1. Government alternation and legislative agenda setting A presentation by: Alica Jung, Marco Carotta, Juliette Dubois, Katharina Dahms

2. Main questions  What are the reasons for the evolution of the Executive‘s agenda setting power?  Which methods can be used in order to control legislative agendas?  What are the distinctive characteristics of the development?

3. Explanation for the increase of the Executive‘s power in lawmaking  What have been drivers for this evolution?  What are the characteristics of the increase of power?

4. Historical approach  Under which circumstances was the constitution composed?  End of World War II: Italy was deeply divided and ideologically polarized  proportional representation  congruent and symmetric bicameralism  Relatively weak Executive

5. Executive‘s role in lawmaking according to the Italian constitution Ordinary procedure (art.72)  no special role/ same position as any MP according to bill proposal  disadvantage:  Every bill needs to be approved by commitee, floor and other chamber = long procedure Other procedures 1. decentralized 2. decree law 3. delegating law

6. Decentralized procedure (sede legislativa) decentralized procedure (sede legislativa)  whole legislative procedure takes part in the commitee  crucial players: members of commitee (1/5+1), floor (1/10+1), responsibile ministers  veto power  only under the condition of quasi unanimity of commitee and floor  possibility to skip the floor

7. Decrease of decentralized procedure

8. Decree law procedure  under the condition of necessity and urgency (!)  Executive passes a bill without approvement of parliament  60 days for converting the decree law into a regular law  otherwise the former law is valid again  disadvantage: any MP in the committee and floor can propose changes  outcome not what government intended  extensive use of reissuing non converted decrees  Constitutional Court‘s sentence in 1996: reiussing not possibile anymore  Strenghtening the Executive‘s power

9. Development of Decree laws [converted/not converted (reiussed)]

10. Delegating law procedure  a law with a section (delega) that delegates the responsibilty to proclaim a new law (legislative decree)  a general framework and a deadline is given by the parliament  advantage:  last word by Executive  in case the framework of the law is too far from the Executive‘s desires: refusal possible  therefore Executive‘s desires considered in advance  most powerful evidence for the Executive‘s increase of power

11. Delegating laws and deleghe (1963-2007)

12. Modification of executive role:  italian executive was one of the weakest in the world  attempts of the legislative to fight filibustering, obstructionism and centralize the agenda formation  it failed, just strengthened internal bodies  Chamber of deputies did not give the executive a special role

13.  1971:new standing orders: no improvement  end of the 1971: party fragmentation started increasing  1980’s: government still had not any decisive role in planning the business  1988 in Senate, 1990 in chamber of deputies: for the first time executive’s indications were one of the source for planning parliament activity  end of the 1990’s: government won the right to present the conference of group chairpersons  but no special proposal or voting rights about planning parliamentary activity

14. problems:  the amendment is not necessarily the last one and come only from executive  in the senate: executive has as many privileges as the committee  in the chamber of deputies: (beginning 1980’s) abnormal submission of amendments

15. most important change about voting and amendments (1988):  the chamber of deputies standing orders require two distinct voting, the first one on the article and the final on the bill  the so-called maxi amendments

16. Maxi amendments  When was the issue raised ?  In 2004 the President of the Republic reminded us about a principle in the Italian procedure for the vote of law : the bills must be approved section by section.  In this particulare case he reproaches that the articles are two long.  This anomaly is an italian practice called « maxi amendments »

17. What are maxi amendments :  It's a way for the Government to pass laws easier :  at last minute, a single amendment replaces all of the sections of a bill.  To the amendment, a question of confidence is attached so that :  1) the bill has the priority  II) It’s difficult for MPs to vote against

18. Consequences :  Then the processus goes really faster  The final content really looks like what the government wants,  The bargaining equilibrium shifts to the executive area : the executive leads the legislative process

19. Harmful consequences :  Less understandable,  More difficult to amend,  Lack of constitutionality ? (as the pdt said, sections must be. Show a lack of cohesion from the government, which needs a « trick » to pass his laws  Lack of cohesion from the government, which needs a « trick » to pass his laws in the Parliament

20. When did it appear ?  Already existed during the First Republic but is widely utilized during the 2 nd Republic.  At first it concerned only decree laws, but then was extended to any bill.  Started to be used a lot under the 13 th and 14 th legislatures (2 maxi amendments during the 10 th, and 24 during the 14 th ).

21. Budgetary process  A legislative sequence for the vote of budget was defined for the first time in 1978.  Why ? Because of the bad financial results, and the bad management of its provision

22. How does it work ?  They introduced a government financial bill and a financial parliamentary session  The Executive instruments that we've studied before are used aswell for the budget  The procedure was changed 3 times since 1978

23. The rationalization of the budgetary process increased the agenda-setting power of the Presidents of the Chambers and of the Budget Committees.  He can : “declare inadmissible any amendments and additional sections dealing with subjects that are unrelated to the Finance and Budget bills”. decide to set aside the measures unrelated to the subject according to the law. ask to re-table amendments during the Floor aswell.

24. Impact of the introduction of a budgetary process  The importance of the Europeanization makes difficult to estimate the impact  But according to the text, the financial goals established by the money government bills seem to have been substantially respected up to 2001

25. A tentative explanation  Demand of strong executive’s role has met an increase of exceptional instruments  Delegating laws  Deleghe  Degree laws  Big changes in italian political system  End of old parties  New electoral rules (bipolarism)

26. differences between I and II republic  Italian first republic  Only one party can rule : Dc (with ally)  No government will be possible just with Msi and Pci  Only changement during a long period is party fragmentation  Italian second republic  Two broad coalitions  Both coalition can rule

28.  Growing of delegating laws and deleghe in the ‘90  Financial crisis  No integration in european union  No decreasing of deleghe and delegating laws, the alternation had become a real possibility  In ’96 the leftiest coalition in italian history at the government  2001 a center-right coalition righter than Dc

29. Italian policy space: I and II republic

30. What means alternation?  In new government coalition status quo is far enough to overcome the existing transaction costs that plague a still fragmented coalition government, and allow the policy change by a change in the allocation of the agenda setting power.  For some of the government parties could be more convenient a no policy change. A relatively bad decision can be convenient for a party member of the government if it can prevent the alternation.

31. Why until now we have not changed the formal rules?  Formal changes reinforced the Executive:  Some of the new formal rules need to be passed by costitutional laws  The two coalition find a reform useful when they are member of the government and dangerous when they are at opposition.  Pro-executive changes in the parliamentary standing order are easier to be done:  They need only the absolute majority of MP’s(No popular referendum required)  Crucial role of the presidents of the chambers

32. conclusion  Hypothesis is that the istitutional or procedural change follows the same logic of the policy change.  The alternation helps the delegation of the agenda setting power  It changes the set of veto players increasing instability  It introduces a prospective change of veto players in the strategic calculations moving the reverse point farther than the present SQ  We should expect to find a strengthening of the government agenda setting where  The alternation is more frequent  Distance between alternative government is larger  Veto players pareto set is small