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A Festive PhD Lecture Eylon Yogev

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1 A Festive PhD Lecture Eylon Yogev

2 Search Problems: A Cryptographic Perspective

3 Moni

4 Computer Science: A Cryptographic Perspective

5 Computational Complexity
Obfuscation, NP Secret-Sharing: [Komargodski-Moran-Naor-Pass-Rosen-Y14], [Komargodski-Naor-Y15], [Komargodski-Naor-Y16] Adversarial Bloom Filters: [NaorY13], [NaorY15] Computational Complexity Cryptography Cryptography Search Problems Data Structures Distributed Algorithms Ramsey, Local Search, Hashing: [Hubacek-Naor-Y17], [Hubacek-Y17], [Komargodski-Naor-Y17], [Komargodski-Naor-Y18] Secure Distributed Algorithm & Derandomization: [Halevi-Ishai-Jain-Komargodski-Sahai-Y17], [Parter-Y17], [Parter-Y18a], [Parter-Y18b]

6 Reverse Randomization
π΅π‘ƒπ‘ƒβŠ‚ Ξ£ 2 [Lautemann 83] Commitment schemes [Naor 89] ZAPs [Dwork-Naor 00] Perfect Correctness [Dwork-Naor-Reingold 04], [Bitansky-Vaikuntanathan 15] Today: TFNP Hardness [HubÑček-Naor-Y 17]

7 TFNP – Total Function NP [MP91]
NP: easy to verify decision problems FNP: easy to verify search problems Given an instance π‘₯, find a valid witness for π‘₯ TFNP: problems in FNP with guaranteed solution Megiddo- Papadimitriou Try to prune the text, be more succinct e.g., NP: easy to verify decision problems FNP: easy to verify search problems TFNP: search problems in FNP with guaranteed solution FNP coNP NP TFNP P FP

8 TFNP Landscape 𝑻𝑭𝑡𝑷 𝑷𝑷𝑷 𝑷𝑳𝑺 𝑷𝑷𝑨𝑫 Polynomial Pigeonhole Principle
β€œEvery length preserving function either has a collision or a preimage for 0” TFNP Landscape 𝑻𝑭𝑡𝑷 𝑷𝑷𝑷 Local Optimum β€œEvery DAG has a sink” 𝑷𝑳𝑺 𝑷𝑷𝑨𝑫 Nash Equilibrium Brouwer Fixed Points β€œevery directed graph with an unbalanced node must have another” π‘ͺ𝑳𝑺 Continuous Local Optimum [DP11] β€œEvery function has a local optimum”

9 Collision resistant hash / one-way permutation
Hardness Collision resistant hash / one-way permutation [Pap94] 𝑻𝑭𝑡𝑷 𝑷𝑷𝑷 𝑷𝑳𝑺 𝑷𝑷𝑨𝑫 P β‰  NP ? ? Ramsey [KNY17] π‘ͺ𝑳𝑺 Obfuscation/FE [BPR15] Obfuscation/FE [HY17]

10 WHAT IS THE WEAKEST ASSUMPTION UNDER WHICH WE CAN SHOW HARDNESS OF TFNP?

11 Hardness based on P β‰ NP formula πœ™ 𝑻𝑭𝑡𝑷 𝑺𝑨𝑻 solution π‘₯ β‡’NP=coNP

12 Barriers for Proving TFNP Hardness
TFNP hardness from worst-case NP hardness β‡’ NP = coNP [Johnson-Papadimitriou-Yannakakis 88] A randomized reduction from TFNP to NP β‡’ SAT is β€œcheckable” [Mahmoody-Xiao 10] There exists an oracle relative to TFNP is easy and PH is infinite [Buhrman-Fortnow-Koucky-Rogers-Vereshchagin 10] TFNP hardness from one-way functions β‡’ exponentially many solutions [Rosen-Segev-Shahaf 16] Maybe decrease the font size a bit and try to make the each item fit a single line.

13 The Five Worlds of Impagliazzo
Algorithmica: P = NP Heuristica: P β‰  NP but NP is easy-on-average Pessiland: NP is hard-on-average but βˆ„ one-way functions Minicrypt: βˆƒ one-way functions but βˆ„ public-key crypto Cryptomania: βˆƒ public-key cryptography The Five Worlds of Impagliazzo This is a nice slide Obfustopia: βˆƒ indistinguishability obfuscation

14 The Five Worlds of Impagliazzo
Algorithmica: P = NP Heuristica: P β‰  NP but NP is easy-on-average Pessiland: NP is hard-on-average but βˆ„ one-way functions Minicrypt: βˆƒ one-way functions but βˆ„ public-key crypto Cryptomania: βˆƒ public-key cryptography The Five Worlds of Impagliazzo Obfustopia: βˆƒ indistinguishability obfuscation

15 The Five Worlds of Impagliazzo
Algorithmica: P = NP Heuristica: P β‰  NP but NP is easy-on-average Pessiland: NP is hard-on-average but βˆ„ one-way functions Minicrypt: βˆƒ one-way functions but βˆ„ public-key crypto Cryptomania: βˆƒ public-key cryptography The Five Worlds of Impagliazzo Obfustopia: βˆƒ indistinguishability obfuscation

16 TFNP* hardness can be based on any hard-on-average language in NP
Our Results TFNP* hardness can be based on any hard-on-average language in NP For example: planted clique, random SAT, etc. In particular, any one-way function. Our results show: hard-on-average TFNP problems exist in Pessiland (and beyond) * In the non-uniform setting (will elaborate later). No need for case: planted clique, random SAT

17 The Five Worlds of Impagliazzo
Algorithmica: P = NP Heuristica: P β‰  NP but NP is easy-on-average Pessiland: NP is hard-on-average but βˆ„ one-way functions Minicrypt: βˆƒ one-way functions but βˆ„ public-key crypto Cryptomania: βˆƒ public-key cryptography The Five Worlds of Impagliazzo Obfustopia: βˆƒ indistinguishability obfuscation

18 The Five Worlds of Impagliazzo
Algorithmica: P = NP Heuristica: P β‰  NP but NP is easy-on-average Pessiland: NP is hard-on-average but βˆ„ one-way functions Minicrypt: βˆƒ one-way functions but βˆ„ public-key crypto Cryptomania: βˆƒ public-key cryptography The Five Worlds of Impagliazzo TFNP Hardness Obfustopia: βˆƒ indistinguishability obfuscation

19 Proof Let πΏβˆˆπ‘π‘ƒ be a hard-on-average language with distribution D {0,1}n D Not in TFNP 𝐿 Search Problem: given π‘₯← D find 𝑀 s.t. π‘₯,𝑀 ∈𝐿 π‘₯

20 Reverse Randomization
𝐿 𝑠 : π‘₯∈ 𝐿 𝑠 ⇔ π‘₯βŠ•π‘ βˆˆπΏ {0,1}n D 𝐿 𝑠 Distributed according to D Random shift of D Not a hard distribution 𝐿 Search Problem: given π‘₯← D find w s.t. π‘₯,𝑀 ∈𝐿 OR π‘₯βŠ•π‘ ,𝑀 ∈𝐿 π‘₯

21 Proof 𝐿’: rβˆˆπΏβ€² ⇔ D π‘Ÿ ∈𝐿 {0,1}m D {0,1}n 𝐿’ 𝐿 π‘Ÿ π‘₯

22 U Proof 𝐿’: rβˆˆπΏβ€² ⇔ D π‘Ÿ ∈𝐿 {0,1}m π‘Ÿ 𝐿’ π‘Ÿ
Search Problem: given π‘Ÿβ†U find 𝑀 such that (D r ,w)∈𝐿 𝐿’ π‘Ÿ The same as for curly D and normal D goes also for curly U and normal U.

23 U Proof 𝐿 𝑠 β€² : π‘Ÿβˆˆ 𝐿 𝑠 β€² ⇔𝐷 π‘ŸβŠ•π‘  ∈𝐿 {0,1}m π‘Ÿ 𝐿’ π‘Ÿ L 𝑠 β€²
Search Problem: given π‘Ÿβ†U find w such that (D r ,w)∈𝐿 OR (D rβŠ•π‘  ,w)∈𝐿 𝐿’ π‘Ÿ L 𝑠 β€² Typo: L’_i in the bullet point

24 U proof 𝐿 𝑠 𝑖 β€² : π‘Ÿβˆˆ 𝐿 𝑠 𝑖 β€² ⇔𝐷 π‘ŸβŠ• 𝑠 𝑖 ∈𝐿 {0,1}m π‘Ÿ 𝐿’ π‘Ÿ L s 1 β€²
𝐿 𝑠 𝑖 β€² : π‘Ÿβˆˆ 𝐿 𝑠 𝑖 β€² ⇔𝐷 π‘ŸβŠ• 𝑠 𝑖 ∈𝐿 {0,1}m U π‘Ÿ Search Problem: given π‘Ÿβ†U find w such that (D rβŠ• 𝑠 𝑖 ,w)∈𝐿 for some i 𝐿’ π‘Ÿ L s 1 β€² Typos: L’_i in the bullet point and L’_{s_1} in the picture

25 U proof 𝐿 𝑠 𝑖 β€² : π‘Ÿβˆˆ 𝐿 𝑠 𝑖 β€² ⇔𝐷 π‘ŸβŠ• 𝑠 𝑖 ∈𝐿 {0,1}m r L’ r L s 1 β€²
𝐿 𝑠 𝑖 β€² : π‘Ÿβˆˆ 𝐿 𝑠 𝑖 β€² ⇔𝐷 π‘ŸβŠ• 𝑠 𝑖 ∈𝐿 {0,1}m U r Search Problem: given π‘Ÿβ†U find w such that (D rβŠ• 𝑠 𝑖 ,w)∈𝐿 for some i L’ r L s 1 β€² Hard distribution?

26 Is this a Hard Distribution?
The instance is the random coins of the distribution Can we learn anything from the random coins about the solution? Think of the planted clique vs. random SAT We need the distribution to be a β€œpublic-coin” distribution Do such distributions necessarily exist? Theorem: There exists a reduction from private-coin to public-coin [Impagliazzo-Levin 90] Proof goes through universal one-way hash function

27 Finding a Good Shift A random set 𝑠1,…,π‘ π‘˜ satisfies that 𝐿′ 𝑠 1 ,…, 𝑠 π‘˜ is hard for U Can we find 𝑠1,…,π‘ π‘˜ deterministically? Solution #1: hard-wire them non-uniformly β‡’ A hard problem in (non-uniform) TFNP Solution #2: use derandomization (Nisan-Wigderson PRG) β‡’ A hard problem in TFNP assuming NW-PRG

28 Nisan-Wigderson Pseudorandom Generator
Assume a hard function exists βˆƒ f ∈ E that has Ξ  2 -circuit complexity 2 𝑂(𝑛) Exists pseudorandom generator Against Ξ  2 -circuits We can derandomize Combine all shifts to one good shift

29 Collision resistant hash / one-way permutation
Hardness Collision resistant hash / one-way permutation [Pap94] 𝑻𝑭𝑡𝑷 𝑷𝑷𝑷 𝑷𝑳𝑺 𝑷𝑷𝑨𝑫 P β‰  NP ? ? Ramsey [KNY17] π‘ͺ𝑳𝑺 Obfuscation/FE [BPR15] Obfuscation/FE [HY17]

30 Collision resistant hash / one-way permutation
Hardness Collision resistant hash / one-way permutation [Pap94] 𝑻𝑭𝑡𝑷 𝑷𝑷𝑷 𝑷𝑳𝑺 𝑷𝑷𝑨𝑫 NP is hard-on-average ? Ramsey [KNY17] π‘ͺ𝑳𝑺 Obfuscation/FE [BPR15] Obfuscation/FE [HY17]

31 The succinct Black-Box Model

32 ? Models of Computation 𝒙 The Black-Box Model 𝒇 𝒇(𝒙)
Complexity: # of queries The White-Box Model 𝒇 ? Complexity: Running time as a function of 𝑓

33 Models of Computation 𝒙 The Black-Box Model 𝒇 𝒇(𝒙) The White-Box Model
Complexity: # of queries The White-Box Model 𝒙 The Succinct Black-Box Model 𝒇 𝒇 𝒇(𝒙) Complexity: Running time as a function of 𝑓 Complexity: # of queries as a function of |𝒇|

34 The Succinct Black-Box Model
The algorithm is given oracle (black-box) query access to the function. Complexity as a function of the size of 𝑓. poly-size representation => poly-many queries. 𝒙 Example: point functions 𝑓 π‘Ž : 0,1 𝑛 β†’{0,1} where 𝑓 π‘Ž π‘₯ =1 iff π‘₯=π‘Ž and 0 otherwise. Representation size is 𝑛. 𝒇 𝒇(𝒙) Fact: finding π‘Ž takes ~2 𝑛 many queries for any algorithm. The promise that 𝒂 exists does not help the algorithm!

35 The Succinct Black-Box Model
The algorithm is given oracle (black-box) query access to the function. Theorem: For any problem in TFNP if: 1. Representation size: 𝑠 2. Solution size: π‘˜ Then: a solution can be found within 𝑂(π‘ β‹…π‘˜) queries. 𝒙 𝒇 𝒇(𝒙) Explains why all black-box lower bounds require huge oracles Incorrect outside TFNP Example: point function

36 Can shave log(π‘˜) factor by querying on very biased columns.
The Succinct Black-Box Model Theorem: representation is 𝑠 bits, a solution is of size π‘˜ then a solution can be found within 𝑂(π‘ β‹…π‘˜) queries. 𝒙 𝟐 𝒏 … 𝒙 πŸ‘ 𝒙 𝟐 𝒙 𝟏 1 𝑓 1 𝑓 2 𝑓 3 𝑓 2 𝑠 Proof: 𝐿 := all possible functions of size 𝑠. Repeat: 𝑓 βˆ— π‘₯ = Maj π‘“βˆˆπΏ 𝑓(π‘₯) Solve 𝑓 βˆ— ==> 𝑣 1 ,…, 𝑣 π‘˜ . Query on 𝑣 1 ,…, 𝑣 π‘˜ . If consistent, output 𝑣 1 ,…, 𝑣 π‘˜ . Remove from 𝐿 all inconsistent 𝑓’s. Main point: At every iteration we either find a solution or remove half of the rows. Can shave log(π‘˜) factor by querying on very biased columns. 𝟏 … 𝟎 𝒇 βˆ—

37 Collision resistant hash / one-way permutation
𝑻𝑭𝑡𝑷 𝑷𝑷𝑷 𝑷𝑳𝑺 𝑷𝑷𝑨𝑫 NP is hard-on-average ? Ramsey π‘ͺ𝑳𝑺 Obfuscation/FE Obfuscation/FE


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