Presentation on theme: "Active Shooter and 4th/5th Generation Warfare"— Presentation transcript:
1 Active Shooter and 4th/5th Generation Warfare How to minimize loss of lifeas crime and terrorism blendA Resource for Law Enforcement
2 CreditsPeople: Chief Bert DuVernay, Sergeant Michael Conti, John Giduck, Colonel Thomas Hammes, LTC Dave Grossman, John Holschen, Captain Al Sharon, Chuck Remsberg, Chief Richard Fairburn, Todd Rassa, Lt. Frank Borelli, Paul Howe, Nick Minzghor, Keith Jones, Sgt. Allan Garcia, Dr. Laurence MillerOrganizations: PoliceOne.com, LAPD, AIS/Prism, NTOA, ILEETA, IL SP Academy, NC DOJ
3 Purpose The purpose of this resource is to: Familiarize law enforcement officers and command staffs about trends in active shooter/terrorist eventsHelp them to understand the nature of emerging threatsSuggest plans and training that will minimize the loss of life in these eventsThis resource is not meant as training in and of itself. Training for these events is a complex endeavor in which there is no substitute for hands-on work. There are many good organizations that can provide such training.We aren’t trying to tell you how to train and plan, but rather what to plan and train for.
4 How to use this resource There is a lot of information here!In some cases you may want to use this as a presentation as it is, but in most cases you will probably want to use this file as a resource as you construct your own material for a specific audience.Cut, paste and modify slides and the information on them as you wish.
5 Active shooter as we know it A review of basic principles and issues Part 1Active shooter as we know itA review of basic principles and issues
6 What is an active shooter? A situation where one or more people are in the process of causing death or injury or posing an immediate danger thereofNot a hostage situationNot a stand offNot a barricaded perpetratorBut can transition to one of these
7 What’s different about it? Danger is immediateCannot wait for SWATMust act now to save livesA “come as you are” affair for respondersWeapons, equipment, skills, mindset, physical conditionYou have less than a minute to actYou’re it! This is what they pay you for!
8 Rapid Deployment response The Rapid Deployment (R/D) active shooter response came out of the Columbine tragedyPre Columbine, post SWAT: establish perimeter and call SWATPost Columbine: neutralize the threatTheory originally out of LAPD/NTOAMany variations on the theme exist today
9 Active Shooter priority change Normal LE prioritiesOfficer safetyHostage/public safetyPerpetrator apprehensionPerpetrator safetyActive shooter LE prioritiesNeutralize perpetrator
10 Rapid Deployment concept Imperative:Stop the violence NOWTheory of operation:Enter structure with minimally safe teamMove quickly to sounds/source of violenceSearch only when source of violence unknownMove past victims and threats (IEDs, etc.)Engage and neutralize perpetrators
11 Responding to scene Describe situation to dispatch Position vehicle to take in information and communicate with facility authority- preplan who that isActivate ICSWait for more officers?
12 Ideal situation First officer on scene is initial commander Has most informationDirects other responding unitsHands off command to supervisorEntry team(s): 4 officersLarger buildings have multiple teams enter different entrances (note comms issue)Rescue team: 4 later-responding officersAd-hoc ICS-commander outsideEveryone can communicate with each other
13 Reality It may be you or 2 of you You can’t wait for ICS or supervisor Your radio talks to whomever it doesNo rescue teamChaos will reignYour Job 1 is to neutralize the perpetrator
14 Moving to structure Do not be in tight formation Spread out patrol-likeUtilize cover and leapfroggingDo you know how?Maintain areas of control with muzzleNo hard rulesForm up at breach point
15 Movement formationsMost R/D instruction is based on officers moving through the structure in one or more teams of 4 officersMost R/D instruction spends most of its time on teaching officers to move effectively as a team, either searching as they go or moving to the sound of gunfireA lot of emotional energy is spent defending one movement formation vs. another
16 4 officer movement Diamond formation Looks cool, military likeFront officer exposed going by doorsOften falls apart at cornersMost everyone moves into a T anywayT formation – probably the best of a bad situationLong gun ideally at front center and rearTeam leaderIn center or at wingDesignates a comms officer
19 1-2 officer movement Fewer officers = more risk You go with what you have“Formation” is fluid and dependent on environmentAll officers need to have basic searching/clearing/movement training…Both alone and as part of a team
20 Principles, not specific tactics Use normal building clearing techniques when searchingOnly fasterStructure movement principlesMuzzle orientated to general area of dangerAll areas of responsibility (AOR) coveredScan areas as you pass themALWAYS with a high or low ready—muzzle not pointed at innocents!T intersections: wings pie both ways; lead pies in direction of travelX intersections: make a choice!Stairs: normal clears for typeEmphasis on flow and speed
21 Room entry principles Stack if door open Wings enter or wing/point entryDoor closed: get one PO to try door knobPie through door glass if you crossEntryStructured: criss-cross vs. button hookUnstructured: whatever the other officer doesn’t doMaintain AORDrive to corners (often advisable)Triangulate on suspectSpeed: AVOID FATAL FUNNEL
22 As you move Students/workers will be running past you Detain them and gather intelWhere? How many? Race? Sex? Weapons? Clothing?Pass by injured, dead and dyingMight be your friends, relatives, or even childrenPass by IEDsSprinklers will be spraying, noises will be loud, chaos will be everywhereFocus on your goalCommunicate your progress
23 Contact teamIf bad guys are shooting, you know where they are – move to them quicklyBypass other rooms and areasIf they are not shootingA. Use your intel (verbal, visual, radio) to move quickly to them, orB. Slow down and do quick entries/searches as you moveChallenge or engage when you encounter themIf life not in imminent danger, transition to SWAT mode
24 Rescue team Follows entry team Fire/EMS personnel rescue team issues Removes victims (including officers)Must be capable of becoming contact team if perpetrators encounteredFire/EMS personnel rescue team issuesNon-swornNo tactical skillsNo trainingArmed?Not likely to enter an un-secured area anywayTEMS exceptions
25 Typical movement mistakes Not moving smoothlyGetting too tenseMoving too fast; moving too slowFailing to communicate with each otherEvery officer trying to command the teamMoving into each other’s line of fireNot maintaining areas of responsibilityBreaking roleTraining is the key!
26 Non-active shooter events Life NOT in imminent dangerIsolate and contain subjectCall in specialized resourcesUse the 4Cs: Contain/Control/Communicate/Call SWAT
27 Multiple jurisdictional response Issues to be sorted out AHEAD of time:Notification mechanismCommand structureCommunication capabilityLegal agreements/MOUsTactics commonalityRoles and responsibilitiesJoint training exercisesAnd so on…
28 To ponder…“In SWAT, making entry is the last option. In R/D, we’re asking minimally trained officers to use SWAT’s last option as their first.”These skills are perishable. Do you have a policy and schedule for regular training?Do other responding agencies?
29 R/D largely untestedR/D used but few times. Out of 80 active shooter events from , 44 had detailed info*:Southfield, MI – R/D positive outcomeWilliamsport, PA – moot outcomeBethel, AK – R/D positive outcomeLA, CA – negative outcome – friendly casualtiesSpokane, WA – R/D positive outcome (POSA source)*Rapid Deployment as a Response to an Active Shooter Incident,Illinois SP Academy, Richard Fairburn, 2003
30 ISP study* conclusions Most incidents over by the time first officers on sceneImmediate action by on-scene officers most likely to have positive effectBut SROs not usually chosen for their “warrior” qualitiesIsrael had similar problemsThey arm the populationThey arm the teachersSchools are no longer targetsR/D success chances heightened by rifle*Rapid Deployment as a Response to an Active Shooter Incident,Illinois SP Academy, Richard Fairburn, 2003
31 Since 2003Multiple active shooter incidents per year, including Virginia Tech (VT)In most, all killing was done before the first officers got to the scene
32 Implications of the data Training in Rapid Deployment/Active Shooter tactics, while necessary, is unlikely to minimize loss of lifeThe most important thing you can do to save lives is pre-event work with facilities, so that they take action immediately to execute their plan (details later in this resource)
33 Prepared school staffs the key courtesy of School Violence Solutions www.schoolviolencesolutions.com The truth is the educational staffs can do more to mitigate the loss of life than the police, due to being on scene when the shooting startsThe need for training the educational staff in every school in how to recognize, react to and prevent active shooter events is CRITICALPassing out a comprehensive school safety plan to school staffs is simply not enough preparation/training for an active shooter event!Training EVERY member of the school community is paramount!
34 The Rhode Island model courtesy of School Violence Solutions www The Rhode Island model courtesy of School Violence SolutionsGovernor’s Statewide Steering Committee formedCurricula created to instruct educational staffs statewideMulti-media learning modules are given to hundreds of educators throughout the state during six training sessionsSchools are now mandated to perform lockdown drills and training. Sanctions apply if not performedAdditional training for teachers and staff in schools continues
35 Active shooter as a terrorist event Where we’re headed Part 2Active shooter as a terrorist eventWhere we’re headed
36 Crime to 4th gen. warfareUntil now in the U.S., active shooter incidents have been crimes perpetrated by individuals for their own purposesBut future active shooter incidents will include persons perpetrating 4G and even 5G warfare
37 What is 4G warfare? One definition (there are many): “The loss of the state's monopoly on war and on the first loyalty of its citizens, and the rise of non-state entities that command people’s primary loyalty and that wage war. These entities may be gangs, religions, races and ethnic groups within races, localities, tribes, business enterprises, ideologies—the variety is almost limitless”William S. Lind Strategic Defense Initiative
38 Warfare generationsThere are several different schemes that divide history into generational periods of warfare, and these schemes often differ in the characteristics of warfare that they use to define its generations.What follows is one popular scheme, provided for context.
39 1G to 3G Warfare 1st Generation Warfare-up to WWI Armies fought attrition-based battles at close range with individual and squad-level weapons (cannons)2nd Generation Warfare-WWIArmies fought attrition-based battles at close range with large-scale weapons support (chemicals, bombs, etc.) and mechanized transport (e.g., railroads)3rd Generation Warfare-WWIILarge-scale maneuvers (e.g. the blitzkrieg)Long range weapons targeting enemy infrastructure
40 4th generation warfareCarried out by small cells that blend with the population—not by armiesFundamentally a political endeavorSeeks to destroy the will of the enemies decision makers—not to defeat its militaryExamples: Mao, al-Queda; I.R.A.; SandinistasTerrorism is a tactic of, not a synonym for, 4GWCo-opting the media is a crucial element of 4GW
41 5th generation warfareThere are many different definitions of 5th generation warfare, but they all agree that actions undertaken by individuals of their own initiative will be a salient characteristic of it.That is the important attribute of 5GW for our purposes.
42 4/5GW and active shooters Active shooter tactics are essentially the same as terrorist tactics: kill a lot of innocent people indiscriminatelyBut a 4/5GW terrorist incident will be better planned and resourced than a lone (or a couple of) active shooter(s)
43 Self-deployment (5G warfare) examples MD / VA snipersLAX / El Al incident onRichard Reed (the “Shoe Bomber”)Vehicle attack at UNC-Chapel Hill,Seattle shootings,Vehicle attacks in SF-Fremont area,
44 What to expect?Our enemies freely tell us what they are planning and want to accomplish!We have merely to pay attention…And come out of denialMost public officials have taken a “downplay, deny and deflect” position
45 Captured al-Queda tapes Produced for internal use, not propagandaIncluded:Live-fire room entryLive-fire/role-player scenariosAny resistance was met with being shotAssassination scenariosKidnapping trainingNo presumed compliance from victimsExplosives plantingPrisoner handling: search, control and execution
46 al-Queda tapes (2) Commands given in English Prisoners begging for their lives in EnglishDistraction devices preceding entryMultiple breach pointsTargeting LE officers in ambushes using “disabled” vehicle as ploy, then sounding horn to initiate assaultScenarios on 6-lane highways at clover-leafs (to facilitate exfiltration)There are few such highways in the Middle East
47 al-Queda tapes (3) Security/overwatch elements to shoot responding LE Residential and golf course assassinationsUse of storm drains and sewers for exfiltrationMuch practice on assault of buildings with a large number of occupants, including inconspicuous movement to entry points (weapons hidden)Anyone giving any trouble at all is shotExecuting hostages in front of the mediaOften no exfiltration plans for buildings – they plan to kill everyone and die in place
48 Take-home lessonWhile terrorist plans for large-scale events including WMD are certainly in place…They are preparing smaller-scale attacks by small groups with various small arms and planted explosives in populated buildings, particularly schools
49 Why schools? Our Values Our Lack of Preparation The most sacred thing to us are our childrenKilling hundreds of children will boost the terrorist’s morale and lower ours, leaving us stunnedOur Lack of PreparationPolice deal with crime, but school attacks are war actsPolice are generally not preparedSociety hasn’t come to grips with terrorism on U.S. soil
50 Why schools? (2)al-Qaeda has said they have the right to kill millions of American childrenal-Qaeda terrorists have been video-taped practicing school takeovers and issuing commands in EnglishSome Islamic religious literature condones killing children if it is done for the “general good”Target scouting and infiltration efforts have already reportedly occurred
51 School assault model-Beslan A dress rehearsal has already taken place in 2004 in Beslan, Russia where 172 children were killedLarge buildings with complicated floor plans are preferred—they are harder to counter assaultIn Beslan, over 1,000 people were held hostage by 100 terrorists for three days without food or water
52 Beslan (2)Started as at least 4 vehicle, 36 person “active shooter” attackAdditional 40+ terrorists in crowdOne police officer, one security officer present, both armed only with handguns, both killed immediatelySecured building in 15 minutes with over 1000 hostages
54 Beslan (3)Terrorist snipers and RPGs were immediately positioned in strategic locations once the school was takenTerrorists’ weapons included AK-47s, sniper rifles, rocket propelled grenades and explosivesHostages’ cell phones were takenAdults and teachers were separated from children to keep complete controlIntel spotters were in crowd
56 Beslan (4)Attempts at negotiation by responders were used by the terrorists to buy time to fortify the schoolAll entrances and many stairwells were booby trapped with explosivesChildren were used as shields by snipersThe terrorists used amphetamines to stay awake
57 Beslan (5) 11 hours of fighting, 8 hours of heavy fighting Women and older children were repeatedly rapedAdult males and large boys were made to help fortify the school, then they were shotOver 330 persons killed and over 660 persons injured
59 Beslan (6)When troops stormed the school, troops and children were gunned downExplosions started many firesTrip wires connected to explosives slowed the assaultTerrorists broke into three groupsOne group attempted to escape by dressing in hostage’s clothingOne group attempted to fight off the rescue teamsOne group focused on killing the hostages by shooting them and detonating explosives
61 Beslan lessons Terrorists were well prepared Reconnaissance started months in advanceGained tactical superiority quicklyExcellent tactics were employedTerrorists were well trained
62 Beslan lessons (2) Terrorists had effective communication equipment Terrorists were well funded; reports indicate al-Qaeda fundingHad learned from prior incidentsHad gas masksBroke out windows to negate gas effects
63 Schools are real targets bin Laden has promised that Beslan will happen to the U.S. many times overFirst 6 months of 2006 alone: 204 schools attacked in Afghanistan: more than 300 schools attacked in TurkeyFloor plans for schools in VA, TX and NJ have been recovered from terrorists in Iraq
64 What’s likely here?Terrorists striking simultaneously at multiple schools, or:a Beslan-type attack with fewer terrorists but better bombsMiddle schools without a police presence are preferredThe girls are big enough to rape; the students are not big enough to fight back; staffed largely by femalesPreferred targets are states that do not allow concealed carry of firearms, have no hunting culture, and where the police do not carry riflesRural areas are favored because of the delayed response time for police to arrive in forceSchools with external surveillance cameras are preferred so terrorists can observe the LE response
65 What’s likely here? (2)As they seize the school, the attackers will initially kill every teacher and many of the students they seeThey will rape, murder and toss the bodies outside, as was done in BeslanThey will plant bombs throughout the school, and on studentsEmergency responders and fleeing children will be blown up by car bombs in the parking lot100 to 300 children could be killed on the first strikeThe terrorists are likely already here, many having crossed over the border with Mexico
66 What’s likely here? (3)Fully automatic weapons placed in over-watch positionsFaux “negotiations” to buy time for fortification and PR valueThey expect to fight and die there, not negotiate their way outThey know that Americans will not assault if “negotiations” are going wellLogical SWAT entry points heavily fortified with bombsWill force SWAT entry by starting to kill children
67 Skewed priorities U.S. schools extensively guard against fire Fire drillsSprinkler systemsBuilding codes, etc.Yet not one child had died from fire in any U.S. school in over 25 years (excluding dorm fires)Well over 200 deaths have occurred by active shooters in the same period hereBut training and preparation for these events meets with stiff resistance and denial
69 DeterAn armed police presence in a school is a strong deterrence against attackThe terrorists are willing to die, but they don’t want to die without completing their tactical objective. They want a high body countUnarmed security in a school is pointless
70 DetectThey have to live among us, plan the event and recon the facility. Alert police officers are essential.Follow good patrol procedures on traffic stops:Ask probing questions, be alert for contradictions, inconsistencies, unduly nervous behavior. Be aware of the inside of the vehicle and the people in itWatch for signs of surveillance on potential targets. Terrorists always conduct recon and may use cameras and camcordersSome terrorists are blue-eyed blonds who may not fit the usual profileHave the school report any inquiries about security practices. It could be a recon event.
71 Detect (2)In order to avoid failure or embarrassment, they will plan extensivelyInfo gathering (libraries, public records, etc.), recon, dry runsFor example, in Miami, two Saudi “students” who spoke English well, climbed onto a school bus and refused to get off. When the police arrived, they said they thought is was a public transit bus. They were probably seeing how long it took police to respond.Report all suspicious activities to your fusion centerBeware of groups renting halls/schools, and people videotaping the interior during the event.Most non-police incident intell will come in the form of gossip and storiesMake friends with mail carriers, landlords, store clerks, and so on to receive these intell nuggets
72 DelayOne police officer firing from behind effective cover inside a school may hold off a group of attackers for several minutes and save lives by buying time for help to arrive and to let students evacuateAt the first hint of trouble, the school should engage in a three step lock-down modelLockdown is to violence what fire drills are to fireMove away from the violence. Don’t be paralyzed by the event.Move to a pre-selected secure location(s) to wait for policeMove again when in danger. “Lock-down” does not mean hunker down and die.
73 DestroyPolice officers must be fully prepared, mentally and physically, to aggressively use deadly force to stop the threatAct immediately. Every minute the Russians waited, the target got harder.If you hesitate, people will die
74 Infrastructure/personal issues Officers need to be trained to essentially go to war—many are not physically, mentally or emotionally preparedYour ICS capabilities incorporating other agencies will be critical—are you prepared?Your comms capability is critical—is it capable?Inter-agency plans and roles/responsibilities are crucial—are they in place?
76 Getting started - pick ten Concentrate on the ten most likely structures/locations in your jurisdiction or precinctSchoolsBusinessesMunicipal officesShopping districts, malls, theatresVisitor attractionsOutdoor venues: fairs, sporting events, etcAssign an officer to be responsible for each
77 Getting started (2)Initiate a relationship with the facilities manager and top business manager there: CEO, Principal, etc.Develop an active shooter and/or 4/5 Gen takeover plan with themThere are many good active shooter plans out thereIACP, ASIS, NEA, US Dept. of Education, NASRO, Etc.Even Google will return many good plansPick one for a starting point with each of your 10 facilitiesDevelop a custom plan for each with the facilities personnel
78 Stakeholders involved Involve in planning:Primary LE agencyAssisting LE agenciesFire/EMSFacility managementProfessional societies/organizationsEMSHospitalsCrisis resources: Red Cross, etc.Media—don’t forget them!
79 Facility planning issues Once you’ve selected a plan template from an appropriate source and identified representatives from each stakeholder group, you’ll need to develop a specific plan for each of your “top 10” facilities.The following slides are examples of issues that you’ll have to address; this is not an exhaustive list, but simply examples.
80 Facility planning issues (2) Distribute to appropriate personnel:Floor plansKeysFacility personnel lists and telephone numbersUnderstand which suspects are therePeople with recordsSuspicious people you knowProbation involvementIntel from regional intel task forcesInfo shared by other agenciesInfo sharing with facility personal department
81 Facility planning issues (3) People don’t just “snap”Typical active shooter has longstanding histories of involvement with legal, mental health, and/or substance abuse servicesMost of these people will not be murderers, but they form a pre-event suspect pool
82 Facility planning issues (4) Facility personnel rules and regulationsVisitor sign-in and out procedureHow will you know who’s in the building at any time?Physical security and monitoringSuspicious activity reporting mechanismMonitoring of suspended/fired personsEmployee screening: criminal, substance abuse, etc.Counseling services involvementThreat identifications and assessments
83 Facility planning issues (5) Establish crisis team at each facilityEstablish chain of commandEstablish communication chains and mechanismsWho has control over what? Keys, controls, entrances…Involve maintenance staff: sprinklers, plumbing, electrical…Determine evacuation or lockdown decision process and procedures (address disabled persons, too)Establish evacuation holding sites – use safe room?Determine how to take student/employee/visitor inventoryMake up crisis kits: radios, floor plans, student/employee lists, etc
84 Facility planning issues (6) How will first observers communicate the threat? To who?How will the threat be communicated to everyone in the facility? Code words?Lockdown or evacuate? When? How?Consider a kit in each room including color-coded signs with room numbers on them to post under hallway door and outside windows (e.g., red sign means help needed, green sign means no one hurt)Each room should have 2 exits, even if a window
85 Facility planning issues (7) How/when will the facility communicate to family members of people involved? When?Should all doors have locks on them?Have busses respond to evacuate students/building occupants to a reunification/debriefing/counseling areaPlan to shut down streets for emergency vehicle access
86 Lockdown vs. EscapeCurrently, a lockdown is often advocated in an active shooter situation. That is, secure the potential victims in a locked room(s). But if it was you or your child, wouldn’t you want (them) to break a window and get out of the potential kill zone?Consider evacuation and escape as alternatives to lockdown
87 LE recommendations-officers Obtain patrol rifles, ballistic shields, ballistic helmets and other tactical gearGet every officer comfortable with a rifleLearn how to use AK-47 type weaponsTrain to shoot while movingTrain officers inBomb awarenessBasic crowd managementBasic riot controlBallistic shield tacticsTeam firing drills,And other response skills needed for a mass school takedown
88 LE recommendations-officers (2) Make sure every officer is familiar with all of the likely target structure’s interiors in their jurisdiction/precinctIf you are a police parent, consider changing your personal data at the school to something more generic (city employee versus police officer) so that your child won’t be as valuable a hostageEncourage all police officers to always carry a weapon off duty. What if you were off duty visiting your child’s school and you were the only one there to save them?
89 Individual officer response bag Police officers should have a response bag for these eventsMultiple spare rifle and pistol magazinesFloor plans for every structure in their AORLocations of utility shut-offs, HVAC vents, etc.Facility contact numbers, including cell phonesKeysSelf-rescue medical suppliesChemlites to mark IEDsGlass punch (to breach building)Door wedgesBreaching rounds if shotgun carried in cruiserCan be incorporated into a vest with extra ballistic protection
90 LE recommendations-agency Expand active shooter training to include large, complicated, multi-adversary scenarios and exercises with multiple responding agenciesTrain for open-air encounters, not just within a structure. The incident may transition to or include the outdoors.Practice against a booby trapped environmentPractice counter-assault on school buses. Terrorists may hijack several buses and drive them to a schoolSchool Resource Officers will be specifically targeted by terrorists. They will probably be the first casualties. SROs need training in surveillance awareness and the real-life testing tactics of terrorists.
91 LE recommendations-agency (2) Incorporate suicide-bomber shooting drills into firearms training for every police officerTeach effective CQB skills that integrate empty-hands techniques with the firearmMake sure that who makes the “enter” decision and when has been addressed, simulated and trained
92 LE recommendations-agency (3) Get the name and phone number of every private helicopter in your area and coordinate with them ahead of time to deploy in an emergency. News helicopters can be great allies when transporting troops into a siege site in exchange for news footage. Practice landing personnel on flat roofs.Practice frequent incident command training and exercises using multiple jurisdictions and multiple disciplines (EMS, Fire, Police, Public Works, etc)
93 LE recommendations-agency (4) Integrate the fire service into your tactical training. A fire hose can be a “crew-served weapon” at the scene of a terrorist attack. They not only put out fires but they can knock a combatant out of a window 50 yards away.Have a policy for officer parents of hostage children/spouse/etc.Have a plan for a “parent siege” of an attacked schoolHave a plan for handling the media
94 LE recommendations-agency (5) Develop breaching capabilityBarricading/securing facility prior to starting to kill people is a trend with recent shootingsVT shooter chained doors shutWhite lights for weapons are necessary; facility may be darkShotgun breaching rounds in each cruiserFrangible buckshot or slugsOther breaching capability for specific structuresDevelop sniper capability, and ability to get several on scene fastPlan for a siege: ammo, water, first aid, etc.
95 LE recommendations-aftermath Include immediate aftermath planning and training:Treating injuredConsolidating victimsManaging the sceneTraining facility personnel to maintain crime sceneManaging any prisonersProtecting/moving all from additional IEDs and other threatsNotifying victim’s families
96 EMS issues EMS won’t enter an area until it’s secure After you neutralize the shooter, it will still take a long time to secure the facilityDesignate a causality collection point to bring casualties out toUse uninjured subjects (victims, bystanders, etc.) to hold pressure on bleeding victims
97 If you are captured Aggressively escape if you can You will be killed immediately if you don’tYou will be killed eventually anywayThe intelligence you provide will be invaluable
98 Final thought “If not me, who?” That’s the motto of the Russian Special Forces, but it applies to every police officer, and by extension to every public safety official and government executive.
99 Required Reading Terror at Beslan, John Giduck www.terroratbeslan.com The Sling and The Stone, Col Thomas X. Hammes
100 ResourcesPrevention and Response To Suicide Bombing Incidents, New Mexico Tech, Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center,Many incident critical event/active shooter simulation software packages availableRural Law Enforcement Technology Center—several training DVDs/discs,Terrorist Screening Center—information on using the nationwide database of terrorist watch subjects—(866)School Violence Solutions,National Terrorism Center,