1. Severe Solar Activity/Space Weather and the Global Threat to Electric Grids
John G. Kappenman
Storm Analysis Consultants

2. A Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Solar Activity & Geomagnetic Storms
Geomagnetic Storms are disturbances in the Earth’s normally quiescent geomagnetic field caused by intense Solar activity
Geomagnetic Storms have Continent-Wide & Planetary Footprints
Intense Solar Activity

3. A Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Solar Activity & Geomagnetic Storms
A rapidly changing geomagnetic field over large regions will induce Geomagnetically-Induced Currents (i.e. GIC a quasi-DC current) to flow in the continental interconnected Electric Power Grids
Storm causes Geomagnetic Field
Disturbances from Electrojet Current that couple to
Power Systems

4. 20 Minutes of Bad Space Weather
March 13, 1989 – Storm 7:39UT
This animation provides a recreation of just 20 minutes of the geomagnetic storm events from 2:39-2:58 EST on March 13, It was during this time interval that the geomagnetic storm caused the Blackout to the entire Province of Quebec. As illustrated by this animation, storm activity was confined to very high latitudes (no population or infrastructures) and then it had a sudden onset and large geographic footprint of intense disturbances that developed along the US-Canada border. The speed and size of this onset is unlike traditional terrestrial weather threats that power grids are more commonly exposed to and better engineered to withstand.
Time 2:39-2:58 EST (7:39-7:58 UT)
20 Minutes of Bad Space Weather

5. Reported Power System Events – March 13, 1989
This animation shows the sequence of significant power grid impacts reported to NERC that developed due to the intense geomagnetic disturbances shown in the prior animation. As shown power system impacts were in the interconnected power grid along the US-Canada border. The most significant of these impacts was the complete Blackout to the Hydro Quebec grid and the entire Quebec province. They went from normal operating conditions to complete province-wide blackout in just 92 seconds. There was not even sufficient time available for system operators to even assess what was happening to the grid, let alone take any meaningful human intervention actions. For comparison purposes, it is important to note that the intensity of the disturbance over the Quebec region only reached ~500 nT/min, while data from historically larger storms indicate that intensities up to ~5000 nT/min are possible (10 times larger than this storm).
Quebec Blackout in 92 Seconds at Intensity 0f ~480 nT/min
Time 2:39-2:58 EST (7:39-7:58 UT)

6. March 13, 1989 – Storm 21:40UT Time 4:40-5:30 PM EST (21:40-22:30 UT)
This animation shows further intense geomagnetic storm conditions that happened later that day on March 13, The storm reached higher intensity levels and as a result it expanded to lower latitudes and as shown during this 50 minute time interval, the most intense storm activity is centered on mid-latitude portions of the US and at times has a continent-wide footprint. Also shown is even more intense activity that extends around the globe into northern Europe during this same time interval, clearly making this type of storm an event that can have a planetary reach.
Time 4:40-5:30 PM EST (21:40-22:30 UT)

7. Reported Power System Events – March 13, 1989
This animation shows the sequence of significant power grid events that again were reported to NERC. The NERC assessment of this storm concluded that major portions of the US Power grid came uncomfortably close to also experiencing a blackout of unprecedented scale. The area of blackout could have extended from the Wash DC area and surrounding mid-Atlantic states through the upper mid-west and even into the Pacific Northwest regions of the US. Again, these impacts were observed for intensities that generally were in the ~300 nT/min range, while very large storms could reach ~5000 nT/min in intensity.
Intensity over Mid-Atlantic Region
~300 nT/min
Time 16:03-17:30 EST (21:03-22:30 UT)

8. US High-Voltage Transmission Network
500 kV & 765 kV serve ~60% of US geographic territory and ~86% of US population
765kV
European and Asian Continental Grids are of similar proportions
500kV
345kV

9. GIC Risk Factor – Growth of Transmission Network
The larger the Grid – the Larger the Antenna to cause GIC
Cycle 19
Cycle 22
To further illustrate the changing nature of the power grid infrastructure for exposure to large storms events that are expected at frequencies of 1-in-30 to 1-in-100 year intervals, the above graph illustrates this trend line of increasing vulnerability that is occurring. As this graphic shows, the power grid acts as an Antenna that readily couples to both the Geomagnetic Storm and HEMP Threat Environments, further this antenna has grown over ten fold in size over the last 50 years. The introduction of new higher operating voltages such as 765kV also greatly increase this coupling or risk factor. Initiatives that are being put forward to develop a large 765kV supergrid for the purposes of harnessing wind energy have the potentials to significantly escalate the size and coupling efficiency of the grid to the disturbance environments.
1969 – First 765 kV Transmission Line
1964 – First 500 kV Transmission Line
1953 – First 345 kV Transmission Line

10. Areas of Probable Power System Collapse
A Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Solar Activity & Geomagnetic Storms
GIC flow in transformers can cause Power Grid Blackouts & Permanent Grid Damage
Areas of Probable Power System Collapse
Blackouts of Unprecedented Scale

11. A Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Solar Activity & Geomagnetic Storms
GIC flow can also has potential to cause wide-spread catastrophic damage to key Power Grid Transformers
Causing Restoration Problems
These Key Assets may take a Year or More to Replace
Internal
Damage due to one storm
Salem Nuclear Plant
GSU Transformer
Failure, March ‘89

12. Severe Geomagnetic Storm Scenario
At-Risk 345kV, 500kV, & 765kV Transformers
Many Regions with High Damage Loss Estimated
Estimated that many large EHV Transformers would have sufficient GIC exposure to be At-Risk of Permanent Damage & Loss – Replacement could extend into 4-10 years at current world production rates

13. Great Geomagnetic Storms
US Electric Grid Vulnerability Trends and Preparedness
Threat
New Awareness that Geomagnetic Storm Severity is 4 to 10 Times larger than previously understood – Past Metrics did not measure risks correctly for power industry
Vulnerability
Power Grid infrastructures have experienced a “Design Creep” over past few decades that have unknowingly escalated vulnerability to these threats – No Design Code Yet Exists
Consequences
Power Supply is an essential scaffolding of modern society
All other Critical infrastructures will also collapse with long-term loss of Electricity
Risk – Events have catastrophic potential, the ability to take the lives of hundreds of people in one blow, or to shorten or cripple the lives of thousands or millions more, impact future generations of society

14. Great Geomagnetic Storms
March 1989 Superstorm & May 1921 Storm Comparisons
Position of Westward Electrojet
Illustration showing the large regions of geomagnetic field eastward and westward electrojet currents at time 22UT on March 13, This provides some perspective as we explore a comparison with even larger storms such as those in 1859, and as shown in the next slide May 1921, before power grids as we know them today existed.
Boundaries of Eastward Electrojet
March 13, 1989

15. Great Geomagnetic Storms
March 1989 Superstorm & May 1921 Storm Comparisons
Data (in the form of strip charts) exists across North America for what many consider to be the largest geomagnetic storm of the 20th Century. This historic data can be readily compared with the same data from the March 1989 storm to show not only the increase in intensity but also a dramatic increase in the geographic footprint of this large storm compared to the March 1989 storm. This comparative analysis indicates that not only is the 1921 storm as much as 4 to 10 times more intense than the March 1989 storm, but as shown by the white outlined areas, it would have an even larger geographic footprint that would extend across the entire continental US and it’s electric power grid.
Estimated Boundaries of Eastward Electrojet
May 14-15, 1921
Larger & More Intense than March 1989

16. Great Geomagnetic Storms
March 1989 Superstorm & May 1921 Storm Comparisons
Severe Geomagnetic Storms will have an even larger Planetary Footprint

17. Geomagnetic Storms – GIC & Conventional Wisdom
Only Power Grids at High Latitude Locations needed to worry about GIC
This did not explain Power Grid Problems Reported at Low-Latitudes
Southern Japan
+/- 40o Geomagnetic
South Africa
A New Class of GIC Risks
Large GICs are possible at Low-Latitudes and Have Caused Problems
Potential for Severe Storm to Cause Impacts to Developed Grids on a Planetary Scale

18. Failures linked to Long Duration / Low Intensity GIC Exposure
Overview of South Africa EHV Transformer Failures due to Oct-Nov 2003 Geomagnetic Storms
Failures linked to Long Duration / Low Intensity GIC Exposure
Station 3 Gen Transformer 4 HV winding failure
Station 3 Gen. Transformer 5 evidence of overheating
Courtesy Eskom, Makhosi, T., G. Coetzee

19. Nuclear Plant GSU Transformer Incidents
Within 25 months after the March 1989 Storm 7 11 12 10 6
Salem
Oyster Creek
South Texas
Shearon Harris
Surry 1
Zion 2
WNP 2
Peach Bottom 3
D.C. Cook 1
Susquehanna
Maine Yankee
Nine-Mile 2 9 8 1 5 4 3
Latent Impacts of March 1989 Storm – Delayed Failures of Large Transformers at Nuclear Plants suspected across US

20. Nuclear Plant GSU Transformer Incidents
Nuclear Plants have some special vulnerability issues
Severe Storms could initiate a Long Term Outage to large portions of the US electric grid – Including many Nuclear Power Plants all at the Same Time
The Large Transformers in Nuclear Plants also have Higher Exposure to GIC, making them more Vulnerable to damage/failure
Transformer Damage - Fire & Disruptive Failure of the Exposed Transformer - Collateral Damage to Vital Back-up and Cooling Systems at the Nuclear Plant
Fukushima demonstrated that loss of outside power (Grid Blackout) & Plant Damage to Back-up Systems has severe consequences for both reactors and spent fuel pools

21. Nuclear Plant GSU Transformer Incidents
Movie of Transformer Disruptive Failure – NOT DUE TO GIC
Above Movie is Disruptive Failure of ~3MVA Transformer
Nuclear Plant Transformers can be 400 Times Larger Capacity

22. What are the Issues We should Understand Going Forward
Wrap-Up
The Nation has experienced a Several Decade Long Failure to Understand how Risk has Migrated into our Electric Grid Infrastructures from Space Weather Threats
What are the Issues We should Understand Going Forward
The Sun, Magnetosphere remain fully Capable of Producing Historically Large Geomagnetic Storms in the Future
Grid Design Evolutions have unknowingly Escalated GIC Risks and Potential Impacts
Un-Recognized Systemic Risk – No Design Code Yet to minimize this Threat
Given Sufficient Time the Reoccurrence of Large Storm Event is a Certainty – Only with Much more Serious Consequences