1. Discussion of paper “Contracting between corporate sponsors and academic researchers” by J. Bercovitz and B. Tyler Simcha Jong University Lecturer Centre for Enterprise and the Management of Innovation University College London

2. General comments Clearly focused paper

3. General overview of paper Use transaction cost economics (TCE) theory to better understand organization of relationships between corporate sponsors and academic researchers Indeed, this is an important issue worth studying given growing importance of such relationships and TCE theory indeed highlights some interesting challenges sponsors and academic institutions face in organizing their relationships Study uses unique dataset, and is well executed

4. Points for discussion Discussion of extent to which goals are achieved; –TCE is about how actors structure transactions/relationships in order to prevent holdups, opportunistic behavior, etc. –Findings of paper are certainly not inconsistent with TCE theory, however; It is hardly surprising that if legal provisions are available to protect IP rights of sponsors, they will seek to use them (H1&H2) What is more interesting from a TCE perspective is the question how do sponsors protect themselves from information asymmetries, monitoring problems, etc. when such legal provisions are not available Minor points; –Greater number of prior sponsored interaction, the greater the limits and/or allowable pubs; interesting! –Sample non-clinical contract; however, clinical faculty included; clarification