1. PEER Older Hazardous Concrete Buildings Policy Issues Peter J. May Center for American Politics and Public Policy University of Washington Laurence Kornfield Chief Building Inspector City and County of San Francisco

2. Policy Challenges for Addressing Older Hazardous Concrete Buildings Insufficient information for guiding policy development – How many? What condition? Inappropriateness of “one size fits all” regulatory solutions – too costly, politically unacceptable Limited willingness of owners to undertake retrofits “voluntarily” – not our problem!

3. California Un-reinforced Masonry Programs California Law 1986 – inventory and planning requirements for 25,000 buildings By 2004, some 55% retrofitted, 14% demolished – many remain unaddressed Cities are participating as required, but voluntary programs are not working well 85% retrofit in mandatory programs addressed, only 10 to 21 % in other programs Mandatory warning placards prior to 2004 were not posted – no enforcement mechanism

4. Lessons from Un-reinforced Masonry Programs 2004 placard law – posting of placards about unsafe buildings More teeth added to notification requirements

5. Lessons from URM experience (Alesch and Petak; Berke and Beatley; Olson) Barriers Limited problem recognition – not our problem! Lack of technically feasible, affordable, solutions Legal challenges to ordinances Limited enforcement abilities for regulations

6. Hospital Retrofit Experience SB 1953 California mandatory hospital retrofits enacted in 1994 (regulations 1998) Lengthy policy development and negotiation (diagram – Alesch and Petak 2004)

7. California Hospital Retrofit Experience SB 1953 (Alesch and Petak 2004, CA SSC 2001) Notable for risk classification of facilities – but, arguably too many classified as high risk Circa 40 % initially classified as highest risk category of imminent danger of collapse High costs of compliance for the industry – inducing delays – Some 260 facilities seeking “diminished capacity” exemptions as of 2006 for meeting initial 2008 deadline Shakeout in the health care industry due to economics of the industry – 50 % or more facilities with revenue shortfalls More feasible to close facilities than upgrade in many instances; premature closure?

8. Political Realities Retrofit as a tough sell – costs are up front and benefits are perceived as uncertain Comment cited by Alesch and Petak re LA URM: Who pays, when, and for what?

9. Political Realities (con’t) Other consequences that are often unintended can dominate -- potential impacts for: Tenant costs, property conversions, affordable housing, housing displacement, open space, costs of construction Retrofits become excuses for owners to achieve other desired ends – that in the aggregate exacerbate other policy problems Solutions require intervention – of some form – in complex markets for employment, housing, and services

10. What NOT to Do? No quick fix – will take decades to ameliorate the risks posed by older hazardous concrete buildings No one-size solution – impossible to mandate a uniform retrofit program No need to wait for the perfect solution – it will not arrive in our lifetimes; the risk is real 

11. What to Do? Work toward a mix of solutions: Mandated actions for the “worst” buildings, yet to be defined Realistic voluntary actions for other buildings No action for lowest risk structures Solutions should come from coalition-building among stakeholders; not imposed from above

12. What to Do? Some Potential Directions Seek to foster markets for seismic safety – Akin to “green building” movement – coalition building for green buildings Use of rating systems, information disclosure, building credits, and other policy incentives Foster demands for seismically “safe” structures The Societal Challenge: How to foster a seismic safety ethic among building owners, tenants, suppliers, and others?