1. THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT

3. GWB AND LATIN AMERICA 1.Lack of high-level attention 2.Abandonment of negotiations with Mexico for immigration reform 3.Overriding concern with support for anti-terrorist campaign (not democracy) 4.Hubs, spokes, and FTAs 5.Politicization of drug war 6.Awaiting Fidel’s demise 7.Opposition to Chávez and the Pink Tide

4. PROBLEM! Democracy and U.S.-Latin American relations The rise of the “pink tide” Context: Bush’s Second Inaugural Address

5. THE PINK TIDE: ORIGINS Economic—lack of growth (through 2003), poverty and inequality, frustration with Washington Consensus Political—weakness of representative institutions, inattention to poor, persistence of corruption International—war in Iraq, opposition to Bush policies and growing distaste for American society

6. THE PINK TIDE: MEMBERSHIP Hugo Chávez, Venezuela (1998, 2004, 2006) Lula, Brazil (2002, 2006) Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández, Argentina (2003, 2007) Evo Morales, Bolivia (2005) Daniel Ortega, Nicaragua (2006) Rafael Correa, Ecuador (2006) Fernando Lugo, Paraguay (2008) Mauricio Funes, El Salvador (2009) Near-Misses: Ollanta Humala, Peru (2006) Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Mexico (2006)

7. CLARIFICATIONS #1 Differentiation: right/center/left Contending leaders in/for Latin America: –Felipe Calderón (Mexico) –Lula (Brazil) –Hugo Chávez (Venezuela)

8. CLARIFICATIONS #2 Disenchanted masses in Latin America ≠ Voters for pink tide candidates ≠ Leftist candidates for office ≠ Leftist winners of presidential elections ≠ Pro-Chávez chief executives ≠ Hugo Chávez Notes: –Tidal swell is spontaneous, not organized –Rivalries and defections

9. THE PINK TIDE: GOALS Domestic—winning power, rearranging electoral alignments; overturning status quo, possibly through institutional reform; changing policy direction Hemispheric—gaining support throughout Latin America (invoking “Bolivarian dream”), reducing U.S. hegemony Global—challenging international order, forging alliances with developing world and non-aligned nations

11. THE PROBLEM WITH HUGO Uses language of the street (including the Arab street)—e.g., the “devil” speech Sits atop petroleum Puts money where his mouth is Breaks established rules of the game Plays off resentment of Bush, U.S. power Challenges Washington Consensus and FTAA Goes for high stakes Seeks rearrangement of prevailing world order

12. THE ODD COUPLE: HUGO AND JORGE George’s “gifts” to Hugo: –discourse on democracy (e.g., Second Inaugural) –caricature of “ugly American” –unpopularity of foreign policies –inattention to Latin America And Hugo’s reciprocation: –exaggerated rhetoric –potential threats to neighboring countries –authoritarian tendencies Q1: What does Hugo do without George? Q2: What about oil?

13. CHALLENGING AMERICAN MYTHS The Cherished Assumption—freely elected leaders will support U.S. policy The Western Hemisphere idea—the new world is distinct from old, will forge common front in international arena Democracy rationale for “regime change”—free elections as protective shield The hegemonic presumption—the United States can dictate political life in Latin America

14. GWB AND THE PINK TIDE Strategy of “inoculation” Circumvention through FTAs Cultivation (and cooptation?) of Lula The presidential tour (March 2007): –Carefully selected sites—Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico –Rhetoric of social concern –Only deliverable: ethanol agreement –The Chávez “counter-tour”

16. VISIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA: GWB AND USA Democratic—with tilt to right or center-right Prosperous—with commitment to free-market policies and ties to United States Unified—under U.S. leadership Peaceful—in view of unanimity Deferential—following U.S. lead in global arena

17. REALITY CHECK #1 Democracy = broad ideological spectrum, from “left” to “right” Prosperity = mixed economies; rejection of Washington Consensus, FTAs, and FTAA Ideology = diversity rather than unity Outlooks = anti-U.S. attitudes strong and growing among large share of population Alliances = rejection of U.S. leadership and rules of the game

18. REALITY CHECK #2 Not everyone wants the same thing…!

19. GWB and Latin America: Comparative and Historical Perspective _________Latin America as Priority___________ ______ Low _______ _______ High _____ Operational Mode for U.S. ____ Unilateral Ad hoc Systematic imposition intervention (Bush 2001-04) (Reagan 1981-89) ________________________ __________________ Intermittent, Consistent, Multilateral low-level high-level diplomacy engagement (Clinton 1993-2000) (Kennedy 1961-63) ____________________________________________________________

20. Rank-Order Preferences for U.S. Policy ___Partners___ __Targets___ U.S. Policy (Mexico, (Cuba, __Rivals___ ___Bystanders__ __Configuration__ _Bush II__ __Colombia)__ __Venezuela)__ __(Brazil?)__ ___(Others)____ Low priority 14 2 1 4 + Unilateral Low priority 23 1 2 2 + Multilateral High priority 31 4 4 3 + Unilateral High priority 42 3 3 1 + Multilateral Note: As presented here, ordinal rankings mean that 1 stands for the first-place (most preferable) choice, 2 for the second-place choice, 3 for the third-place choice, and 4 for the fourth-place (least preferable) choice.

21. The End.