Type-based Taint Analysis for Java Web Applications Wei Huang, Yao Dong and Ana Milanova Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 1.

Type-based Taint Analysis for Java Web Applications Wei Huang, Yao Dong and Ana Milanova Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 1

Taint Analysis for Java Web Applications Tracks flows from untrusted sources to sensitive sinks ◦ Such flows can cause SQL-injection, Cross-site scripting, other attacks 2 Untrusted input Sensitive sinks unsanitized SOURCES : ServletRequest.getParameter(), etc. SOURCES : ServletRequest.getParameter(), etc. SINKS : Statement.execute(), etc SINKS : Statement.execute(), etc

SQL Injection HttpServletRequest req =...; Statement stat =...; String user = req.getParameter(“user”); String query = “SELECT * FROM Users WHERE name = “ + user; stat.execute(query); Tainted input “John OR 1=1” SELECT * FROM Users WHERE name = John OR 1 = 1 SELECT * FROM Users WHERE name = John OR 1 = 1 3

Work on Taint Analysis Finding Security Vulnerabilities with Static Analysis [Livshits and Lam, Usenix Security’05] TAJ [Tripp et al. PLDI’09] F4F [Sridharan et al. OOPSLA’11] Andromeda [Tripp et al. FASE’13] TAJ, F4F and Andromeda are included in a commercial tool from IBM, called AppScan 4

Issues with Existing Work Dataflow and points-to based approaches Reflection Libraries Frameworks 5

Our Type-based Taint Analysis SFlow: a type system SFlowInfer: inference tool for SFlow ◦ Takes Java program where sources are typed tainted and sinks are typed safe ◦ Infers SFlow types for the rest of the variables ◦ If inference succeeds --- no flows from sources to sinks ◦ If it fails with type errors --- potential flows Easily and effectively handles reflection, libraries and frameworks 6

Inference and Checking Framework 7 Unified Typing Rules Set-Based Solver Extract Typing Type Checking Parameters Instantiated Rules Set-based Solution Concrete Typing Program Source Annotated Libraries Annotated Libraries Immutability (ReIm) Universe Types (UT) Ownership Types (OT) SFlow AJ EnerJ More? Immutability (ReIm) Universe Types (UT) Ownership Types (OT) SFlow AJ EnerJ More?

SFlowInfer The instantiated inference tool Detects (or verifies the absence of) information flow violations Java source Annotated Libraries SFlowInfer Result Sources and Sinks 8

SQL Injection HttpServletRequest req =...; Statement stat =...; tainted String user = req.getParameter(“user”); tainted String query = “SELECT * FROM Users WHERE name = “ + user; stat.execute(query); Source: the return value is tainted Type error! Sink: the parameter is safe Subtyping: safe <: tainted Subtyping: safe <: tainted 9

Contributions SFlow: A context-sensitive type system for secure information flow SFlowInfer: An inference algorithm for SFlow ◦ SFlowInfer is an effective taint analysis tool Implementation and evaluation 10

Outline SFlow type system Inference algorithm for SFlow Handling of reflection, libraries and frameworks Implementation and evaluation 11

SFlow Type Qualifiers tainted: A variable x is tainted, if there is flow from an untrusted source to x safe: A variable x is safe if there is flow from x to a safe sink poly: The polymorphic qualifier, can be instantiated to tainted or safe safe <: poly <: tainted 12

Instantiated Typing Rules for SFlow (TCALL) T Viewpoint adaptation accounts for context sensitivity. q y is the context of adaptation. Additional constraints… 13

Set-based Solver Set Mapping S : ◦ variable  {tainted, poly, safe} Iterates over statements s ◦ Removes infeasible qualifiers for each variable in s according to the typing rule Until reaches a fixpoint, and outputs ◦ Type errors if one or more variables get assigned the empty set, or ◦ A set-based solution 16

From Stanford Securibench-micro 17 StringBuffer buf; … foo(buf, buf, resp, req); void foo(StringBuffer b, StringBuffer b2, ServletResponse resp, ServletRequest req) { String name; name = req.getParameter(NAME);//source b.append(name); PrintWriter writer = resp.getWriter(); String str = b2.toString(); writer.println(str); //sink } StringBuffer buf; … foo(buf, buf, resp, req); void foo(StringBuffer b, StringBuffer b2, ServletResponse resp, ServletRequest req) { String name; name = req.getParameter(NAME);//source b.append(name); PrintWriter writer = resp.getWriter(); String str = b2.toString(); writer.println(str); //sink }

From Stanford Securibench-micro 22 StringBuffer buf; … foo(buf, buf, resp, req); void foo(StringBuffer b, StringBuffer b2, ServletResponse resp, ServletRequest req) { String name; name = req.getParameter(NAME);//source b.append(name); PrintWriter writer = resp.getWriter(); String str = b2.toString(); writer.println(str); //sink, BAD! } StringBuffer buf; … foo(buf, buf, resp, req); void foo(StringBuffer b, StringBuffer b2, ServletResponse resp, ServletRequest req) { String name; name = req.getParameter(NAME);//source b.append(name); PrintWriter writer = resp.getWriter(); String str = b2.toString(); writer.println(str); //sink, BAD! }

Set-based Solver 23 {tainted,poly,safe} StringBuffer buf; … foo(buf, buf, resp, req); void foo({tainted,poly,safe} StringBuffer b, {tainted,poly,safe} StringBuffer b2, ServletResponse resp, ServletRequest req) { {tainted,poly,safe} String name; name = req.getParameter(NAME);//source b.append(name); PrintWriter writer = resp.getWriter(); {tainted,poly,safe} String str = b2.toString(); writer.println(str); //sink, BAD: flow from source! } {tainted,poly,safe} StringBuffer buf; … foo(buf, buf, resp, req); void foo({tainted,poly,safe} StringBuffer b, {tainted,poly,safe} StringBuffer b2, ServletResponse resp, ServletRequest req) { {tainted,poly,safe} String name; name = req.getParameter(NAME);//source b.append(name); PrintWriter writer = resp.getWriter(); {tainted,poly,safe} String str = b2.toString(); writer.println(str); //sink, BAD: flow from source! }

Set-based Solver 28 {tainted,poly,safe} StringBuffer buf; … foo(buf, buf, resp, req); void foo({tainted,poly,safe} StringBuffer b, {tainted,poly,safe} StringBuffer b2, ServletResponse resp, ServletRequest req) { {tainted,poly,safe} String name; name = req.getParameter(NAME);//source b.append(name); PrintWriter writer = resp.getWriter(); {tainted,poly,safe} String str = b2.toString(); writer.println(str); //sink } {tainted,poly,safe} StringBuffer buf; … foo(buf, buf, resp, req); void foo({tainted,poly,safe} StringBuffer b, {tainted,poly,safe} StringBuffer b2, ServletResponse resp, ServletRequest req) { {tainted,poly,safe} String name; name = req.getParameter(NAME);//source b.append(name); PrintWriter writer = resp.getWriter(); {tainted,poly,safe} String str = b2.toString(); writer.println(str); //sink } Type error! tainted or poly str cannot be assigned to safe parameter!

Set-based Solver (Cont’d) What if the set-based solver terminates without a type error? Extract the maximal typing from set-based solution according to preference ranking tainted > poly > safe ◦ If S(x) = {poly, safe} the maximal typing types x poly Unfortunately, the maximal typing for SFlow does not always type-check 29

Maximal Typing class A { {String f; {String get(A this) { return this.f; } A y =...; String x = y.get(); writer.println(x); // sink Unfortunately, the maximal typing for SFlow does not always type-check! 31

Maximal Typing (Cont’d) class A { {poly} String f; {poly,safe} String get({poly,safe} this) { return this.f; } {tainted,poly,safe} A y =...; {safe} String x = y.get(); writer.println(x); 32

Maximal Typing (Cont’d) class A { {poly} String f; {poly,safe} String get({poly,safe} this) { return this.f; } {tainted,poly,safe} A y =...; {safe} String x = y.get(); writer.println(x); 33

Maximal Typing (Cont’d) class A { {poly} String f; {poly,safe} String get({poly,safe} this) { return this.f; } {tainted,poly,safe} A y =...; {safe} String x = y.get(); writer.println(x); ✗ 34

Method Summary Constraints Reflect the relations between parameters and return values Further remove infeasible qualifiers String id(String p) { String x = p; return x; } 35

Method Summary Constraints (Cont’d) class A { {poly} String f; {poly,safe} String get({poly,safe} this) { return this.f; } {tainted,poly,safe} A y =...; {safe} String x = y.get(); writer.println(x); 36

Method Summary Constraints (Cont’d) class A { {poly} String f; {poly,safe} String get({poly,safe} this) { return this.f; } {tainted,poly,safe} A y =...; {safe} String x = y.get(); writer.println(x); ✔ 37

Reflection, Libraries and Frameworks Reflective object creation is easy! There is no need to abstract heap objects! Flow from x to y is reflected through subtyping x <: y 39 X x = (X)Class.forName(“str”).newInstance(); x.f = a; // a is a source y = x; b = y.f; // b is a sink

Reflection, Libraries and Frameworks (Cont’d) Libraries (JDK, third-party, frameworks) Unknown library methods are typed poly, poly  poly safe l = r.m(r1,r2) l = r.m(tainted r1,r2) 40

Reflection, Libraries and Frameworks (Cont’d) Frameworks (e.g., Struts, Spring) ◦ Framework classes/interfaces are subclassed/implemented in web application code Superclass-subclass relation is handled using function subtyping constraints UserAction.execute(ActionForm userForm) <: Action.execute(tainted ActionForm form) entails form <: userForm //userForm is tainted 41

Implementation Built in inference and checking framework for pluggable types [Huang et al. ECOOP’12] ◦ Instantiated framework with SFlow ◦ Built on top of the Checker Framework [Papi et al. ISSTA’08, Dietl et al. ICSE’11] Publicly available at ◦ http://code.google.com/p/type-inference/ 43

Evaluation DroidBench ◦ A suit of 39 Android apps by [Arzt et al. PLDI’14 ] for evaluating taint analysis for Android Java web applications ◦ Stanford Securibench: a suit by Ben Livshits designed for evaluating taint analysis ◦ Other web applications from previous work ◦ 13 web applications comprising 473kLOC 44

DroidBench [ Arzt et al. PLDI’14 ] Tool NameAppScanFortify SCAFlowDroi d SFlowInfer Correct warning ✔ 14172628 False warning ✖ 5449 Missed flow 141120 Precision ✔ /( ✔ + ✖ ) 74%81%86%76% Recall ✔ /( ✔ +) 50%61%93%100% SFlowInfer outperforms AppScan and Fortify SCA FlowDroid [ Arzt et al. PLDI’14 ] is flow-sensitive ◦ DroidBench is designed for flow sensitivity 45

Java Web Applications We manually examined all type errors Parameter Manipulation / SQL Injection ◦ 7 benchmarks have no type errors ◦ 66 type errors correspond to true flows ◦ Average false positive rate: 15% Parameter Manipulation / XSS ◦ 8 benchmarks have no type errors ◦ 143 type errors correspond to true flows ◦ Average false positive rate: 4% 46

Runtime Performance SFlowInfer takes less than 3 minutes on all but 2 benchmarks Largest benchmark, photov 126kLOC, takes 640 seconds ◦ Can be optimized Maximal heap size is set to 2GB! 47

Conclusion A type system for secure information flow An efficient type inference algorithm ◦ Effective taint analysis tool Evaluation on 473kLOC Publicly available at ◦ http://code.google.com/p/type-inference/ 48

Type-based Taint Analysis for Java Web Applications Wei Huang, Yao Dong and Ana Milanova Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 1.

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Type-based Taint Analysis for Java Web Applications Wei Huang, Yao Dong and Ana Milanova Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 1.

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