1. A Secure Ad-hoc Routing Approach using Localized Self-healing Communities Jiejun Kong Mario Gerla Jiejun Kong, * Xiaoyan Hong, Yunjung Yi, Joon-Sang Park, * Jun Liu, Mario Gerla WAM Laboratory Computer Science Department * Computer Science Department University of California, Los Angeles University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa {jkong,yjyi,jspark,gerla}@cs.ucla.edu {jliu,hxy}@cs.ua.edu

2. Problem Statement RREQ flooding attack by non-cooperative members (selfish or intruded member nodes) Direct RREQ floods –Non-cooperative members continuously generate RREQ –RREQ rate limited & packet suppression needed Indirect RREQ floods –RREP & DATA packet loss Caused by rushing attack etc. [Hu et al.,WiSe ’ 03] –Indirectly trigger more RREQ floods Don ’ t blame the RREQ initiator Excessive floods deplete network resource

3. Indirect Attack Example RREQ forwarding –Rushing attackers disobey delay (MAC/routing/queuing) requirements & w/ higher prob., are placed on RREP / DATA path –Can trigger more RREQ floods initiated by other good nodes RREP & DATA packet loss is common in MANET –Hard to differentiate attackers from non-attackers; network dynamics? non-cooperative behaviors? source dest RREQ RREP

4. Outline Related work Community-based secure routing approach –Strictly localized –“ Self-healing community ” substitutes “ single node ” Our analytic model –Asymptotic network security model –Stochastic model for mobile networks Empirical simulation verification Summary

5. Related Secure Routing Approaches Cryptographic protections [TESLA in Ariadne, PKI in ARAN] –Cannot stop non-cooperative network members; They have required credentials / keys Network-based protections –Straight-forward RREQ rate limit [DSR, AODV] Long RREQ interval causes non-trivial routing performance degradation –Multi-path secure routing [Awerbuch,WiSe ’ 02] [Haas,WiSe ’ 03] Not localized, incurs global overhead, expensive Node-disjoint multi-path preferred, but challenging –Rushing Attack Prevention (RAP) [Hu,WiSe ’ 03] RREQ forwarding delayed and randomized to counter rushing Causes large route acquisition delay; less likely to find optimal path

6. Our design Goal: minimize # of allowed RREQ floods –Ideally, 1 initial on-demand RREQ flood for each e2e connection –Maintain comparable routing performance Solution: –Build multi-node communities to counter non- cooperative packet loss –Design applies to wide range of ad hoc routing protocols & various ad hoc networks

7. Community: 2-hop scenario Area defined by intersection of 3 consecutive transmissions Node redundancy is common in MANET –Not unusually high, need 1 “ good ” node inside the community area Community leadership is determined by contribution –Leader steps down (being taken over) if not doing its job (doesn ’ t forward within a timeout T forw ) Community

8. Community: multi-hop scenario The concept of “ self-healing community ” is applicable to multi-hop routing Communities source dest

9. Community Based Security (CBS) End-to-end communication between ad hoc terminals Community -to-community forwarding (not node -to-node ) Challenge: adversary knows CBS prior to its attack –It would prevent the network from forming communities –Network mobility etc. will disrupt CBS

10. On demand initial config Communities formed during RREP –Simple heuristics: promiscuously overheard 3 consecutive (ACKs of) RREP packets  set community membership flag for the connection Goal revisited: reduce the need of RREQ floods –In spite of non-cooperative behavior

11. Community around V formed upon hearing RREP RREQ RREP E  V V E U On demand initial config around V (Potentially non-cooperative) V ’ s community must be formed at RREP –Else V drops RREP and succeeds –V 1 and V 2 need to know V ’ s “ upstream ” V1V1 V2V2 upstream

12. ACK-based config Communities (if C forwards a correct RREP) source dest C C’ C” B D E Communities (C’ and C” not in transmission range & C’ wins)

13. Proactive re-config Each community loses shape due to network dynamics (mobility etc.) End-to-end proactive probing to maintain the shape –PROBE unicast + take-over –PROBE_REP unicast + take-over –Just like RREP Again: reduce the need of RREQ floods –In spite of random mobility & non-cooperative behavior

14. Re-config: 2-hop scenario (PROBE, upstream, … ) (PROBE_REP, hop_count, … ) Old community becomes stale due to random node mobility etc. S D oldF newF Newly re-configured community Node D's roaming trace X no ACK PROBE PROBE_REP

15. Re-config: multi-hop scenario Optimization –Probing message can be piggybacked in data packets –Probing interval T probe adapted on network dynamics Simple heuristics: Slow Increase Fast Decrease source dest PROBEPROBE_REP X no ACK

16. Control flow & Data flow Control flows ’ job –Config communities: RREP –Reconfig communities: PROBE, PROBE_REP (& data packets piggybacked with probe info) –Unicast + take-over DATA –DATA packets –Unicast + make-up (not take-over) [community setup unchanged]

17. Outline Other countermeasures Community-based routing approach –Strictly localized w/ clearly-defined per-hop operation –“ Self-healing community ” substitutes “ single node ” Our analytic model –Asymptotic network security model –Stochastic model for mobile networks Empirical simulation verification Summary

18. Notion: Security as a “landslide” game Played by the guard and the adversary –Proposal can be found as early as Shannon ’ s 1949 paper –Not a 50%-50% chance game, which is too good for the adversary The notion has been used in modern crypto since 1970s –Based on NP-complexity –The guard wins the game with 1 - negligible probability –The adversary wins the game with negligible probability –The asymptotic notion of “ negligible ” applies to one-way function (encryption, one-way hash), pseudorandom generator, zero-knowledge proof, …… AND this time ……

19. Our Asymptotic Network Security Model Concept: the probability of security breach decreases exponentially toward 0 when network metric increases linearly / polynomially Consistent with computational cryptography ’ s asymptotic notion of “ negligible / sub-polynomial ” is negligible by definition x is key length in computational crypto x is network metric (e.g., # of nodes) in network security Definition Definition: A function  : N  R is negligible, if for every positive integer c and all sufficiently large x’ s (i.e., there exists N c >0, for all x>N c ),

20. The Asymptotic Cryptography Model Security can be achieved by a polynomial-bounded guard against a polynomial-bounded adversary 1 2 # of key bits (key length) 128 Probability of security breach negligible sub-polynomial The “negligible” line (sub-polynomial line) Insecure Secure (Ambiguous area) See Lenstra’s analysis for proper key length (given adversary’s brute-force computational power) There are approximately 2 268 atoms in the entire universe

21. Our Asymptotic Network Security Model Conforming to the classic notion of security used in modern cryptography ! We ’ ve used the same security notion Network metric (e.g., # of nodes -- network scale) Probability of network security breach negligible sub-polynomial The “negligible” line (sub-polynomial line) exponential memory-less The “exponential” line (memory-less line) Insecure Secure (Ambiguous area)

22. Mobile network model Divides the network into large number n of very small tiles (i.e., possible “ positions ” ) –A node ’ s presence probability p at each tile is small  Follows a spatial bionomial distribution B(n,p) –When n is large and p is small, B(n,p) is approximately a spatial Poisson distribution with rate  1 –If there are N mobile nodes roaming i.i.d.  N = N·  1 –The probability of exactly k nodes in an area A’

23.  1 in Random Way Point model [Bettstetter et al.] a=1000

24. Community area A heal (left) maximal community –2-hop RREP nodes are (1 +  )·R away –Area approaching (right) minimal community –2-hop RREP nodes are (2 -  )·R away –Area approaching 0 Real world scenarios randomly distribute between these two extremes

25. Modeling adversarial presence  : percentage of non-cooperative network members (e.g., probability of node selfishness & intrusion) 3 random variables –x : number of nodes in the forwarding community area –y : number of cooperative nodes –z : number of non-cooperative nodes

26. Effectiveness of CBS routing Per-hop failure prob. of community -to-community routing is negligible with respect to network scale N Per-hop success prob. of node -to-node ad hoc routing schemes is negligible (under rushing attack) Tremendous gain EG := 1 / negligible approaching + 1

27. Community Based Security In summary, in mobile networks haunted by non-cooperative behavior, community- based security has tremendous ( ) gain ( ) P community P regular N N  

28. QualNet  simulation verification Perfermance metrics –Data delivery fraction, end-to-end latency, control overhead –# of RREQ x -axis parameters –Non-cooperative ratio  –Mobility (Random Way Point Model, speed min=max) Protocol comparison –AODV: standard AODV –RAP-AODV: Rushing Attack Prevention (WiSe ’ 03) –CBS-AODV: Community Based Security

29. Performance Gap CBS-AODV ’ s performance only drops slightly with more non-cooperative behavior Tremendous EG justifies the big gap between CBS-AODV and others %

30. Mobility’s impact

31. Less RREQ In CBS-AODV, # of RREQ triggered is less sensitive to non- cooperative ratio  Enforcing RREQ rate limit is more practical in CBS-AODV %

32. Summary Conventional node -to-node routing is vulnerable to routing disruptions –Excessive but protocol-compliant RREQ floods –Rushing attack + RREP / DATA packet loss The new community -to-community secure routing is our answer –Analytic study approves the community design –Empirical simulation study justifies the analytic results –General design Open challenges –More optimal estimation of forwarding window T forw & probing interval T probe –Secure and efficient key management between two communities

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35. 11 Inspired by Bettstetter et al. ’ s work –For any mobility model (random walk, random way point), Bettstetter et al. have shown that  1 is computable following –For example, in random way point model in a square network area of size a £ a defined by -a/2 · x · a/2 and -a/2 · y · a/2 –  1 is “ location dependent ”, yet computable in NS2 & QualNet given any area A’ (using finite element method)

36. Delivery fraction & Control overhead CBS-AODV ’ s performance only drops slightly with more non-cooperative behavior Tremendous EG justifies the big gap (of delivery fraction & total control overhead) between CBS-AODV and others

37. Latency Route acquisition latency monotonically increases with  AODV ’ s avg. data packet latency drops due to short routes

38. Mobility’s impact CBS ’ s have better delivery fraction –CBS-AODV,cons_flood ’ s cost is too high

39. RREQ limit control In CBS-AODV, # of RREQ triggered is less sensitive to non- cooperative ratio  Enforcing RREQ rate limit is more practical in CBS-AODV

40. Protocol Details Packet format –(RREQ, upstream_node, …… ) –(RREP, hop_count, …… ) –In DSR or AODV, some of the extra fields can be spared

41. Protocol Details Unicast control packets & their ACKs

42. Protocol Details Unicast control flows config/re-config communities –RREP, PROBE, PROBE_REP packets & data packets piggybacked with probe info –Unicast + take-over Data flows –DATA packets –Unicast + make-up (not take-over)