1. After the Catastrophe: IP Network Availability and Resiliency In The Post-Disaster Environment. Rakesh Bharania Network Consulting Engineer Cisco Tactical Operations http://www.cisco.com/go/tacops E-Mail: rbharani@cisco.com Twitter: @densaer http://www.cisco.com/go/tacops

2. © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ABAG – IP Resiliency 2 Agenda – After the Catastrophe  The Need for Information In A Post-Disaster Environment  Questioning Assumptions  The role of Cisco in the Infrastructure picture  Examples: 1. September 11, 2001 attacks 2. 2011 Japan Earthquake and Tsunami 3. 2010 San Bruno, CA gas pipeline explosion

3. © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ABAG – IP Resiliency 3 The Fundamental Problem… Public Safety 33 In complex disasters with multiple response organizations … How to deliver the right information in the right format to the right person at the right time? Defense National, State & Local Government Healthcare Critical Infrastructure Transportation NGO / International Orgs

4. © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ABAG – IP Resiliency 4 Changing Technologies Affect Mission Success  Radio, Phone Integrated Mobile/Fixed  Single DeviceAny Device  Voice only Voice, Video, Data  Closed Teams Open Collaboration  Command&Control CentricIn the field, social media, public  Fixed LocationsDeployable anywhere Goal: Mission workflow and productivity benefits that save lives and speed recovery. Evolution in People, Process and Technologies to support Disaster and Humanitarian relief

5. © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ABAG – IP Resiliency 5 Mythbusting  Assumption: “When a disaster happens, telecommunications will go down.”  Reality: Not always. About 60% of Haiti telecom stayed operational after quake. Other examples: Chile Quake, Japan.  Assumption: “I have a cellphone, an ordinary telephone line, a PBX (etc). Why should I care about the IP network?”  Reality: Everything is IP now –and has been for some time.  Assumption: “The Internet is an optional luxury for public safety.”  Reality: Not anymore – just as critical as radio communications. Haiti was a data- driven response.

6. © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ABAG – IP Resiliency 6 Cisco’s Role in IP Resiliency  As a vendor, Cisco doesn’t have direct responsibility for the health of the national telecommunications infrastructure (owned by the Service Providers such as AT&T, Verizon, etc.)  But our products constitute a large part of the national communications infrastructure, We have an obligation to produce secure, reliable products and to assist where appropriate with our expertise.  We participate in the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (DHS) – http://www.ncs.gov/ncc/ - ongoing public/private coordination for tech companies, service providers, Federal gov. agencies. http://www.ncs.gov/ncc/  Cisco has aggressive customer support available for crisis situations: CAP, Cisco Tactical Operations, etc.

7. © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ABAG – IP Resiliency 7 September 11, 2001  Infrastructure to note: WTC 1/2: below-ground fiber from transatlantic cables & Telehouse and 60 Hudson St. 60 Hudson St: termination point to many transatlantic cables NYIIX at 25 Broadway Telehouse: peering site for 40 ISPs from NY, Europe South America and South Africa.  WTC 2 collapse severed fiber between 60 Hudson and 25 Broadway  Reachability disruption to <1000 BGP prefixes (less than 1% of advertised prefixes globally)  No global Internet routing instability occurred (But there was with Nimda worm on 9/18/2011)  Global Internet routing continued normally.

8. © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ABAG – IP Resiliency 8 Location of Critical Internet Infra on 9/11/2001

9. © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ABAG – IP Resiliency 9 2011 Japan Quake and Tsunami  M9.0 quake/tsunami on March 11, 2011 Internet impact: Both IIJ redundant backbone fiber links Tokyo/Sendai were severed. 20% of Japan’s total traffic dropped immediately due to outages. 3 of 8 fiber links failed to USA, but good links remained available. Japanese ISPs: “outside of immediately affected areas, no region was disconnected from Japan or the world.” Internet was used heavily by the Japanese public for streaming video, social media, etc.  Rapid recovery from the event: One of the major Tokyo/Sendai fibers restored by March 12 All three trans-Pacific fibers restored by T+28 hrs ISPs reported 85-90% normal traffic T+10 days after quake  Were we lucky? Most of Japan’s core Internet infrastructure was outside of the affected region.

10. © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ABAG – IP Resiliency 10 Example: SINET4  Japan’s Science and Information Network (SINET4) links 700 universities, colleges, and national laboratories.  While there was some network disruption (Sendai), restoration was rapid. Network continued to work normally outside of immediate area and was used for emergency information use (heavy ustream traffic, etc)

11. © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ABAG – IP Resiliency 11 San Bruno CA Explosion  Local communications disruption to cellphones, mobile data services immediately around the affected neighborhood.  Cisco TacOps mutual aid request via NCRIC in support of San Mateo County OES.  Provided communications support to Incident Command Post.  GIS support through Google disaster response team for NTSB.  Extensive After Action: “San Bruno Fire Technical Debrief” from CMU-SV DMI

12. © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ABAG – IP Resiliency 12 Conclusion  Internet infrastructure in developed countries is highly resilient to disasters at a macro scale – redundant links + dynamic routing.  Local disruptions are possible – prepare redundancy into your organization.  Recent Internet history in disaster demonstrates it is reliable and indispensable in a crisis.

13. 13 © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco PublicABAG – IP Resiliency 13 Questions?