1. 1 Security in Application & SDLC Barkan Asaf (abarkan@mercury.com) (abarkan@mercury.com) Nov, 2006

2. 2 Firewall Hardened OS Web Server App Server Firewall Application Client Network Layer Firewall External Network Internal Segment Proxy Load Balancer Databases DMZ Internal Segment Application Layer Security Perimeter

3. 3 Web Application attacks & 5 Web Security Myths Top Five myths of web security We use 128-Bit SSL Firewalls protect the web site My network scanner found no issues My application scanner found no issues We have annual security assessments Jeremiah Grossman

4. 4 Vulnerability Stack & Security scanners

5. 5 Technical vs. Logical Vulnerabilities Logical Flaws Security vulnerabilities that arise with some contextual logic in application. Example: Multi step procedure that can be bypassed with direct invocation Technical Vulnerability Security vulnerabilities that can be discovered without any contextual logic Examples: HTML Injection SQL Injection Technical vs. Logical Vulnerabilities at WhiteHat Web Application scanners limitations/challenges Session state management - Script parsing Logical flows Custom URLs Privilege escalation False negative/positive

6. 6 Product Requirements Functional Design Technical Design ImplementationTestingBeta Release Cycle Security Requirements Document Architectural Risk Analysis Security Tollgates Security Testing Secure Coding Security Tollgates in Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC)

7. 7 Unvalidated Input (A1) Description HTTP inputs into the application are not validated. Include URL, Headers, query strings, cookies, form fields, hidden fields. Leads to almost all web application vulnerabilities. Threats Client-side Attacks (3), Command Execution (4), Denial of Service (6.2) Counter measures Use Application level validation that includes: Strong data type Length Logical Boundaries Legal characters Correct Syntax Demonstration

8. 8 Broken Access Control (A2) Description Authorization boundaries in code are broken or not properly enforced. Threats Credential/Session prediction (2.1), Insufficient Authorization (2.3) Insufficient process validation (6.4) Counter measures Robust authorization management Do not trust client side tokens for authorization Authorize all requests except anonymous objects Block resource enumeration and Forced Browsing in application

9. 9 Broken Authentication & Session Management (A3) Description A weak implementation of Authentication framework or unsecure Session management. Threats Brute Force (1.1), Insufficient Authentication (1.2), Insufficient session expiration (2.3), Session fixation session (2.4), Session prediction (2.1) Demonstration Counter measures Use Random GUID as session indication Assign session id only after authentication Assign new session id when change from HTTP HTTPS Correlate session indication with valid session object in application Use standard and robust Password policy enforcement Use standard and robust Lockout policy enforcement Do not trust client to send session state (session GUID only)

10. 10 Cross Site Scripting (A4) Description Attacker is using a vulnerable web application into sending unintentionally a user (Victim) a malicious active script that will be executed on its browser and breach his security framework. Threats Client-side attacks (3) Counter measures Use Application level validation that will either negatively or positively validate all inputs coming from untrusted clients. Use HTML encoding centrally in presentation layer Demonstration

11. 11 Buffer Overflows (A5) Description The attacker sends data to a program, which it stores in an undersized stack buffer. The result is that a either corrupted or malicious code is executed. Buffer overflow vulnerabilities typically occur in code that: Relies on external data to control its behavior Depends upon external properties of the data Is so complex that a programmer cannot accurately predict its behavior Threats Buffer overflow (4.1) Counter measures Use interpreted languages as Java/Python Validate your input boundaries and size before processing Code Example char buf[BUFSIZE]; gets(buf);

12. 12 Injection Flaws (A6) Description Attacker is using Injection flaws to relay malicious code through a web application to another System. The code is executed on behalf of the web application. Threats Command execution (4), Denial of Service (6.2) Counter measures Use Application level validation that will either negatively or positively validate all inputs coming from untrusted clients. Use prepared statements and set each parameter before use in query Example

13. 13 Improper Error Handling (A7) Description Improper handling of errors in application can result with the application sending the attacker Error messages that reveal implementation/architecture/components information he should not know. Threats Information leakage (5.2) Counter measures Catch all exceptions in server side – never throw exception to client Handle all errors in back end Do not send the user excessive information that is not required as Platform architecture ports in use, components in use and more. Example throw SQL exceptions back to client throw stack trace on Web service exceptions throw Application server stack trace back to client

14. 14 Insecure Storage (A8) Description Improper usage/implementation of cryptographic in code application. Threats Information leakage (5.2), Insufficient Authentication (1.2) Counter measures Use well known and proven cryptographic Choose a suited algorithm according to security/performance trade-off Make secrets in memory not serialized Make keys replaceable and configurable by size if possible Encrypt all private/confidential credentials Examples Saving private key of SSL server on File system as clear text Saving DB connection object as clear text on file system Failure to encrypt critical data Poor sources of randomness Poor choice of algorithm Attempting to invent a new encryption algorithm Failure to include support for encryption key changes

15. 15 Denial Of Service (A9) Description All actions or procedures in application that will make it unusable. Network level attacks are not Included in here. Threats Denial of Service (6.2) Counter measures Use well known and proven cryptographic Choose a suited algorithm according to security/performance trade-off Make secrets in memory not serialized Make keys replaceable and configurable by size if possible Encrypt all private/confidential credentials Example Resource starvation when all concurrent users are used by zombies HTML persistence injection causes DoS to the application main page

16. 16 Insecure Configuration Management (A10) Description Insecure usage of servers/components configuration. Mostly out of the box settings are not secure. Threats Insufficient Authentication (1.2), Insufficient authorization (2.2), SSI Injection (4.6), Directory indexing (5.1), Information leakage (5.2), Path traversal (5.3), Predictable Recourse Location (5.4), Abuse of Functionality (6.1) Counter measures make hardening procedure to infrastructure before shipping Examples Unpatched security flaws in the server software Web server Misconfigurations (directory listing/traversal enabled) Unnecessary default, backup, or sample files Improper file and directory permissions Unnecessary services enabled Default accounts with their default passwords Administrative or debugging functions that are enabled or accessible Overly informative error messages (more details in the error handling section)error handling section Unsecre usage of certificates

17. 17 No Such thing as Security in client side Validate all inputs from untrusted clients * Use standard security solutions/configuration Make sure the client gets only the responses he needs * Loose the naïve approach regard client’s behavior * Remove legacy/unnecessary resources from production app Summary

18. 18 The script, sent by the attacked client to the server was then received again by the client, now with the proper security context, and was able to send the cookie to the attacker Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

19. 19 SQL Injection – Code example By passing Login logic using SQL Injection flaw SQLQuery = "SELECT Username FROM Users WHERE Username = ‘" & strUsername & "‘ AND Password = ‘" & strPassword & "‘" strAuthCheck = GetQueryResult(SQLQuery) If strAuthCheck = "" boolAuthenticated = False Else boolAuthenticated = True End If Defending (Java example) PreparedStatement ps = null; RecordSet rs = null; try { isSafe(pUsername); ps = conn.prepareStatement(“SELECT * FROM user_table WHERE username =‘?’”); ps.setString(1, pUsername); rs = ps.execute(); if ( rs.next() ) { … }

20. 20 Validation layers (Secure in depth)