persistent Peepers Constellation
Sun synchronous, circular, polar orbit with 101.8o inclination 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Viper Tilt Rotor Escort
Increase survivability of MV-22 and other high speed transports Conserve JSF strike assets Limited CAS capability further offloads JSF tasking 400 kt dash speed 6 internal AGM-114 Hellfire and 4 external AIM-9 Sidewinder 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Conceptual Design Conclusions
Once capability gaps had platform solutions assigned, the conceptual architecture was initially defined The conceptual architecture was then ready for comparison against the Current and Planned architectures using the high fidelity Extend model Prior to discussing the comparison methodology and results, all three architectures will be briefly described 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Architecture Description
MAJ Ong, SAF 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

ExWar MEB Architectures
Year 2002 ~ 2014 Current Architecture Year 2015 ~ 2020 Planned Architecture Conceptual Architecture Good Morning, I’m Major Ong, Singapore Army, I’ll next give you an overview of the three architectures adopted for the Ex War Studies. The three architectures based two time dimensions are namely the Current Architecture, from Year 2002 till 2014, and the Planned and Conceptual architectures are from Year 2015 till 2020. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Current Architecture (Baseline) “Notional” Force Structure Planned Architecture Marine Corps Vision Conceptual Architecture ExWar study group’s Visualization The Current architecture is defined according to a notional Marine Expeditionary Brigade structure for conventional warfare. The Planned Architecture is defined based on ongoing development programs by the Navy and Marine Corps in coherent with the Marine Corps vision for the 21st Century. The Conceptual Architecture as the name implies is a combined conceptual visualization of the MEB perceived by the Ex War study group. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Structure and ORBAT Capabilities Concept of Operations Limitations Advantages I will briefly, run through the three architectures describing the followings, namely structure and ORBAT, Capabilities, which is order of battle Concept of operations, limitations of the current architectures and advantages for the other two. The Current Architecture will act as a baseline definition to highlight the difference between the three architectures. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Structure and ORBAT The structure of the notional MEB comprises the Command Element, Ground Combat Element, Aviation Combat Element and Combat Service and Support Element, and they are consistently supported by an Amphibious Task Force from the Navy. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Command Element (Current, Planned & Conceptual)
Reconnaissance/ Surveillance assets Dep MEF Commander as MEB Commander The CE for the three architectures is essentially the Command and Control arm of the MEB, equipped with Reconnaissance and Surveillance assets, with the Deputy Marine Expeditionary Force commander as the MEB commander, the CE is capable of assuming the role of Joint Task Force Headquarters for small operations with additional support from the MEF CE. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Ground Combat Element Current Infantry Regiment as Main maneuver forces Wide range of Ground Combat Support elements Estimated 5,500 Marines Planned Infantry Regiment remains AAV battalion converted to AAAV battalion Improved Firepower Conceptual Leaner Maneuver and support forces with Higher Mobility Incorporate Long Range Precision Weapons Leverage on Hi-Tech The Ground Combat Element (GCE) for the Current architecture is built on an Infantry Regiment as the main maneuver effort, integrated with a wide range of ground combat support elements. The estimated size force of the GCE is approximately 5500 Marines. In the planned architecture the structure remains largely the same, with an exception of the AAV battalion now converted to a AAAV battalion, and other weapon systems with improved firepower capabilities for longer range. In the conceptual architecture, the GCE is built leaner with higher mobility, incorporating long range precision weapons, the same level of combat power is maintained by leveraging on High end technology. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Aviation Combat Element
Current Composite of Marine Aircraft Groups Fixed and Rotor wings Anti-air and Support Squadrons Planned Structure remains functionally identical Replacements CH46E >> MV-22A AV-8B >>JSF Upgrades UH-1H>>UH1T AH1W>>AH-1Z Conceptual More Air Lift Assets New Heavy Lift aircraft to replace CH-53E The ACE for the three architectures is a composite of Marine Aircrafts Groups with Fixed and Rotor wings, supported by anti-air and support squadrons capable of conducting all functions of Marine Aviation including Offensive Air Support, Assault Support, Electronic Warfare, Control of Aircraft and Missiles, Anti-Air Warfare and Air Reconnaissance In the planned architecture, the structure of the ACE remains functionally identical with the phasing in of the JSF (F-35B) to replace the roles of AV-8B and MV-22A to replace CH46E. There will also be upgrades to the some aircraft as shown. In the conceptual architecture, the ACE will now have more Heavy Lift capabilities with a new fleet of Medium and Heavy Lift aircrafts, and a leaner structure on the close-air support and strike structure with the total replacement of JSF to take up the dual roles previously held by AV-8B and F-18D. \here is also a New Heavy Lift aircraft to phase out the current CH-53E, which will be reaching the end of its operational life cycle by then. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Combat Service Support Element (Current, Planned & Conceptual)
Brigade Service Support Group Support MEB from ashore in Current architecture and from sea for both Planned and Conceptual architectures in all missions The Combat Service Support Element is common to the three architectures, fundamentally formed by the Brigade Service Support Group (BSSG), capable of supporting the entire MEB from ashore in the current architecture and from sea for both planned and conceptual architectures in all missions. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Amphibious Task Force Current Formed from 3 NESG Each NESG comprises: LHA or LHD LPD-4 class LSD – 41 or 49 Escort Ships Additionally: 6 MPF ships Planned Same Each NESG comprises: LHA (R) LPD-17 class LSD – 41 or 49 Escort Ships Additionally: 6 MPF (F)ships Form Sea Base LCU (R) and HLCAC Conceptual Leaner but with more capabilities Each NESG comprises: 2 ExWar Combat ships Escort ships Additionally: 3 ExWar Logistics ships Form Sea Base In the Current Architecture, The Amphibious Task Force or ATF comprises a mix of amphibious ships, support ships, and in some cases MPF assets, which carry equipment and sustainment for Marine forces. The Amphibious fleet, supporting a MEB, is formed from 3 NESG. Each NESG will normally consists of a large-deck amphibious assault ship, a LHA or an LHD; an amphibious transport dock of the LPD-4 class; and a dock-landing ship of the LSD-41 or LSD-49 classes. Additionally, there are 6 more MPF ships that will sustain the MEB 30 days logistically at the Iron Mountain. In the Planned architecture, the Amphibious fleet remains structurally similar. Each NESG now consists of a new large-deck amphibious assault ship, the LHA(R); a new amphibious transport dock of the LPD-17 class; Additionally, there are 6 new Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) MPF (F) ships that will sustain the MEB 30 days and to form the seabase at sea. The LCU and LCAC that are launched from the amphibious ships are also replaced by LCU (R) and HLCAC with heavier payload and longer range capabilities. In the conceptual architecture, new amphibious platforms will replace those in the current and planned platforms. Each NESG now consists of 2 new large-deck amphibious assault ships, named the ExWar Combat Ships with its escort ships. Additionally, there are 3 ExWar Logistic Ships that will sustain the MEB for 30 days and may form the seabase at sea. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Capabilities (Current, Planned & Conceptual)
Deploy Forces/ Conduct Maneuver Develop Intelligence Exercise C2 Employ Firepower Perform Logistics and CSS Protect the Force The operational capabilities of the MEB are explicitly derived from the tasks that it is required to fulfill. These capabilities basically address how the tasks can be accomplished. Common for the three architectures are these tasks to be fulfilled for Expeditionary warfare. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Capabilities (Current Architecture)
Conduct offensive and defensive operations against an enemy, both at sea and in support of forces ashore. MPF is capable of building up Iron Mountain to re-supply forces in AO. Provide logistics and maintenance at sea and ashore via amphibious ships and Iron Mountain. The capabilities described in the architecture will be the baseline for both the planned architecture and conceptual architecture to build upon. Some highlights of capabilities in the current architecture are: 1. The MPF is capable of building up Iron Mountain to re-supply forces ashore. 2. The MEB is able to Conduct offensive and defensive operations against an enemy, both at sea and in support of forces ashore. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Capabilities (Current Architecture)
Reconstitute the forces ashore and re-deploy in support of other operations, in or out of theater. Self-protection measures to operate independently in a threat environment Passive defense against Chemical, Biological and Radiological (CBR) attack. 4. Ability to Reconstitute the forces ashore and re-deploy in support of other operations, in or out of theater. 5. Possesses Self-protection measures that ensure each ship can operate independently in a threat environment 6. And Passive defensive capabilities to protect against Chemical, Biological and Radiological (CBR) attack 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Additional Capabilities (Planned & Conceptual Architecture)
Able to conduct STOM operations. MPF (F) capable of at-sea arrival and assembly of forces and equipment. Coordinate fire support functions from a Sea Base or ashore. Provide logistics and maintenance at sea via Sea Base. Reconstitute forces at sea and re-deploy in support of other operations, in or out of theater In the Planned and Conceptual architectures, the highlights in the improvements to be MEB are: 1. Ability to conduct OMFTS and STOM operations. 2. MPF (F) capable of at-sea arrival and assembly of forces and equipment. 3. Coordinate fire support functions from a Sea Base or ashore. 4. Provide logistics and maintenance at sea via Sea Base. 5. Reconstitute forces at sea and re-deploy in support of other operations, in or out of theater 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS Current Architecture
3 MEUs organized into 3 NESG 2 NESG forward deployed in Yokosuka, Japan and Southern Arabian (Persian) Gulf Another NESG deployed from San Diego 3 NESG sail to launching area and prepare for operations ashore upon activation 6 MPF ships in MPSRON located at Diego Garcia Carries equipment and supplies to sustain 17,000 MAGTF personnel for up to 30 days The concept of operations for the ExWar studies is based on a particular Burma scenario. In all three architecture, a MEB comprising of 3 MEU’s is organized into 3 NESG, 2 NESG are forward deployed in Yokosuka, Japan and Southern Arabian (Persian) Gulf, while one is deployed from San Diego. The 3 NESG will sail to launching area and prepare for operations ashore upon activation. In the current architecture, the MEB will be supported logistically by 6 MPF ships located at Diego Garcia. The MPF ships will Carry equipment and supplies to sustain 17,000 MAGTF personnel for up to 30 days. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS Current Architecture
‘Iron mountain’ with port facilities is established near landing area as base for combat force and logistics build-up Combat forces proceed for operations at objective area MPF pull in to unload equipment and supplies Subsequent re-supplies from CONUS to iron mountain by commercial ships at regular intervals The MEB will establish the ‘Iron mountain’ with port facilities near landing area as base for combat force and logistics build-up Combat forces will proceed for operations at objective area The MPF ships will then be able to pull in to unload equipment and supplies Subsequent re-supplies are being transferred from CONUS to iron mountain by commercial ships at regular intervals. Fire support for fighting forces is primarily provided by three main sources, namely, Organic artillery Aircraft and helicopters from amphibious ships or at iron mountain Naval gunfire if within range 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS Planned Architecture
6 MPF (F) ships at Diego Garcia proceed to form Sea Base STOM principles and concepts will be applied No ‘iron mountain’ and no operational pause at landing beach Landing forces proceed directly to objective area from landing beach. MPF (F) ships form Sea Base at a secure location at sea and supply the forces ashore directly from Sea Base Subsequent re-supplies from CONUS to Sea Base by commercial ships or high-speed vessels (HSV) at regular intervals In the planned architecture, the 6 MPF(F) ships will replace the MPF ships, and proceed to pre-selected location to form the Sea Base. The Ship to objective maneuver (STOM) principles and concepts will be fully in place and effective. There will not be ‘iron mountain’ and operational pause at landing beach Landing forces can proceed directly to objective area from landing beach MPF (F) ships form Sea Base at a secure location at sea and supply the forces ashore directly from Sea Base. Subsequent re-supplies transferred from CONUS to Sea Base by commercial ships or high-speed vessels at regular intervals 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS Conceptual Architecture
Capable of launching from 75 NM from the sea to 200 NM inland upon arriving at the launching area Re-supplied by 3 dedicated shuttle ships, as well as commercial and other logistic ships Requirement to conduct beach landings because AAAV and M1A1 are too heavy to be transported to objective by shipboard compatible aircraft LCU(R) and HLCAC provides Expeditionary Force of the future an over-the-horizon strike capability In the conceptual architecture, it is envisaged that the MEB will be Capable of launching from 75 miles from the sea to 200 miles inland within 24 to 48 hours upon arriving at the launching area. The MEB will be Re-supplied by 3 dedicated shuttle ships, as well as commercial and other logistic ships There will still be a requirement to conduct beach landings because AAAV and M1A1 are too heavy transport to objective by air, unless lighter platforms are in place, which is recommended as a topic for investigation in follow-on studies studies LCU(R) and HLCAC provides Expeditionary Force of the future an over-the-horizon strike capability 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Current Architecture Limitations
Inability to conduct Sea Base Operations Limitations Unable to execute STOM with large forces. Unable to provide logistic support in STOM environment. Unable to indefinitely sustain large forces ashore without a large footprint. Unable to rapidly reconstitute and redeploy forces Limitations. The most significant limitations in the current architecture, is the Inability to conduct Sea Base Operations. The existing platforms faces limitations in executing STOM with large forces. In providing logistic support in a STOM environment. to indefinite sustain large forces ashore without a large footprint ashore to rapidly reconstitute and redeploy forces 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Planned Architecture Advantages
Planned systems being designed to allow forces to execute Sea Basing and STOM Planned systems: LHA(R), MPF(F), LPD-17 LCU(R), HLCAC , AAAV MV-22, F-35B (JSF) The planned systems in the planned architecture attempts to solve the problem faced by the current architecture by designing planned systems that allowed forces to execute Sea Basing and STOM operations. More emphasis in the planned architecture is given to Sea Basing and Heavy Lift Capabilities development. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Conceptual Architecture Enhancements
Fully integrated Sea Base based on TSSE and AERO conceptual designs given considerations to the Planned capabilities The conceptual architecture allows Deployment of MEB directly to objective up to 200 NM inland Rapid and accurate re-supply of forces Reduced footprint ashore Indefinite sustainment at sea Sea Base logistic and maintenance support Rapid reconstitution and redeployment of forces at sea In the Conceptual Architecture, an envisaged Fully Integrated Sea Base based on TSSE and AERO conceptual designs given considerations to the Planned Capabilities is being developed. In this architecture, The MEB is now capable of deployment directly to objective up to 200NM inland, Integrated Fires Rapid and accurate re-supply of forces Reduced footprint ashore Indefinite sustainment ashore, Sea Base Logistics and Maintenance support and Rapid reconstitution and re-deployment of forces at sea. With this, I’ll hand over to Major Poh, who will brief you on the Architectural Modeling. Thank you. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Architectural Modeling With EXTEND
MAJ Poh, RSN 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Why Model ? The need to be able to quantitatively analyze system of systems and to identify critical factors within that system End-to-end emulation of the processes involved in accumulating, assembling, deploying, and sustaining expeditionary forces ashore Allows a systematic approach to study and verify the end-to-end system processes involved in the expeditionary warfare (ExWar) system Provides a full accounting of all the moving parts and interactions within the ExWar system 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Sample Model Output - At the Objective 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Sample Model Output - At the Iron Mountain 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Overview of ExWar Model
High-Level Assembly Area Launching Area AAAV MPF AAAV MPF MPF HELO HELO AAAV AAAV MPF MPF Lower-Level LCAC LCAC LPD LSD LHD HELO LCAC LCAC HELO LCAC 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

The Two EXTENDTM Models
Model 1: Current Architecture 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

The Two EXTENDTM Models
Model 2: Planned/Conceptual Architecture Sea base 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

What Can The Model Do ? Enables total system of systems analysis within and between architectures Controls experimental studies of interfaces and synergies among ships, aircraft and other systems within an architecture Identifies the most significant factors in the ExWar architectures Answers questions on use of HSV Sea Basing 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Factors Taken Into Account In The Models
Environmental Effects Mine Threats Attrition of troops and vehicles Reliability/serviceability of vehicles/equipment Of all simulation models that we are aware of, no other captures all of these factors 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Validation Validated with results from a published technical paper:
An Analysis of STOM (Ship to Objective Maneuver) In Sea Based Logistics by Kang, Doerr, Bryan, and Ameyugo, 2002. Conclusions from EXTENDTM modeling results consistent with verified findings about the logistics sustainment using Sea Base for STOM Some slight, but consistent, differences in the exact data output due to slightly different design considerations and assumptions 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Design of Experiment (DOE)
Systematic approach to run model and obtain the desired results Half factorial runs to capture essential data Design Factors Architecture Replenishment means between Offshore Base and the logistic depot Proximity of the ships to the Objective Noise Factors Attrition rate Weather conditions Mine threats Consumption rate 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Optimized DOE Matrix 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Measures of Performance (MOPs)
4 MOPs in 2 categories: Assault Phase Logistic Sustainment Phase 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Performance Metric Assault Phase Combat Power Ashore
Summation of the Combat Power Indices (CPIs) of entities that contribute combat power to the force The CPIs allocated were based on a RAND® study: “Situational Force Scoring: Accounting For Combined Arms Effects In Aggregated Combat Models” By Patrick Allen RAND ® Strategy Assessment Center, 1992. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Performance Metric Assault Phase The entities contributing towards combat power defined for this analysis were: M1A1 Tank Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) Advanced Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAAV) M mm Howitzers High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) Troops 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Measures of Performance
Assault Phase Time to build up an Advance Force (TAF) Time to build a Desired Force Level (TBU) CPA 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Desired Levels for TBUs Within Architecture Analysis CPAs as a result of assault assets ONLY Between Architectures Analysis Total force build-up CPAs Results of Initial Force Built-Up (by assault asset) + Remainder Force Build-Up (by Logistic Elements) 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Assault Phase Interpretation of TAF & TBU from graph. CPA Smaller TAF & TBU => BETTER ! 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Logistic Sustainment Phase Logistical Sustainment Mean Squared Error (MSE) MSE accounts for the bias and variability in the Days-of-Supplies (DOS) for the 3 resources from the desired level at the logistic depot and the Objective Food Fuel Ground Ammunition 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Logistic Sustainment Phase Mean Squared Error (Iron Mountain/Sea base) – MSE (IM/SB) Mean Squared Error (Objective) – MSE (Obj) Desired Level Smaller MSE => BETTER ! 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Extend Model Analysis Results
CPT Lau, SAF 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Analysis Results Time to Build Up Advance Force (TAF) The time to build up the advance force for each architecture was unaffected by the factors studied in the model Time to Build Up Desired Force Level (TBU) Proximity of the ships to the Objective and weather conditions are the 2 main determinants Under good weather conditions, launching the MEB further out to sea does not increase the build up time significantly 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Analysis Results Resource levels at the Iron Mountain / Sea Base (MSE IM/SB) Using HSV to replenish the logistic depot rather than the LMSR results in the least variation in the resource levels Resource levels at the Objective (MSE OBJ) Proximity of the ships to the Objective and weather conditions are the 2 main determinants for the Current and Planned Architectures Weather is the main determinant for the Conceptual Architecture 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Analysis Results Time to Build Up Force Conceptual Architecture projects the forces ashore in the shortest time Newly designed ExWar Ships were able to get on station fastest Increased number of aircrafts coupled with increased lift capability were able to project the force with fewer trips 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Analysis Results Time to Build Up Force Current Architecture takes the longest time to project the force ashore Requires additional delay to capture Iron Mountain Planned Architecture is most affected by weather than the current and conceptual Architecture Higher usage of sea transports; sea craft suffer a greater degradation in poor weather 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Analysis Results Logistical Sustainment at the Objective Current Architecture is the most robust in sustaining the Objective, if you’re willing to accept the accompanying operational pause The Iron Mountain has a highly capable overland transportation, which is not affected significantly by weather or attrition in the scenario 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Analysis Results Logistical Sustainment at the Objective Conceptual Architecture performs just as well as Planned Architecture Greater reliance on its air assets made the aircrafts more susceptible to attrition Conceptual Architecture uses 75% air/25% sea Planned Architecture uses 50% air/50% sea With better aircraft survivability, the Conceptual Architecture will perform better than the Planned Architecture 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Analysis Results Logistical Sustainment at the Objective Planned Architecture is more affected by distance between Launching area and the Objective Greater usage of sea transports Sea crafts are disadvantaged in longer distances due to their slower transit speeds 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Analysis Results Logistical Sustainment at the Objective Planned Architecture is able to sustain the Objective as well as the Current Architecture under good weather conditions Planned Triad of LCAC(H), AAAV and MV-22 can sustain the Objective indefinitely However, under inclement weather, the Sea Base will not be able to maintain the desired level of resources at the Objective Having better sea keeping and transloading capabilities, the Planned Architecture can perform as well as the Current Architecture 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Summary of Key Findings
Projection of Forces Ashore Conceptual Architecture is able to project forces ashore in the shortest time Air assets are better able to project forces ashore However it is necessary to improve aircrafts’ survivability Reducing sea crafts susceptibility to weather effects will also lead to better forces build up time 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Logistical Sustainment at the Objective Sea Base is able to sustain the Objective without the Iron Mountain under good weather conditions Inclement weather will decrease throughput from the Sea Base to the Objective Establishing an Iron Mountain, whenever possible, can reduce the effects of weather on the re-supply process 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Logistical Sustainment at the Objective Logistic Sustainment of the Objective can be improved by reducing the effects of weather and attrition Reduce the effects of weather by improving design of transports to allow for better sea keeping capabilities Reduce the effects of attrition by having better aircraft survivability 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Excursion Analysis: The Effect of Speed
MAJ Teo, RSAF 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

SPEED EXCURSION OPNAV Tasker Effects of speed of platforms on both logistics and war fighting HSV type of high-speed platforms 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

SPEED-CRITICAL AREAS IN EXWAR AND POSSIBLE ROLES FOR HSV
Equipment / Logistics Transfer Mine Warfare Special Operations Other Operations 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

HSV SPECIFICATIONS HSV-X1 Joint Venture Length: ft, beam: ft Full Load Displacement: 1872 tons, max draft: 13 ft Loaded Speed: 38 knots, Lightship Speed: 48 knots Loading / Unloading time (Average): 2 hours Deadweight: tons Payload: 308 tons Range 1200 Nautical miles (Full load) – 1 way 3000 Nautical miles (Empty load) – 1 way 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

HSV ASSUMPTIONS Effective cruising speed at a sea state 3 Linear speed versus payload relationship HSV able to carry all variety of loads and vehicles, limited only by the weight of the item to be transported Refueling of HSV conducted at 1000 nm intervals by Strategic Refueler tankers at sea At-sea refueling takes 2 hours (approach, set-up, refuel, disengage and pull off) 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

SETUP OF ANALYSIS Factor Level Description Re-Supply Line Distance CONUS to Sea Base 7,037 Nm Offshore Base to Sea Base 1,765 Nm Ship Type/ Payload (Full) FSS 27 knots, 32,295 tons deadweight HSV 38 knots, tons deadweight Re-supply Practices Min Dev Minimum deviation from initial inventory level Re-supply a certain number of days of supply once that number of days of supplies are utilized at the Sea Base so that there is minimum deviation at the Sea Base; if there are 45 days of supplies at the onset, then there will be approximately 45 days of supply throughout the operation Min Reqt 30 At least 15 days of supplies at the end of the 90-day operation (with initial supply set at 30 days) Re-supply schedule is set such that there will be at least 15 days of supply at the Sea Base at the end of the 90-day operation, with Sea Base having an initial supply of 30 days Min Reqt 45 At least 15 days of supplies at the end of the 90-day operation (with initial supply set at 45 days) As above, except that Sea Base has an initial supply of 45 days 12 different combinations 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

SETUP OF ANALYSIS Assumptions HSV assumptions as presented previously Fast Sealift Ship (FSS) / T-AKR Loaded Speed: 27 knots Deadweight: 32,295 tons Refueling Time: 1 day (refueled concurrently during loading / unloading process) Range: Able to sustain without refueling for single way trip for the particular scenario investigated 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

SETUP OF ANALYSIS Assumptions Unit of measurement for Payload Transferred is Day of Supply (DOS) FSS carries approximately 7.5 DOS HSV carries approximately 0.19 DOS Squadron of 12 HSVs carries approximately 2.3 DOS Cost ratio of FSS to HSV is 6:1 Speed ratio of FSS to HSV is 1:1.4 Payload ratio of FSS to HSV is 39:1 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

SETUP OF ANALYSIS Methodology Timeline Analysis / Replenishment Model Equal Payload Transferred Equal Cost Comparison 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

RESULTS OF ANALYSIS Sample Output Graph 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

RESULTS OF ANALYSIS Offshore Base to Sea Base CONUS to Sea Base
Min Dev Min Reqt 30 Min Reqt 45 FSS HSV Number of Ships Required 2 36 24 Number of Runs per Ship 6 13 5 17 4 14 Rest Day between Runs 9 1 Number of Equal Cost HSVs Available 12 Ratio of HSV to FSS 18:1 12:1 Exceeds Equal Cost by Factor of 3 CONUS to Sea Base Exceeds equal cost by factor of 3.5 to 4 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

RESULTS OF ANALYSIS Recommended Distance for HSV Operation At current cost and performance, HSV can only match or better the performance of FSS at short distances Should be limited to 250 nm runs, until cost can be lowered or performance improved 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

RESULTS OF ANALYSIS Recommended HSV Speed (Fixed distance, payload) Still requires 8 HSVs to replace a FSS even if speed increased to between 50 to 55 knots 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

RESULTS OF ANALYSIS Recommended HSV Payload (Fixed distance, speed) Requires payload of 3.5 DOS per Squadron of HSV to effectively replace a FSS Approximately 1.5 times current payload 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

RESULTS OF ANALYSIS Summary of Results ITEM RECOM. REMARKS Maximum Distance for Re-supply Runs (Speed and Payload fixed) 250 nm At the lowest possible cost ratio of 7:1 Cost Ratio Required at Various Distances (Speed and Payload fixed) Varies Nil Speed Required to Fulfill Current Cost Ratio of 6:1 (Distance set at 1,765 nm, Payload fixed) > 55 knots Cost ratio at 55 knots is 8:1 Higher speeds not investigated Payload Required to Fulfill Current Cost Ratio of 6:1 (Distance set at 1,765 nm, Speed fixed) 3.5 DOS per Squadron Approximately 1.5 times of current payload 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

SPEED CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
At current cost, speed, and payload, HSV not an effective replacement for FSS for re-supply missions To be effective replacement, implement either one of following for future HSV designs Reduce cost of HSV Increase speed of HSV At 1,765 nm, speed required is beyond 55 knots, which may render HSV unstable or significantly reduce its practical payload capability Increase payload of HSV At 1,765 nm, the payload required is approximately 1.5 times the current payload Exact requirements vary according to the distance that the HSV would be utilized for 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

SPEED CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Increasing speed and payload of HSV may bring about associated increase in cost Need to balance between requirements At current cost and specifications, HSV is still useful in niche areas Mine Warfare Special Operations Intra-theatre troop lift Casualty evacuation 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Excursion Analysis: The Effects of Sea Basing
LTC Loh, RSAF 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Implications of the Sea Base
Focus Areas of Analysis: Sea Base Sustainment of Forces Ashore – Using ExtendTM Aerial Throughput of the Sea Base – Using ExcelTM Spreadsheets & ARENATM Protection Levels for the Sea Base – Using EINSTeinTM The sea base excursion analyses sustainment of forces ashore, Aerial throughput and the protection of the sea base, using the analysis tools as show. Focus on Results and Significant Findings 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Analysis of Sea Base Sustainment of Forces Ashore Using ExtendTM
Examined only the Planned Architecture for the focused areas below: Effects of Varying the Distance of the Sea Base Relative to the Objective At 58 nm, 108 nm, 158 nm & 208 nm Re-supply Options to Sustain Forces Ashore MOP: Time to Build Up 80% of Forces at the Objective Days of Supplies (DOS) maintained at the Objective Mean Square Error (MSE) of DOS maintained at the Sea Base and Objective In the analysis of sustaining the forces ashore using Extend, we chose the Planned Architecture for more in-depth study We varied the distances between the Sea Base and the Objective, investigated the re-supply options by air and sea. The MOPs used is as shown are they are similar to those use in the earlier Design of Experiment on the architectures comparison you have heard earlier. A point to note is that replenishment to the sea base is set at a fix quantity to determine areas of concerns. The re-supply of resources to the Sea Base is set as a fixed quantity 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

- DOS Maintained at Objective for Varying Distances 58 nm 108 nm
The graphs show the DOS maintained the objectives at various distances between the sea base and the objectives. The vertical axis represents the days of supplies of the type of resources and the horizontal axis represents time in days. Looking at the graphs, you can notice that the variability in maintaining the DOS increases as the distance increases. Now if you look at the blue line which represents fuel, you can see re-supply to the objective collapses. This problem is two-fold, - one is the fixed fuel re-supply to the sea base, and the other is the increasing fuel demand from the air re-supply platforms and the land vehicles when we stretch the range up to 208 nm. This concern on the fuel supply can be eradicated by ensuring more frequent fuel re-supply to the sea base and objective, or ensuring the sea base ships have a bigger fuel storage capacity. Distance of Sea Base from Objective 58 nm 108 nm 158 nm 208 nm MSE (days) 0.707 0.784 1.673 1.812 System Fails (Due to Fuel Consumption) - 65th Day 30th Day 20th Day 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Mean Squared Error of DOS maintained at the Objective
Re-supply Options for Sustaining Forces Ashore Mean Squared Error of DOS maintained at the Objective Good Weather Poor Weather 50% Air & 50% Sea 0.784 2.824 0% Air & 100% Sea 0.957 2.877 75% Air & 25% Sea 0.737 2.847 100% Air & 0% Sea 0.677 0.777 Next, let me point you to this table that summarizes the results from the re-supply option study. Re-supply by air is the best with the lease variability based on the Mean Square Error data as shown in red here for both good and poor weather. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Summary of Findings from Analysis Using ExtendTM
Distance of the Sea Base to the Objective is critical to the overall sustainment effort. The further the distance the more variability or difficulties in maintaining a desired level of DOS at the objective. Air re-supply is more robust in adverse weather but it is highly dependent on survivability during transit. Air re-supply is more responsive and expedient but it consumes a significant amount of fuel. In summary, the re-supply sustainment is dependent on the distance. The greater the distance, the more difficult it becomes because we have more variability in maintaining a desired level of supplies ashore. Air re-supply is more robust in adverse weather and more responsive and expedient, but the trade-offs are survivability and higher fuel consumption. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Aerial Throughput Study of the Sea Base
Key Objectives: To compare sustainment capabilities of Planned and Conceptual Architectures At 25 nm, 55 nm & 250 nm To calculate throughput capacity in tons delivered per day for the Conceptual Architecture At 225, 250 and 275 nm Analyze the Sea Basing replenishment throughput rate of the Aero Designed HLA using the Arena Model. Next, I’ll go on to the aerial throughput study. We used the methodology from the 1999 Naval Studies Board study on Naval Expeditionary Logistics to compared the throughput capabilities of the planned and the conceptual architectures at varying distances. Based on the envisioned STOM and OMFTS we analyzed the Conceptual Aviation assets’ throughput capacity at 225, 250 and 275 nm. With the new design of a heavy lift aircraft for the conceptual architecture, we analyze its aerial throughput capacity using Arena. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Planned Aviation Assets Conceptual Aviation Assets
Comparison Between Planned and Conceptual Aviation Assets’ Throughput Capability (Internal Load) Planned Aviation Assets Portion of Force Supported Tons Needed short tons Number of Personnel 250 nm 125 nm 55 nm Full MEF (FWD) 2,235 17,800 15 percent 34 percent 62 percent MEF (FWD) less ACE 848 10,460 40 percent 88 percent 165 percent MEF (FWD) less ACE and CE 785 9,660 43 percent 95 percent 178 percent Landing Force only 490 6,800 69 percent 153 percent 285 percent Conceptual Aviation Assets Portion of Force Supported Tons Needed short tons Number of Personnel 250 nm 125 nm 55 nm Full MEF (FWD) 2,235 17,800 49 percent 100 percent 172 MEF (FWD) less ACE 848 10,460 128 percent 264 454 percent MEF (FWD) less ACE and CE 785 9,660 138 percent 285 percent 490 percent Landing Force only 490 6,800 221 percent 456 percent 785 percent The internal load aerial throughput capability comparison results between the planned and the conceptual architectures is shown here. Focusing on only the landing force at 250 nm, the planned architecture can only meet the landing force daily re-supply requirements which includes fuel, water, food, ammo and spares by 69% whereas the conceptual can achieve 221% throughput capability. The breakdown of the Planned occurs at about 175 nm while the conceptual can meet almost 3 times the planned architecture’s capacity. (Based on 10-Hour Fight Day; Operational Availability of .75 for MV-22, and HLA and .7 for CH-53E) Planned Assets: 36 MV-22 and 8 CH-53; Conceptual Assets: 96 MV-22 & 24 HLA 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Throughput Capability of the Conceptual Aviation Assets
Internal Load Capacity for the Conceptual Compare to DOS 1DOS=490, 2DOS =980, 3DOS=1470 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

ARENATM Model Analysis on the HLA
Recommended Minimum No. of HLA Required Distance Internal External 225 nm 13 20 250 nm 15 275 nm 17 23 Based on 12-hour Operating Time flight day 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Findings From Aerial Throughput Study
Planned Aviation Assets cannot meet sustainment needs of a MEB beyond 175 nm. Conceptual with 24 HLAs and 96 MV-22s operating from the X-ships can surge and sustain MEB up to 275 nm from the Sea Base. Conceptual aerial throughput capability has a surge capacity of 4 times the daily sustainment requirements at 225nm; 3 times at 250nm and 2 times at 275nm (12-Hour Operating Time). Conceptual Architecture can accept up to 50% attrition or diversion of assets to other missions and still sustain a MEB ashore up to 275 nm daily (Ao = .75). The Planned Architecture Aviation Assets are not able to meet the Sustainment needs of a MEB size force adequately from the Sea Base beyond 175 nm. The Conceptual Architecture with 24 newly designed Heavy Lift Aircraft and the recommended numbers of MV-22 operating from the X-ships will be able to meet the need to surge and sustain a MEB size force up to 275 nm from the Sea Base adequately. The Conceptual Architecture Aerial Throughput Capabilities has a surge capacity of up to 4 times the daily sustainment requirements at 225nm; 3 times at 250nm and 2 times at 275nm, operating at a 12-Hour Day. The Conceptual Architecture is able to accept up to 50% attrition or diversion of the valuable airlift assets to other missions and still sustain a MEB size force ashore up to 275 nm daily (Ao .75). 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Protection of the Sea Base Exploratory Investigation Using EINSTeinTM
(Enhanced ISAAC Neural Simulation Toolkit) An artificial-life laboratory for exploring self-organized emergence in land combat Written by Andrew Ilachinski and modified by Greg Cox of CNA for use in maritime warfare. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Model Inputs Context: Burma Scenario (2018). Potential defense assets include CG, DDG, FFG, and future LCS. Threat: Sea and land based surface threats (air and undersea not examined) Enemy: 18 enemy combatant ships (10 missile patrol craft + 8 FFG type ships). Each ship is given “attributes” that describes its mission, capabilities, and aggressiveness Current, Planned and Conceptual architectures’ collection of ships created 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

MOE and Baseline The Measure of Effectiveness explored: % of ExWar Task Force Alive (including escorts) Based on 50 battle runs Goal: Above 80% of Task Force ships alive. Mission capable after an enemy missile task force attack (Unharmed) Baseline: Escorted by 1 CG, 1 DDG & 1 FFG Approach: Incremental increase of CG, DDG, FFG or LCS to achieve MOE 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Comparison of Various Architecture’s Protection Force Structure Options That Approach Goal of Above 80% ExWar Task Force Unharmed Fraction of Forces Unharmed 2 CG, 3 DDG & FFG 1CG, 5 DDG & FFG 3 CG, 3 DDG & FFG 3 DDG & FFG Based on 50 “battles” in Einstein Baseline: 1 CG, 1 DDG & 1 FFG

Findings From EINSTeinTM Simulations
Conceptual did not perform better than Current or Planned in terms of survivability. Less distributed Sea Base becomes less survivable. Mobile land-based ASCMs (Anti-Ship Cruise Missile) pose a threat to the Sea Base. The defense capabilities of the ships need to be increased. The simulations indicate the MOE for the Conceptual Architecture can be achieved with 16 LCS; 3CG, 3DDG and 3 FFG; or 3 DDG and 12 LCS. A Very Rough Order Equal Capability Equation for Anti-Surface Warfare: 1 CG, 1 DDG, and 1 FFG = 5 to 6 LCS 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Conclusions on the Excursion Study on the Implications of the Sea Base
Conceptual Architecture allows Sea-Basing and STOM to be viable up to 275nm. But it is dependent on aerial throughput. Additional MV-22s and HLAs are required to surge and sustain up to a MEB ashore. Sea Base and Logistics Ships require enhanced self-protection. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Excursion Analysis: The Impact of Reduced Footprint Ashore
LTC Loh, RSAF 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Reducing Footprint Ashore
The Study examined the following areas: Reducing Weight of Equipment or Resource Consumption Rates Reducing Troops Ashore Increasing Reliability of Equipment 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Reducing Weight of Equipment or Resource Consumption
Leveraging on Technology Fuel efficient generators & engines for land platforms Reduce spare consumption Develop modular components that when assembled make-up the equivalent of the heavy tank and equivalent AFV E.g. Add-on armor; efficient space-saving equipment designs. Use of lighter composite materials Water recycling, purification and harnessing kits 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Reducing Troops Ashore
Down size physical troops required ashore possible by enhancing associated weapon capabilities and improving remote stand-off precision firepower Remote C2 and Logistics Elements to Sea Base Exploit unmanned assets Portion of Force Supported Personnel Daily Requirements (Tons) Full MEB 17,800 2235 MEB less ACE 10,460 848 MEB less ACE and CE 9660 785 Landing Force only 6800 490 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Impact of Increasing Reliability (Using HMMWV ARENATM Model)
Baseline 3 8 (16,20,24) 71 Embellishment 1 6 72 Embellishment 2 16 85 Embellishment 3 Embellishment 4 (32,40,48) 89 Average FMC MTBM Maintenance Personnel Tow Truck Scenario Note: Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM) is a triangle distribution in hours (minimum, most likely, maximum) Procuring more reliable systems reduces the footprint. Doubling the resources to conduct minor and major maintenance does not match the doubling the MTBM. The operational availability increases from 75 percent to almost 94 percent – a significant difference. Doubling the resources increases the footprint ashore and still does not achieve a 94 percent Ao. The maximum Ao is 89 percent. Operational Availability Mean Time Btw Failure (MTBM) MTBM + Maintenance Down Time (MDT) Ao = 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Conclusion on Reducing Footprint Ashore
Lighter and more resource efficient equipment Less equipment Less troops Less consumption The less glamorous but significantly crucial factor Reliability and Availability of Equipment! 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Excursion Analysis: The Effect of Reduced Manning
LT Alvarez, USN 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Reduced Manning 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Reduced Manning ExWar ships carry considerably more cargo than current platforms 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Conclusions CDR Erhardt, USN 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

STOM Conclusions STOM is a viable operational concept, given a suitable force architecture Analysis results show that in order to conduct STOM: Sufficient aerial throughput is essential in order to seize long range objectives Need highly survivable transport aircraft to maintain the throughput Need to plan for increased fuel consumption Need capability for wide area surveillance and targeting 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Sea Basing Conclusions
The Sea Base concept is capable of achieving the throughput required to sustain a brigade size force ashore, given a suitable force architecture The Planned architecture, under good weather conditions, is able to sustain the Objective through the Sea Base as well as the Current architecture via the Iron Mountain Need capability to quickly deliver combat power to theater 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Sea Basing Conclusions
As the distance to the objective increases, however, fuel consumption markedly increases and must be taken into account in planning factors Need a robust organic MCM capability Manned and unmanned 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Planned Architecture Conclusions
While the programs of record provide a level of STOM capability, this capability could be further enhanced by the addition of specifically designed air and surface craft Conceptual architecture projects the forces ashore in the shortest time While they are capable of inserting the force, Planned architecture aviation assets are not able to meet the Sustainment (vice insertion) needs of a MEB size force adequately from the Sea Base beyond 175 nm. 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Planned Architecture Conclusions
The reduction of footprint ashore requires : Lighter and More Resource Efficient Equipment Less Equipment Less Troops Less Consumption High Reliability 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Additional Conclusions
The Current architecture, with the Iron Mountain, is the most robust in sustaining the Objective, if you can accept the accompanying operational pause Although there are potential roles for the HSV, at the current cost, speed, and payload it is not an effective replacement for a conventional FSS for re-supply missions 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Additional Conclusions
The reduction in the number of ships between the Planned and Conceptual architectures results in a less distributed, and therefore more vulnerable, Sea Base without a corresponding increase in self defense capability over Planned Sea Base ships 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

The Systems Engineering and Integration Team
LTC Loh Kean Wah RSAF WSO (ADA) CDR Bill Erhardt USN Naval Aviator LCDR Aaron Peters USN EOD MAJ Poh Seng Wee Patrick RSN SWO MAJ Chee Yang Kum RSN SWO MAJ Teo Ping Siong RSAF WSO (ADA) MAJ Lim Wei Lian SAF Artillery MAJ Ong Hoon Hong SAF Combat Engineer LT John Stallcop USN Submariner LT Luis Alvarez USN SWO CPT Lau Hui Boon SAF Guards LT Matt Steeno USN SWO CPT Tan Choo Thye SAF Armor 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

We Would Like to Thank: N75, MCCDC, CAN, EXWARTRAGRU San Diego, and the NPS faculty for their support of our analysis efforts Northrop Grumman for providing the refreshments and their generous support of the SEI curriculum and the NPS foundation 05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

Questions? A copy of our Final Report will be available in January at
05 DEC 02 ExWar Project Final Briefing

The Expeditionary Warfare Integrated Project

Similar presentations

Presentation on theme: "The Expeditionary Warfare Integrated Project"— Presentation transcript:

Similar presentations

About project

Feedback

Log in

Auth with social network:

The Expeditionary Warfare Integrated Project

Similar presentations

Presentation on theme: "The Expeditionary Warfare Integrated Project"— Presentation transcript:

Similar presentations

About project

Feedback