1. Excellences, allow me first to remind you of some relevant information on the present status of peaceful use of nuclear energy within global energy strategy which are, I believe, relevant for a formulation of political position of this group on the topic of nuclear energy and nuclear proliferation. Climatologist demand very large reduction of carbon emissions, about 80% in the next 40-50 years in order to keep the mean global temperature increase below 2 degrees C. Cumulative limit by 2050 on emission appears to be 1000 GtCO2. Most energy analysts find that such replacement of conventional sources cannot be done, in this period at least, by renewable sources alone. For this task energy mix including nuclear energy, fission and fusion and fossil energy with carbon capture and storage (CCS) are considered. As CCS and fusion energy are not likely to be developed for serious contribution to carbon emission reduction in the next 50 years, established nuclear fission energy, in spite of temporary setback, must be given serious consideration. Most energy analysts see nuclear fission energy in a future energy mix.

2. Nuclear fission energy pro and contra 1. Nuclear fission energy, in peaceful use since 1957, with decades of operating experience as proven energy source (430 reactors in operation producing about 15% of world electricity) can give a serious contribution to carbon emission reduction in the next 50 years. 2. Present nuclear reactors, mostly light water reactors require enriched uranium for their operation. Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to extract plutonium is seen as requirement in the longer term due to limitation of uranium resources. 3. Both enrichment and reprocessing technologies have been for many years (International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Study 1978/80) recognized as proliferation sensitive. They were indeed used to acquire nuclear weapons and widen the circle of NW countries beyond the initial five recognized as such in NPT. (India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel, South Africa).

3. Relevant recent developments Recent developments in the field of nuclear energy indicate that the connection between peaceful use of nuclear energy and proliferation can be broken and that political understanding for acceptance of required measures is developing. Internationalization of all enrichment installation would resolve part of the problem. Growing danger of nuclear terrorism may induce leading NW countries demanding inspection of enrichment installations in NNW countries, to accept international control of their own installations. Before that the establishment of Nuclear Fuel Agency (“reserve fuel bank”, proposed by IAEA 2006) to supply nuclear fuel for peaceful use of nuclear energy to any country, without political bias and at correct costs, with only requirement on recipient country to accept IAEA controls and inspections, would discourage construction of national enrichment installations. Recent analysis and data about uranium resources (see background papers) show that reprocessing of spent fuel to recover plutonium for recycle or for breeder reactors is not required before about 2065. Conventional proven reactors without reprocessing of spent fuel, running on uranium resources as estimated in 2008, can in the period to 2065 give very serious contribution to carbon emission reduction (over 30% in 2065). This would give about 50 years to develop institutions and measures to ensure safe use and handling of plutonium after 2065, should this be required and close the second proliferation route. Dependence on improved conventional reactors for the next 50 years with their high safety standards is also in accord with lessons of Fukushima. In spite of some attractive non- proliferation features of some Generation 4 reactor types, they cannot give very large contribution to carbon emission reduction before 2065, especially not in technologically less advanced countries. Important lesson of Chernobyl and Fukushima is that nuclear safety cannot be internal issue of the country deciding to build a reactor. Some kind of obligatory international licensing should be considered as a solution

4. Summary To summarize; nuclear fission energy has a great potential for mitigation of climate change but the technology can also be a stepping stone for production of nuclear explosive. Present status of nuclear technology and of nuclear resources offer the possibility for safe use of the important nuclear mitigation potential by large expansion of peaceful nuclear energy while avoiding parallel expansion of proliferation dangers. Proliferation is a political problem and must be resolved by political measures.Nevertheless it can be made more difficult and less attractive by implementation of technically possible measures strongly indicated by present status of nuclear energy. They are not technical fixes; they need political understanding and consensus. They may seem much to ask at this moment,, although they are much more modest than what “nuclear fathers” were proposing in 1946. Hope lies in recognition of common benefits. Short titles of antiproliferation measures: Creation of International Nuclear Fuel Agency (probably by extension of IAEA mandate). Postponement of spent fuel reprocessing for about 50 years International licensing of nuclear reactors Hoping for your understanding, comments and support Thank you for your attention

5. Proposed contribution to conference Declaration A possible connection between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons results from two proliferation sensitive nuclear technologies, recognized as such in the early International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation study (INFCE 1978/80). They are uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing for extraction of plutonium. Both technologies were in the past used to produce nuclear weapons. In view of Iran crisis uranium enrichment is now in the forefront, with some new ideas about solutions. We support the idea of creating an International Nuclear Fuel Agency, probably as extension of IAEA mandate, that would supply nuclear fuel to any country signatory of NPT and accepting IAEA inspections, inclusive Additional Protocol, without any political bias and delays, and at correct price. This would be the step towards the final goal of internationalizing, respectively abandoning all national enrichment installations. A boost in that direction would be given by progress in CTBT and FMCT as confirmation of sincere nuclear disarmament intentions. We call for new efforts to ratify CTBT and remove verification differences on FMCT. As for the second possible path to nuclear weapons through plutonium extraction, we are convinced that nuclear energy can give serious contribution to carbon emission reduction required to keep global temperature increase below 2 degrees centigrade without introduction of nuclear fuel reprocessing and plutonium use at least until 2065. Should the future development of renewable sources, of nuclear fusion and carbon capture and storage (CCS) be insufficient for effective climate control without nuclear energy, 50 years until 2065 would be available to develop international institutions to assure safe use of plutonium if needed. Also, in view of recent events in Fukushima and earlier at Chernobyl we think that nuclear reactor safety must be recognized as being of international concern and subject to international law, as the effects of accidents do not respect national boundaries. We would support the efforts to negotiate and introduce obligatory international licensing for future reactor construction in any country