1. Intervening in Protracted Ethnic Conflict
Dr. Jared O. Bell, Assistant Professor of International Relations & Public Administration
Faculty of Business and Administration
International University of Sarajevo

2. Ethnic Conflict Intervention
What might be some ways that we can intervene in ethnic conflicts?
Ethnic Conflict Intervention

3. Third party intervention and mediation
Third party intervention and mediation is often needed to break a deadlock. Third party changes conflict structure and allows different pattern of communication.
Post-Cold War broadening in scope of third party interventions. Much wider view of timing of intervention. Bottom-up processes and roles of internal third parties and indigenous peacemakers now seen as more significant too.

4. Third party intervention and mediation
Third party intervention and mediation is often needed to break a deadlock. Third party changes conflict structure and allows different pattern of communication.
Post-Cold War broadening in scope of third party interventions. Much wider view of timing of intervention. Bottom-up processes and roles of internal third parties and indigenous peacemakers now seen as more significant too.

5. Levels (“Tracks”) of intervention and mediation
Track I: governmental or inter-governmental representatives. Negotiation, peacekeeping, arbitration, “mediation with muscle”. (UN, international and regional organisations, governments, international financial institutions.)
Track II: unofficial mediators. Conciliation, problem-solving, mediation. (International NGOs, churches, academics, private business.)
Track III: building social cohesion and common ground. (Grassroots, indigenous resources and local actors.)

6. The two-step approach to ethnic conflict resolution
Establishing preconditions for effective intergroup dialogue and negotiations (through Track 1 or Track 2 procedures);
the negotiation of specific constitutional and other arrangements to reach a conflict settlement.
Each of these steps faces its own challenges.

7. Questions of “ripeness”
Zartman: some political, social and economic moments are “ripe” for negotiation and dialogue and a move from violence to non-violence; others are not:
“Parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so – when alternative, usually unilateral, means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament. At that ripe moment, they grab onto proposals that usually have been in the air for a long time and that only now appear attractive” (Zartman 2002: 19).
This moment of ripeness is determined by the contending parties’ perception of a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS), involving both objective evidence and subjective perception.

8. Essential criteria for a successful peace accord
The protagonists are willing to negotiate in good faith;
the key actors are included in the process;
the negotiations address the central issues in dispute;
force is not used to achieve objectives;
negotiators are committed to a sustained process.
Darby and MacGinty 2000

9. Why should external actors care?
Because of:
their own hegemonic ambitions;
concerns for regional stability;
sympathy for oppressed groups [or oppressors??];
sense of international responsibility;
humanitarianism (Cooper and Berdal 1993 cited in Rothchild and Lake 1998: 217).

10. International intervention as a problem
External actors can be driven by belligerent motives (cp. Gurr 2000);
if external actors are biased or lack commitment to enforce conflict settlements, they can exacerbate rather than resolve conflict (Rothchild and Lake 1998);
where external actors aim to rush peace negotiations or avoid difficult issues, the conflict is likely to recur (Barnes 2009);
peace processes that neglect the conditions or interests of local communities increase dependence on external guarantees for peace (Darby and MacGinty 2002).

11. International intervention as a problem
External actors can be driven by belligerent motives (cp. Gurr 2000);
if external actors are biased or lack commitment to enforce conflict settlements, they can exacerbate rather than resolve conflict (Rothchild and Lake 1998);
where external actors aim to rush peace negotiations or avoid difficult issues, the conflict is likely to recur (Barnes 2009);
peace processes that neglect the conditions or interests of local communities increase dependence on external guarantees for peace (Darby and MacGinty 2002).

12. Dilemmas of international intervention (for the intervening party)
The need to engage in confidence-building vs. efforts to punish particular groups;
the politicisation of international intervention;
information failures;
problems of regional or global organisations to agree on a course of action
When to intervene and how