1. RELIABILITY & SAFETY ANALYSIS PRESENTED BY: ANDREW BATEK Team # 15: Acoustic Storm Interweaving the impressive visual power of electricity and the visceral emotion of music, Acoustic Storm takes analog or digital audio input and outputs its own rendition using two varieties of solid state tesla coils.

2. Project Description – Safety Acoustic Storm will comprise multiple solid state tesla coils and associated power circuitry, among other things These present safety hazards in the form of  High power dissipation  Shock and RF burn potential  High Current and Dangerous Charge Storage  Etc… Ironically, these dangers exist when the system operates correctly. Low to Med. criticality failures make our device safer...

3. Current Block Diagram

5. Criticality Levels Low Criticality  < 10 -2 failures per 10 6 unit – hours  Loss of functionality without damage to remaining components  No potential for user injury Medium Criticality  < 10 -3 failures per 10 6 unit – hours  Loss of functionality and damage to separate device components  No potential for user injury High Criticality  < 10 -9 failures per 10 6 unit – hours  Potential for user injury

6. Control Circuit - Microcontroller Microcontroller - dsPIC33EP512MU810 Model: λ p = (C 1 π T + C 2 π E ) π Q π L = 2.517 MTTF: ~45.3 years Parameter nameDescription ValueComments C1C1 Die Complexity Failure Rate0.2816 bit Microprocessor. πTπT Temperature Factor 4.4Using maximum extended temperature device rating C2C2 Package Failure Rate.053Less than 128 pins πEπE Environmental Factor 0.5For use in an area that is not mobile and has normal ambient temperatures πQπQ Quality Factor2.0Assumed Quality Compliance πLπL Learning Factor1.0Has been in production for > 2 years.

7. Power Supply – Boost Controller Estimation of CCM operated boost converter Reliability [1] λ p = 77.59 MTBF = 12888 hours Output Power: 800W & CCM Operating Mode λ p (MOSFET)76.686 λ p (Output Diode).2 λ p (Input Bridge).103 λ p (Input Inductor).509 λ p (Output Capacitor).060 λ p (Output Resistor).0297 Total λ p 77.59 MTBF12888 hours [1] G. Amer and S. S. Rao. “Estimation of Reliability of a Interleaving PFC Boost Converter” in Serbian Journal of Electrical Engineering, Vol. 7, No.2, Nov. 2010, pp 205-216 Available: http://www.ieee.org/documents/ieeecitationref.pdf [4/3/2013]http://www.ieee.org/documents/ieeecitationref.pdf

8. Power Supply – Transformer MOTs - various manufactures and types Model: λ p = λ b π E π Q =.42 MTTF: ~271.8 years * Assumes we wound the secondary well Parameter nameDescription ValueComments λbλb Base Failure Rate 0.014General operating temperature from 150-170°C – Worst Case Assumed πEπE Environment Factor 1.0For use in an area that is not mobile and has normal ambient temperatures πQπQ Quality Factor 30Non-spec power transformer

9. DRSSTC Coils DRSSTC Coils present worse case than HFSSTC coils Model: λ p = λ b π C π E π Q =.028 MTTF: ~4077 years Parameter nameDescription ValueComments λbλb Base Failure Rate 0.0014Wire rated at 155°C – Assume worst Case operating temperature πCπC Construction Factor1.0Not variable construction πEπE Environment Factor 1.0For use in an area that is not mobile and has normal ambient temperatures πQπQ Quality Factor 20Homemade – Assume Low Quality??

10. FMECA Chart for Selected Components Failure No.Failure Mode Possible Causes Failure Effects Method of Detection CriticalityRemarks MC1Micro PWM output is incorrect Software, burned out pins, external noise Incorrect or nonexistent audio outputs Auditory observation Low MC2Micro Pin signal does not change Software, burned out pin, external noise Malfunction in peripherals Visual or auditory observation Low MC3MCLR is always logic low or high Burned out pin, broken reset button, external noise Micro is useless or can only be reset by removing power Observation (oscilloscope) Low BC1Controller fails to assert artificial ramp Internal chip failure Boost converter becomes unstable when duty cycle is > 50%. Potential to damage power supply Observation of instability at high power Power supply not working MedBoost controller also has built in protection for boost circuit and should prevent this

11. FMECA Chart for Selected Components Failure No.Failure Mode Possible Causes Failure Effects Method of Detection CriticalityRemarks BC2Boost Controller Output remains constant Internal chip failure MOSFET will not be driven – Boost converter will not function No high voltage power supply output low MOT1Transformer failure Short between coils, excess current Power supply will cease to function No power supply output Low MOT2Transformer power rating is GREATLY exceeded Abnormal current caused by fault, external surge Copper fuses, vaporizes, and is ejected from transformer ObservationHighHighly, repeat, Highly unlikely TC1Tesla Coils Short Circuit between coils Device Temperature is hot enough to melt insulation and possibly coil wire Coils stop working because the resonant circuit is broken No coil output and/or visual inspection of coils MedCoils and potentially other parts need replacement

12. Special Note: Human Error The majority of the high criticality “failures” of our design will be dependent upon human error These occurrences cannot be analyzed in the same way as actual device failures Goal is to ensure that human error never happens through:  Safety Design  Standard Operating Procedures approved by REM  …I’ll save you the rest of the ~24 pages