1. A School-Based Test of the Sanctions-Perceptions Link in Deterrence Theory Robert Apel, Ph.D. Greg Pogarsky, Ph.D. Leigh Bates, M.A. School of Criminal Justice University at Albany

2. Deterrence Theory & Sanction Perceptions Deterrence as information transmission Deterrence as information transmission Sanction → Perception → Behavior Sanction → Perception → Behavior Threat communication & public policy Threat communication & public policy If sanction → perception link is absent, then “behavior is immune to policy manipulation” (Nagin, 1998) If sanction → perception link is absent, then “behavior is immune to policy manipulation” (Nagin, 1998)

3. Existing Research on Sanction Perceptions Past offending & current risk perceptions Past offending & current risk perceptions Experience punishment → increase perception Experience punishment → increase perception Avoid punishment → decrease perception Avoid punishment → decrease perception Personal & vicarious Personal & vicarious Criminal offenders are Bayesians who update their priors based on their own and others’ experiences Criminal offenders are Bayesians who update their priors based on their own and others’ experiences

4. Existing Research on Sanction Perceptions (cont.) Objective sanctions & risk perceptions Objective sanctions & risk perceptions Objective sanction risk generally unrelated to perceived sanction risk Objective sanction risk generally unrelated to perceived sanction risk People are largely insensitive to variation in objective sanction risk across geographic areas People are largely insensitive to variation in objective sanction risk across geographic areas

5. Reconciling Apparently Divergent Empirical Results Specific deterrence more salient than general deterrence Specific deterrence more salient than general deterrence Sanction perceptions could be responsive to change rather than levels Sanction perceptions could be responsive to change rather than levels Limitations of measuring objective sanction risk at the county level Limitations of measuring objective sanction risk at the county level

6. Reexamining the Link between Objective & Perceived Risk School as a setting for the study of the sanctions-perceptions link School as a setting for the study of the sanctions-perceptions link Near “total institution” within which sanction threats might be more easily transmitted Near “total institution” within which sanction threats might be more easily transmitted Consideration of environmental conditions conducive to deterrence Consideration of environmental conditions conducive to deterrence Size, racial heterogeneity, & disorder Size, racial heterogeneity, & disorder

7. National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 NELS eighth & tenth grade surveys NELS eighth & tenth grade surveys Cross-sectional & change analyses Cross-sectional & change analyses Student perceptions Student perceptions “Rules for behavior are strict” (1-4) “Rules for behavior are strict” (1-4) Objective school sanctions Objective school sanctions Principal-report = # of restrictive policies (0-7) Principal-report = # of restrictive policies (0-7) Student-report = % disciplined in school (0-1) Student-report = % disciplined in school (0-1)

8. Level of Agreement with “Rules for Behavior Are Strict” Mean(8) = 2.82; Mean(10) = 2.74 Mean(8) = 2.82; Mean(10) = 2.74

9. Cross-Sectional Models OLS fitted mean level of agreement that “rules for behavior are strict” OLS fitted mean level of agreement that “rules for behavior are strict”

10. Cross-Sectional Models (cont.) Summary of cross-sectional results Summary of cross-sectional results Positive relationship between objective school sanctions & student perceptions Positive relationship between objective school sanctions & student perceptions Principal- & student-report Principal- & student-report 8th & 10th grade cross sections 8th & 10th grade cross sections Important qualifications Important qualifications Relationship strength is very modest, but appears to be a bit stronger in 10th grade Relationship strength is very modest, but appears to be a bit stronger in 10th grade

11. First-Differenced Models Δ in principal-report sanctions correlated with Δ in perceptions of rule strictness Δ in principal-report sanctions correlated with Δ in perceptions of rule strictness FULL SAMPLE (1)(2)(3) Principal-Report Sanctions.017 (.007) ---- Student-Report Sanctions ----.142 (.071).074 (.080) CHANGE SAMPLE ONLY (4)(5)(6) Principal-Report Sanctions.031 (.013) ---- Student-Report Sanctions ----.240 (.127).123 (.146)

12. Moderating Features of the Sanctioning Environment Magnitude of the sanctions-perceptions link is a decreasing function of other school characteristics Magnitude of the sanctions-perceptions link is a decreasing function of other school characteristics LowMediumHigh School Size.036.012.004 Racial Heterogeneity.037.021 –.008 –.008 Social Disorder.030.020.000

13. Qualified Support for General Deterrence Principles Evidence for sanction-perception link Evidence for sanction-perception link On average, students attending schools with more restrictive policies & practices perceive school rules to be more strict On average, students attending schools with more restrictive policies & practices perceive school rules to be more strict Heterogeneity in sanction-perception link Heterogeneity in sanction-perception link Relationship is stronger in well-organized schools, or in schools that are comparatively small, homogenous, & orderly Relationship is stronger in well-organized schools, or in schools that are comparatively small, homogenous, & orderly

15. Distribution of Objective School Sanctions Principal: Mn(8) = 6.3; Mn(10) = 6.1 Principal: Mn(8) = 6.3; Mn(10) = 6.1 Student: Mn(8) = 32.9; Mn(10) = 13.2 Student: Mn(8) = 32.9; Mn(10) = 13.2

16. Joint Effects of Principal- & Student-Report Sanctions Eighth grade cross section Eighth grade cross section