1. Social Capital and Politics

2. Outline
Political theories of social entrepreneurship
Social capital

3. Capacity for collective action
Community Vitality
Revitalization
Community organizing
Developing Organizational and Leadership Skills
Capacity for collective action
Collective efficacy
Social capital
Building Social Capital
Social cohesion
Social Interactions
Atomistic
Ref.: RAND

4. Social Enterprises as Mediating Structures
Protect individuals from alienation before Leviathan by translating social problems into personal terms (Berger and Neuhaus 1977)
Enhance state’s legitimacy by connecting public problems to private means
Roman Catholic “subsidiarity”: mediating the relationship between people and governments ata level that favors the individual
Ref.: Frumkin (ch 2) 2002

5. Nonprofit Links with the Political Process
Least political
1. Social capital building
2. Civic engagement
3. Grassroots organizing
4. Advocacy
5. Lobbying
6. Direct electoral activity
Most political
Ref.: Frumkin (ch 2) 2002

6. Political Theories of social Enterprise
Nonprofits counteract the coercive power of the state
Nonprofits are a laboratory for institutions that governments later adopt
Nonprofits provide “space” between individuals and states (Locke)
Voluntary associations are a force to fragment the proletariat (C. Wright Mills)
Ref.: Frumkin (ch 2) 2002

7. Tocqueville’s Model of Voluntary Associations
Civic
association
Political
association
Equality
Democracy
Ref.: Frumkin (ch 2) 2002

8. Links Between Government and Social Enterprise
Moral suasion (Reagan)
Promotion of national service (GHW Bush)
Stipended volunteering (Clinton)
Faith-based initiatives (GW Bush)
Ref.: Frumkin (ch 2) 2002

9. Public subsidies versus private charity
Let’s see what happens when we control for income, education, religion, age, gender, marital status, race, and political views. If two people are identical in all these ways, except that one feels the government should redistribute income more while the second person disagrees, the second person will be ten percentage points more likely to make a contribution to charity. He or she will give $263 more to charity each year, and will give $97 more to explicitly secular causes. In other words, people in favor of forced income redistribution are privately less charitable than those who oppose it, regardless of how much money they earn.

10. Different types of giving

11. Volunteering

12. It’s not just about money
If the whole population gave blood like opponents of social spending do, the blood supply would increase by more than a quarter. But if everyone in the population gave like government aid advocates, the supply would drop by about 30 percent.
The charity differences between proponents and opponents of government social spending lead to some jaw-dropping ironies. For instance, people who stated in 2002 that they thought the government was “spending too little money on welfare” were less likely than those saying the government is “spending too much money on welfare” to give food or money to a homeless person.

13. But it’s not politics per se

14. Some international evidence
These volunteering differences are not attributable to any characteristics such as the average level of education or income. On the contrary, if we look at two people who are identical in age, sex, marital status, education, and real income—but one is European and the other American—the probability is far lower that the European will volunteer than the American. For example, an Austrian who “looks” just like an American will be 32 percentage points less likely to volunteer, a Spaniard will be 31 points less likely, and an Italian will be 29 points less likely.
“The government has a responsibility to reduce income inequality,”
only thirty-three percent of Americans agreed—far fewer than the level in any European nation. For example, in Spain, 77 percent favored greater redistribution; in Italy, 65 percent; and in Germany, 49 percent.
The level of agreement with this statement correlated quite consistently with national charity rates.
In Spain, 13 percent volunteered for non-religious charities; in Italy, it was 11 percent; and in Germany, 10 percent.
A 10-percent increase in the percentage of the population that believes the government has a responsibility to reduce income inequality is associated with a six-percent decrease in the percentage volunteering for nonreligious causes, and a five-percent decrease in religious volunteering.

15. Outline
Political theories of social entrepreneurship
Social capital

16. Evidence of social capital is more tangible than social capital itself
Robert Putnam
Networks, norms, and social trust that facillitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefits
Francis Fukuyama
An institutional informal norm that promotes cooperation between two or more individuals
Synthesis
The trust and social cohesiveness that promotes giving, volunteering, and participation in civil society
Evidence of social capital is more tangible than social capital itself
Ref.: Putnam, Fukuyama

17. Two Types of Ties Foster Social Capital
Bonds
Ties based on homogeneity of identity, demography and sense of purpose
Can promote pursuit of narrow interests at the expense of the wider community
Ties that span social differences (gender, ethnicity, SES)
Build social trust that facilitates cooperation for mutual benefit
Bridges
(Putnam, 2000)
Ref.: Granovetter (1974)

18. Benefits of Social Capital
Less passive reliance on state
Proactive citizen intervention into social issues
Schools, crime, economic development
Constructive association
Money for charities
Lower transaction costs with contracts and laws
Fewer public resources needed to govern
Amelioration of “excessive individualism” (Tocqueville 1835)
Ref.: Putnam, Fukuyama

19. Costs of Social Capital
In-group trust means out-group distrust
Some social capital is socially destructive
Less interchange of ideas between tight-knit groups
Less moral suasion not to cheat out-group members
Ref.: Fukuyama

20. The Putnam Hypothesis Social capital is falling in America
Evidence: lower attendance by many traditional groups (e.g. PTA, bowling leagues, church-related groups)
Reasons
Societal cynicism
Female labor force participation
Population mobility and rootlessness
Less marriage, more divorce, fewer kids
Technology—individual consumption of leisure
Ref.: Putnam

21. Not Everyone Subscribes to the Putnam Hypothesis
Some groups increase membership, others lose—can’t just study the losers
Group membership was abnormally high in the American 1950s—can’t measure from that point
Ref.: Fukuyama

22. An Economic Theory of Social Capital
Hypothesis: Social capital is a natural adaptation to suboptimal non-cooperative behavior
Person 2
Person 1
cooperate
compete 20 5 10

23. Prisoner’s Dilemma Implications
Without trust, dominant (but suboptimal) strategy obtains
With trust, optimal strategy becomes viable
Social capital promotes cooperation through trust

24. 2000 Social Capital CommunityBenchmark Survey
30,000 respondents
50 communities nationwide
Supervised by Putnam and Harvard
Undertaken by local Community Foundations
Ref.: SCCBS

25. SCCBS Summary (1) Social trust Groups Political Secular gifts
Religious gifts
National Sample
-0.05
3.68
2.87
$459
$889
Central New York
0.07
3.84
3.09
$506
$702
Chicago
-0.09
3.76
2.93
$501
$825
Houston
-0.23
3.29
2.56
$424
$900
Indiana
0.11
3.59
3.03
$456
$961
Rochester
0.15
3.57
$542
$718
Seattle
0.19
3.82
3.51
$783
$725
Ref.: SCCBS

26. SCCBS Summary (2)
Ref.: SCCBS

27. Lessons for Policymakers and Managers
Don’t assume that social capital is always good
Example: Social capital can push giving and volunteering either up or down
Individual and community-level social capital have different impacts
Create proper conditions for social capital creation (e.g. property rights, public safety)
How does the public sector impact social capital—does it encourage crowding out?