1. Illinois Security Lab Critical Infrastructure Protection for Power Carl A. Gunter University of Illinois

2. Illinois Security Lab 2 TCIP Center NSF/DHS/DOE CyberTrust Center scale activity: Trusted Cyber Infrastructure for Power (TCIP) Trusted Cyber Infrastructure for Power (TCIP) Lead UIUC, other participants include Cornell, Dartmouth, and Washington State University C. A. Gunter, B. Sanders (PI), D. Bakken, A. Bose, R. Campbell, G. Gross, C. Hauser, H. Khurana, R. Iyer, Z. Kalbarczyk, K. Nahrstedt, D. Nicol, T. Overbye, P. Sauer, S. Smith, R. Thomas, V. Welch, M. Winslett

3. Illinois Security Lab 3 Power Grid Features –Critical to many other systems –Safety-critical real-time control of energy –Multiple administrative domains –Increasing dependence on computer control –Limited attention to security in legacy systems Similar systems –Oil and gas SCADA systems –Air traffic control system –International financial system –Inter-domain routing system (BGP)

4. Illinois Security Lab 4 Present Infrastructure Control Area Coordinator - 1000’s of RTU/IEDs - Monitor and control generation and transmission equipment 10’s of control areas feed data to coordinator - State estimator creates model from RTU/IED data - Peer coordinators may exchange information for broad model - Degree of sharing may change over time Photos courtesy of John D. McDonald, KEMA Inc.

5. Illinois Security Lab 5 US Grid Infrastructure Edison Electric Institute 03 CAISO RTO WEST ERCOT MISO TVA GRID FLORIDA GRID SOUTH PJM NYSO ISO-NE

6. Public/Private Internet Control Center (EMS) LAN Control Center (EMS) LAN Dedicated Links M/W, Fiber, Dialup, Leased Lines, etc) RTU IEDs Sensors Dedicated Links M/W, Fiber, Dialup, Leased Lines, etc) Level 0 (Sensors and actuators) Level 1 (IED) Level 2 (Substation) Level 3 (Enterprise) Vendor Operator Switched Ethernet LAN Trust Negotiation QoS Mgnt QoS Mgnt Secure and Timely Data Collection, Aggregation, and Monitoring Secure Tunable Hardware Secure Information Distribution AAA Control

7. Illinois Security Lab 7 Grid Communication Protocols

8. Illinois Security Lab 8 IntelliGrid Environments

9. Illinois Security Lab 9 Secure and Reliable Computing Base Architecture Technical challenges motivated by domain specific problems in Ubiquitous exposed infrastructure Real-time data monitoring and control Wide area information coordination and information sharing Must be addressed by developing science in Trustworthy infrastructure for data collection and control Wide-Area Trustworthy Information Exchange Quantitative Validation

10. Illinois Security Lab 10 Sample Research Questions Should the power grid use the Internet? How can we unify power grid simulations and Internet simulations? What are the risks associated with new power grid elements such as networked meters?

11. Illinois Security Lab 11 Pervasive Metering Advanced power meters on the brink of broad deployment No good threat assessments currently exist Corrupt customers, energy service providers, terrorists, and other external agents all highly motivated to attack pervasive meters –Terrorists: Remotely disconnect customers –Service providers: Profile customer loads with high resolution –Customers: Steal electricity Interesting characteristics: Ownership of the meter and its data shared between service provider and customer Potential security architectures applicable to other networked systems –Likely to make use of cutting-edge technologies like trusted platform modules, virtualization, and remote attestation