1. Panel Discussion Safety Culture Richard Lagdon, Chief of Nuclear Safety, Office of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security

2. Panel Members Matthew Moury, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Safety, Security and Quality Programs Office of Environmental Management Don Nichols, Associate Administrator for Safety and Health National Nuclear Security Administration Carol Sohn, Chief Nuclear Safety, Office of Science

3. Safety Culture Overview  Panel Members  Definition  Principles  DNFSB Recommendation 2011-1  Recent Improvements in the Project Management Order  Considerations for Construction Projects 3

4. Safety Culture - Definition An organization’s values and behaviors, modeled by its leaders, and internalized by its members, which serve to make safe performance of work the overriding priority to protect workers, the public, and the environment. DOE Integrated Safety Management Guide 4

5. Safety Culture Attributes Leadership  Demonstrated safety leadership  Risk-informed, conservative decision making  Management engagement and time in field  Staff recruitment, selection, retention, and development  Open communication and fostering an environment free from retribution  Clear expectations and accountability DOE Guide 450.1c, Integrated Safety Management Guide, Attachment 10 5

6. Safety Culture Attributes (Continued) Employee/Worker Engagement  Personal commitment to everyone’s safety  Teamwork and mutual respect  Participation in work planning and improvement  Mindful of hazards and controls 6 DOE Guide 450.1c, Integrated Safety Management Guide, Attachment 10

7. Safety Culture Attributes (Continued) Organizational Learning  Credibility, trust and reporting errors and problems  Effective resolution of reported problems  Performance monitoring through multiple means  Use of operational experience  Questioning attitude DOE Guide 450.1c, Integrated Safety Management Guide, Attachment 10

8. Safety Culture – 2011-1  Initial concern raised by a WTP contractor employee to the DNFSB  Board issued Recommendation 2011-1, Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant  Assert Federal control at the highest level  Conduct an extent of condition review  Conduct a non-adversarial review and determine impact on Safety Culture 8

9. Safety Culture S-1/S-2 Dec 5, 2011 Memo Nuclear Safety at the Department of Energy  DOE is Committed to a strong and sustained safety culture  A strong safety culture is embedded in DOE’s objective of management and operational excellence  No retaliation for raising concerns 9

10. Lessons Learned  Line Management must walk the talk  Have a regular presence in the work place  Show interest when walking the floor  Reward those with the courage to raise issues  Follow up promptly and visibly on all issues raised  Delays in addressing raised issues undermines safety culture  Delays sends the message that line management doesn’t care about safety  Devalues the risk that employee took in raising issue 10

11. New PM Order Improvements & Safety Culture  Design Reviews - Design sufficiently mature prior to CD-2 and reviewed by OECM as part of EIR  Design Maturity - Prior to CD-3 approval, the Final Design must be complete and reviewed to determine that the design is sufficiently mature to start procurement or construction.  Safety Design Strategy - Prepare SDS at CD-1 and update SDS at CD-2 and CD-3;  Code of Record - Created Requirement for definition of the body of requirements for a nuclear project  Design Authority - Defines Design Authority as the engineer who establishes design requirements; provides design control and technical adequacy 11

12. CONSIDERATIONS FOR EXISTING NUCLEAR PROJECTS 12  Business process improvements  Transfer/designation of design authority  Sharing of lessons learned  Establishing expectations Design completion/design margin  Construction Project Reviews  Standard processes for issue identification/resolution  Matching skill sets with the oversight functions  Establishing risk acceptance  Transition from a design/testing organization to construction/commissioning

13. Questions Please comment on this…It appears our safety culture has tilted. In some instances, our greatest nuclear safety risks are upon us – here and now – like liquid radioactive waste in aging tanks – but, we delay addressing those risks by trying to trying to achieve perfection by minimizing the potential of future risks decades from now.

14. Questions Have we gone over the top? Has the nuclear safety culture gone too far with respect to the amount of dollars spent on planning before we actually start construction? Is the nuclear industry pricing themselves out of the market, and within DOE, meeting our nuclear mission and cleanup requirements?

15. Questions Are you aware of instances where the application of a graded approach to Safety has been used successfully to improve the timeliness and cost effectiveness of project delivery? If so, can you provide some information regarding the approach?

16. Questions WTP has received a lot of high-level attention with respect to safety, what fallout for this do you see for the rest of the complex?

17. Questions Do peer reviews have a positive or negative effect on the safety culture at nuclear projects?

18. Questions From a safety culture perspective, how do regulatory oversight organizations hurt or help the nuclear safety culture in DOE?

19. Questions Are there any new nuclear safety regulations coming? If so, will these improve the safety culture in DOE?

20. Questions Is our safety culture on large nuclear projects real or perceived? Are there examples of “just going through the motions” with respect to safety? Your thoughts?

21. Questions Would more widespread use of a design-bid-build project delivery method, as opposed to fast-tracking projects so that design and construction overlap, make Nuclear Safety Management more straightforward? In what way?

22. Questions To what extent are some of our safety culture issues attributable to trying to stretch technology too far, too fast?

23. Questions Would greater use of pilot scale testing of unproven processes help to resolve some of our safety culture problems?